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Abstract 
Millions of people worldwide work outside the law as street vendors in order 
to earn a living. However, they often work in fear of police evictions and 
confiscations since their work is in many places considered illegal. In this 
context, formalization (steps towards legalization) is often portrayed as a 
model for empowerment that allows poor street vendors to improve their 
well-being. Formalization, as a model to manage street vending, is widely 
promoted by various international development organizations. While 
important, studies of formalization show that street vendors often resist state 
control, and the majority continues to work outside the law. 
The main research question guiding this study is: how does formalization of 
street vendors in Bogotá enable and/or hinder their well-being? To examine 
this question, this study uses an ethnographic approach and the concept of 
social control within the tradition of sociology of law. The data for this study 
was collected through ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 
2014 in the city of Bogotá, Colombia. Three groups were studied: vendors 
within the transitional zones (a formalization program), two rickshaw driver 
associations, and itinerant ice cream vendors.  
The main findings illustrate that although street vendors work outside the 
law, they do not operate in a state of chaos or anarchy. Quite the opposite, 
law and other forms of social control are present in their work. These 
practices of control often affect their well-being. Despite harsh working 
conditions, well-being according to them means more than economic 
survival, and often, street vendors strive to improve their lives and gain 
independence in their work.  
Another finding is that formalization is often directed toward the more 
established vendors and does not account for the fact that new individuals 
arrive on the streets every day trying to make a living. Often, the most 
vulnerable groups (immigrants, women, the newly unemployed) lack the time 
and knowledge to formalize or simply are not targeted in formalization 
programs. Without a deep understanding of how social control already 
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operates, the state runs the risk of developing formalization initiatives that 
undermine the well-being of the most vulnerable groups. Thus, this study of 
everyday forms of social control provides empirically based insights into the 
ways law influences the lives of those working outside the law. 
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Resumen 
Un gran número de personas en el mundo trabajan en actividades no 
reguladas en la ley, tal es el caso de los vendedores ambulantes, los cuales se 
dedican al comercio informal con el fin de ganarse la vida. Las personas 
dedicadas a este tipo de actividades viven frecuentemente en condiciones de 
incertidumbre y de miedo, pues carecen de una licencia para operar; esto 
conlleva a constantes desalojos e incluso la confiscación de su mercancía por 
parte de la policía. La formalización de los vendedores ambulantes se ha 
vislumbrado como un modelo que permite mejorar su bienestar y ha sido 
ampliamente promovido por varias organizaciones internacionales de 
desarrollo, tales como el Banco Mundial, las Naciones Unidas y la 
Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Sin embargo estudios sobre 
formalización evidencian la resistencia por parte de los vendedores 
ambulantes a un control formal y en la mayoría de casos continúan 
desarrollando sus actividades sin regulación legal alguna.  
El presente estudio se plantea la siguiente pregunta de investigación: ¿cómo 
la formalización (pasos para la legalización) de los vendedores ambulantes en 
Bogotá posibilita y/o impide su bienestar? Para responder esta pregunta se 
utiliza un enfoque etnográfico y el concepto de control social basado en la 
tradición de la sociología del derecho. Los datos utilizados en el presente 
estudio fueron recogidos a través de trabajo de campo etnográfico realizado 
entre 2012 y 2014 en Bogotá, Colombia. Tres grupos fueron estudiados: los 
vendedores dentro de las zonas de transición (un programa de formalización), 
dos asociaciones de bicitaxistas, y los vendedores ambulantes dedicados al 
comercio de helados.  
Los resultados de esta investigación muestran que, a pesar de la informalidad 
en la que trabajan los vendedores ambulantes, estos no operan en un estado 
de caos o anarquía, por el contrario, la ley y otras formas de control social 
están presentes en su trabajo, aunque muchas veces estas mismas sean la 
causa la incertidumbre y de miedo en su quehacer diario. A pesar de estas 
condiciones, los trabajadores informales se esfuerzan por mejorar su calidad 
12 
de vida y lograr mayor independencia, incentivados por su idea de bienestar, 
la cual va mucho mas allá de la simple supervivencia económica.  
Otro hallazgo es en relación con la formalización, la cual se dirige hacia los 
proveedores más establecidos y no tiene en cuenta el hecho de que nuevos 
individuos llegan a las calles todos los días buscando nuevas opciones para 
ganarse la vida. Tal es el caso de los inmigrantes, las mujeres, los nuevos 
desempleados, y en general los grupos más vulnerables, los cuales carecen de 
tiempo y conocimiento para formalizar su actividad o simplemente los 
programas de formalización no están en la práctica dirigidos hacia estos 
grupos.  
Sin una profunda comprensión de como opera el control social en la vida 
cotidiana de los vendedores ambulantes, las reformas legales corren el riesgo 
de implementar iniciativas de formalización que atentan contra el bienestar 
de los grupos más vulnerables de la sociedad. Por lo tanto, este studio, de las 
formas cotidianas de control social, proporciona una visión que está basada 
en la investigación empírica sobre las formas en las que el derecho influye en 
la vida de las personas que trabajan por fuera del marco legal. 
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1. Introduction 
Soon it will be six in the morning, and the sun is already rising on the 
horizon, covering the city skyline in a warm golden colour, while down in the 
streets people are rushing to work and buses and the roads are already 
packed. Here at one of the city’s main bus stations, rickshaw drivers pedal 
faster to bring people from the barrios to the station, and vendors offer all 
kinds of breakfast food for people rushing to work. The mornings in the city 
are cold, and people like me stop to buy aromatica, a sweet herbal and fruit 
tea, before jumping on to the bus. The vendor was Maria, a 69 year old 
woman that talked proudly about her job. Maria said:  
I don’t like to depend on others for my needs. You may think that I am an old 
woman, but I am still strong. I have worked my entire life. When I was a child 
I helped my parents on the farm, and when I came to Bogotá I worked 
cleaning houses. Now I am too old for that work, but I can still do other 
things. But don’t get me wrong, I mean, work on the streets is hard. You can’t 
really trust anyone around here and when the police come we all have to run 
away. I don’t understand what we do wrong, I mean the only thing I do here is 
earn money for my food, else, how does the mayor want me to survive? (Field 
notes based on interview from 24
th
 of June 2013)  
Most street vendors in the world operate outside the law (ILO 2013, 47; ILO 
2002, 49). While their irregular status and the challenges they post to urban 
order and public space control have been largely discussed (Chen 2007, 10), 
we know less about the conditions of their everyday work (Saha 2011). 
Particularly how local laws influence their well-being. I met Maria on one of 
my first visits to Portal de las Americas, a big bus station that is part of the 
rapid transit system of Bogotá known as Transmilenio. Just like Maria, men 
and women of all ages work in the city’s streets in small businesses to earn a 
basic livelihood. Yet they work under harsh working conditions, competition 
for costumer is at the heart of their everyday struggle, and on top of that 
police harassment is a permanent threat. 
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Growing up in Colombia, street vendors were not a new phenomenon for me; 
rather, I was a regular costumer of vendors and rickshaw drivers. I was also 
used to seeing, once in a while, the police arriving and people in the streets 
running away. I observed how street vendors have become resilient to police 
harassment, and often vendors returned to the same places after the police 
left. Yet, as Maria explained, vendors often work in fear of losing their 
products in a police raid, and the authorities see them as a source of urban 
congestion, dirt and chaos.  
Street vendors are not only typical of Colombia but are also present in other 
places. Street vendors are one of the most visible occupations in the informal 
economy, which includes about “one half to three-quarters of non-
agricultural employment in developing countries” (ILO 2002, 7). The streets 
are places where potentially vulnerable groups can earn an income, because 
they can start small businesses without the need for big capital or a fixed 
place (Bromley 2000, 5).  
However, street vendors live under constant fear of eviction because most of 
them work without a legal permit or license (Anjaria 2009, 2140; Bhowmik 
2005; Saha 2009, 312). The visibility of their work exposes them to police 
harassment, and consequently they can lose their businesses to confiscations 
or evictions (Bhowmik 2010, 15; Chen 2012, 19). 
Since they work outside the law, formalization, understood as a legal permit 
to develop previously non-compliant businesses, has been the main policy 
response to street vendors (De Soto 1989; Ferragut and Gómez 2013; 
Gandolfo 2013). Formalization can include, among other things, the 
regulation of licenses, markets, or zones that enable street vendors to work 
within the law. Formalization is often portrayed as a tool of empowerment, 
that allows the poor to improve their well-being (CLEP 2008a) and is 
promoted by different international organizations such as the World Bank, 
the United Nations and the International Labour Organization (Banik 2011). 
While important, formalization is often rejected by people working in the 
streets, and the majority continues to work outside the law (Nchito 2011, 87; 
Faundez 2009, 168; Gandolfo 2013). In the meantime, street vendors 
continue to experience different risks and insecurities in the workplace, and 
in many cases are not covered by basic social protection, such as health 
insurance, maternal leave or pension insurance (Saha 2011, 312; Tokman 
2007, 18). 
15 
While formalization is seen as the solution, different studies have critically 
shown that one of the main issues of regulation of street vendors is the 
recovery of public space (Adaawen and Jorgensen 2012, 83; Donovan 2008; 
Hunt 2009, 341). In this regard, police authorities and local governments 
have played a crucial role in the control of street vendors (Peña 2000; Roever 
2005a, 16; Yatmo 2008). Additionally, formalization is criticized for leaving 
unattended people’s working conditions and focusing exclusively on the 
recovery of public space (Adaawen and Jorgensen 2012, 83). Moreover, and 
although it has been studied less, a number of scholars have shown that 
police control is often resisted by people engaged in street vending who run 
away or move around in order to escape evictions (Meneses-Reyes 2013, 
335; Vargas and Urinboyev 2015).  
Apart from police control and formalization programs, street vendors 
experience other forms of social control. According to Peña, vendors often 
depend on networks, family ties, associations, and mafias to gain access to 
the most profitable corners on the streets (Peña 2000, 54). 
There is a great interest to formalize street vendors and empty public spaces 
(Adaawen and Jorgensen 2012, 83; Donovan 2008; Hunt 2009, 341), while 
little attention is paid to the ways in which law operates in everyday life, and 
the multiple practices that control and affect their working conditions and 
livelihoods. The experiences and voices of people engaged in street vending 
are often absent from a debate in which legal regulation and urban 
development is often the central issue (Chen 2007, 4). Subsequently, policies 
and legal reforms towards vendors are often ignored or resisted at the local 
level (Nchito 2011, 91; Meneses-Reyes 2013, 350; Vargas and Urinboyev 
2015).  
This thesis is an ethnographic study of street vendors in Bogotá. I use the 
term street businesses or street vendors to refer to people selling goods or 
providing services in public spaces. I include two groups: vendors and 
rickshaw drivers. The common element to these two groups is the use of 
public spaces to conduct small businesses, and their similar experiences of 
harassment and state control.
1
 
 
                                                     
1 The street vendors I met often use the words harassment or bothering to refer to the acts of 
the police stopping or aggressively asking them to leave the streets. The term police 
harassment has also been used in the literature on street vendors see (Bhowmik 2005; 
Austin 1993). 
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Why the streets of Bogotá? An important element of ethnographic research is 
the need to spend a period of time in a specific place (Madison 2011). 
Although street businesses are a common phenomenon in many cities in 
Colombia and around the world (Bromley 2000, 1), I selected Bogotá as a 
case study that can illustrate both the common issues of formalization and 
public space control, as well as the different, contextual experiences 
(Donovan 2008). Street vendors are a considerable group and estimates 
indicate that there are more than 100,000 people working in public spaces in 
Bogotá (DANE 2003). Additionally, having lived in the city of Bogotá 
facilitated my entry to the field, which is essential in ethnography (Angrosino 
2007). However, I tried to keep an external view of the group I was studying 
through discussions about my findings at my universities. Since one of the 
main advantages of ethnography is the possibility to explore people’s 
experiences in the natural context where they occur and in more spontaneous 
ways (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 4), the selection of a specific city was 
essential for this study. In this regard, the streets of Bogotá provided a setting 
that was available to me as a researcher, as well as representing a case that 
could contribute to the broader debate surrounding the working conditions of 
people in the informal economy.  
Thus, I have used ethnography to explore how street vendors experience 
social control at work, and how these different practices of social control 
influence their well-being. Work plays a central role in human life (Loscocco 
and Spitze 1990, 313), and therefore, having good working conditions 
influences our lives and well-being. The working conditions (the physical 
and psychological environment) of street vendors are heard through the 
voices of the people I met, and their opinions, experiences and feelings at 
work are expressed through this thesis.  
This introductory chapter explains my position as researcher and situates my 
study in the relevant literature on the informal economy, urban studies and 
well-being. Furthermore, I present the aim and research questions guiding 
this thesis, and the scope.  
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Why Street Vendors? 
There is a popular proverb in my country that says something like “Us 
Colombians don’t have to starve since we can always start a small business 
on a street corner.” From my readings, as well as meetings with scholars from 
other countries, I realized this proverb illustrates the role of street vending for 
economic survival not only in Colombia but also in many other places. 
People asked me, why street vendors? And why was I studying the lives of 
people making a livelihood in the street? And the short and simple answer to 
this question is the contradiction I felt when living in Bogotá, a city like 
many others growing with the desire to catch up with the world class cities of 
Europe and the United States, but where, as part of this goal, people earning a 
livelihood in the streets are forcibly evicted and pushed away. Yes, it is true 
that the most commercial areas of the city are crowded with street vendors 
and rickshaw drivers; yet the idea of cleaning up urban places from people in 
need of an income to survive seemed outrageous to me, in a country like 
Colombia, where poverty and unemployment are common. Street vendors 
operate from Monday to Monday, day and night, they are young and old, 
wheelchair-bound, women with small children in the hot sun or rain, and on 
top of that they must run away with their goods every time the police feel like 
raiding them. Yet, most of the political debate, at least between 1995 to 2008, 
prioritized the issue of public space over the needs of people working in the 
streets (Parra 2009; Donovan 2008).  
I felt that the debate, at least in Bogotá, was too centered on recovering 
public space, and the policies towards street vendors’ quality of life, working 
conditions and well-being were secondary, or absent. The issues concerning 
lack of police control of street vendors were often in the news and continue to 
be a central issue in public opinion (El Tiempo 2015a; El Tiempo 2015b; 
Semana 2014). While some projects were initiated and the city built different 
re-location malls, the majority of vendors continued to work outside the law 
(Contraloria Distrital 2012; Donovan 2008, 45). According to the auditing 
office of the city almost half of the relocation places for street vendors are 
abandoned (Contraloria Distrital 2012). As Donovan explains, most of the 
time relocation spaces are abandoned because vendors could not sell as much 
as previously, and even when relocation was successful it was not enough to 
clear public space, because new vendors occupied the old spaces that were 
recovered (2008, 45). I started to think that people talking about street 
vendors had not spent enough time in the streets and that the government 
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obsession with public space recovery was blind to the needs of this group of 
workers.  
My interest in street vendors was sharpened in Sweden during a lecture on 
development and poverty reduction. Sitting at the back of the auditorium, I 
listened to a professor from the university presenting, with great enthusiasm, 
the results of the United Nations Commission on Legal Empowerment of the 
Poor. Being a lawyer myself, I was curious to see how law could actually 
help people in poverty. However, this presentation ended with a very 
dissatisfactory statement: people living in poverty needed the rule of law, 
said the professor, and received much applause from the auditorium. I 
wondered why people struggling to survive in this economic system needed 
the rule of law (referring to business rights) rather than education, health 
care, and other kinds of welfare. Law was acting, not to empower people 
working in street businesses, but instead to criminalize their work, if it 
worked at all. I felt the international debate on poverty reduction was lacking 
a workers’ rights perspective, and that people involved in development were 
not aware of what the needs of people living in poverty were.  
This feeling of dissatisfaction concerning how poverty and development are 
treated in many academic circles in Europe and North America triggered my 
interest in what was happening in the world, particularly with regards to 
people working in street businesses. For some reason, there was a lot of talk 
about poverty reduction and empowerment, but I could not find much about 
the lack of welfare and protection for workers in the informal economy. Soon 
I realized that what was happening in Colombia was not unique to my 
country, and I would read how street vendors were harassed and criminalized 
in many places in the world. Forceful evictions and the destruction of their 
livelihoods were common in various cities, and earning a livelihood in the 
street was not compatible with models of urban development. While I was a 
lecturer at the Swedish International Centre for Local Development, I also 
met different groups of urban planners from East Africa attending my 
lectures, and they constantly asked me how they were supposed to deal with 
the problem of street vendors. They were aware of high poverty levels in 
their cities, yet they were mostly preoccupied with the issues of public space 
order, how to collect taxes and the beautification of their cities. Although 
important, those issues obscured the possibility of broadening the debate and 
include the experiences of people working in street vending.  
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The more I read about street vendors, the more I realized that the overarching 
issue was how to eradicate them and empty public spaces. Little attention was 
paid to how to protect their right to work and their working conditions. They 
were not considered workers but merely as invaders of public space. 
Government officials often argued about the need to formalize street vendors 
and move them into specific market places. As I will show in the following 
review of the literature, in cities of Africa, Latin America and in Asia it was 
hard to find a place in which evictions and public space recovery were not 
part of the urban development model. Not to mention, in Europe and North 
America, this cleaning of the streets was taken for granted, and the few that 
risked going to the streets, most of them immigrants with an irregular legal 
status, often faced strong police control (Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989). 
In many cities, governments were actively pursuing the eradication of street 
vendors, while the news reported devastating consequences for the urban 
poor, including economic losses, but also brutal human rights violations, 
arrests, and violence. Seeing this discouraging panorama, I was intrigued by 
the resilience of street vendors as well as the emergence of a social 
movement that claimed the right to work in the streets (Chen 2001, 80).  
Thus inspired by the idea that street vendors and rickshaw driver need more 
than legal formalization in order to improve their lives, I conducted my first 
field trip to the city of Bogotá and studied one of the formalization programs 
for street vendors in the city, the transitional zones. However, after this first 
trip it was clear that the use of formal/informal labels was not adequate for 
studying street vendors that there was informality within the transitional 
zones and, similarly, many structured organizations were present in the 
streets. State formalization was a form of control among many others. Based 
in my interest in the relations between law and society, the concept of social 
control became an analytical tool that helped me make sense of what was 
happening among street vendors. The fieldwork I conducted in Bogotá 
showed me how different social control practices played a role in the 
hardships or well-being of street vendors. 
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Previous Studies 
There is a wide array of academic studies that look into the phenomenon of 
street businesses, predominantly in disciplines such as economics, gender 
studies, urban geography, anthropology, sociology, development studies and 
urban planning. The most studied occupation among street businesses is 
vendors of goods (Austin 1993; Bhowmik 2005; Bromley 2000, 2; Cross and 
Peña 1999), although there are relevant studies on rickshaw drivers (Begum 
and Sen 2004; Fung 2005; Mani, Pai, and Aggarwal 2012), shoe-shiners 
(Elkan, Ryan, and Mukui 1982), and waste picketers (Aparcana and Salhofer 
2013; Nguyen et al. 2004).  
Three areas of the literature are of special relevance to my thesis. First, the 
literature on the informal economy that has been developed within the field 
of sociology and economics. This literature situates street vendors as one of 
the occupational groups of informal workers, and discusses the reasons why 
people work outside the law. Within this literature, special attention is paid to 
the use of formalization programs as a way to promote micro-economic 
development and poverty reduction, and is of great relevance to this study. 
The second field of interest includes various urban studies in disciplines such 
as sociology, urban planning and geography. The studies I present here are 
concerned with regulation of public space and urban development. Following 
that, I present the less explored literature on social movements and the 
relations to social capital and organization. Finally, although there is less 
research on the working conditions of street vendors, I present some of the 
studies that have dealt with the problems of working conditions and social 
protection for informal workers.  
Literature on the Informal Economy 
Research on street vendors takes place within the wider debate on the 
informal economy (Bromley 2000; Castells and Portes 1989; Centeno and 
Portes 2006; Chen 2012; Godfrey 2011; Maloney 2004). Within this debate, 
street vendors represent one of the most visible groups (Bhowmik 2010, 12). 
This literature is useful to understand the socio-economic context in which 
the discussion on informal workers has been placed, as well as the various 
explanations that scholars have given for why people work outside the law.  
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The first thing one realizes when reading about street vending is that this is a 
worldwide phenomenon (Bromley 2000). If you have been in Latin America, 
Asia or Africa, you have probably already seen thousands of fruit or 
vegetable vendors, rickshaws or tuk-tuk drivers, and you may have bought 
food, freshly cooked on the streets. Street vending exists in many places, 
even in the cities of Europe or North America, although the streets there are 
more controlled (Gerxhani 2004; L’Hote and Gasta 2007). Street vendors are 
often part of the so called informal economy, because they develop their 
businesses without complying with municipal laws that require them to 
obtain a license, or simply prohibit them from operating in public spaces 
(Anjaria 2009, 2140; Bhowmik 2005; Saha 2009, 312). Street vendors are 
considered informal workers, which “comprises one half to three-quarters of 
non-agricultural employment in developing countries: specifically, 48 percent 
of non-agricultural employment in North Africa; 51 per cent in Latin 
America; 65 percent in Asia; and 72 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa” (ILO 
2002b, 7).  
In Latin America informal employment outside agricultural employment 
ranges from 40 per cent in Uruguay and 75 per cent in Bolivia (ILO 2014a, 
xi). Among informal workers, street vendors are considered a representative 
group and estimates indicate that they represent 11 per cent of total urban 
employment in India and 15 per cent in South Africa (ILO 2014a, 47). In the 
case of rickshaw drivers, there are statistics for places where they are a 
considerable phenomenon, such as Bangladesh, where estimates indicate that 
more than 750,000 rickshaws operate (Gallagher 1992).  
The work of people in street business is characterized in the literature on the 
informal economy as an option for people that have not attained higher 
education or training, but nevertheless have some entrepreneurial skills 
(Bromley 2000). Street vending often require long working hours in order to 
meet their income needs and involve hazardous working conditions due to 
their exposure to poor weather, pollution and insecurity (Chen 2005, 18). 
While both women and men work in street businesses, some occupations, 
such as food vending, are predominately composed of women (ILO 2013), 
while rickshaw drivers are mostly men (Begum and Sen 2004). Minors are 
also employed in street vending (Hindman 2009), as well as people with 
disabilities or of retirement age.  
The debate surrounding the informal economy is very controversial, and there 
seems to be no single answer that explains why it is growing in many places 
in the world. However, the most common explanations for why people work 
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informally include lack of jobs in the formal economy (dualist theory), the 
need for cheaper goods and labor (structural theory), a way to avoid rental 
fees and taxes (voluntarist theory), the result of too many complicated rules 
(legalist theory), or the result of colonial structures that failed to recognized 
the practices of the people they invaded (colonialist theory).  
The proliferation of economic activities in the streets is often explained as a 
result of lack of jobs in the formal economy (dualist-theory). Williams and 
Gurtoo explain how street vendors are often seen as residue from pre-modern 
economies that should disappear when modernization and industrialization 
takes place (2012). In this regard, the ”dualist theory” considers that there are 
two separate ways of carrying out an economic activity: formal and informal. 
Under this dichotomy, the informal economy is the result of a lack of 
opportunities in the formal economy, high unemployment, and economic 
recession (Hart 1973; Sethuraman 1976, 70). According to the dualists, 
governments should promote economic growth and industrialization in order 
to stop the increase of the informal economy. While this is one of the oldest 
explanation, a recent book by Mike Davis dedicates a chapter to exploring the 
issues of urban informal workers he calls “a surplus humanity” (2006). In his 
book, Planet of Slums, Davis describes all the workers living in lower income 
neighbourhoods as people who cannot find a job within the formal system 
and thus are left to fight for their own survival.  
While the studies developed in the 1970s brought up the relevance of the 
informal economy for many countries in the world, they were soon criticized 
because they failed to recognize the important links between the formal and 
informal sector. According to Portes & Castells (1989, 11) and Moser (1978, 
1041), the informal economy serves the function of providing cheap goods 
and cheap labor, which benefits capitalist growth, thus contributing to the 
formal economy in multiple ways. This approach, known as the ”structuralist 
theory”, assumes that both informal and formal economies exist in relation to 
each other. In this regard, one of the first to point out this relation was 
Caroline Moser, who elucidated how the informal economy was subordinate 
to the capitalist system of production, and that the reason why some forms of 
informality were tolerated was that they served accumulation, perpetuating 
the exploitation of disadvantaged groups (1978, 1041).  
More recently, the work of people in the informal economy has revolved 
around the issues of entrepreneurialism. While both dualists and structuralism 
considered informal workers as actors with no other choice than informality, 
a new set of literature appeared at the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s 
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that presented them as creative entrepreneurs (De Soto 1989; Kucera and 
Roncolato 2008; Maloney 2004). Among these groups of thinkers, two sides 
arose: those who saw informal entrepreneurs as rational economic agents 
trying to avoid taxes and fees, and those who saw them as victims of the 
cumbersome bureaucracy of the state. The first approach, called the 
”voluntarist theory’” believes that most of the people working in the informal 
economy are entrepreneurs who decide to work informally in order to avoid 
taxation, labor costs, regulations, rental fees and in general all the costs of 
working in the formal economy (Maloney 2004). According to the research 
developed by Maloney in Latin America, there are many incentives for 
people to work informally (2004). 
The other approach, called ”legalist theory” insists that informal 
entrepreneurs have no real options to become formal due to the lengthy time 
and cost involved in the legal process one must undergo to operate formally 
(De Soto 1989; Ghersi 1997, 107). The most influential work in the literature 
shift towards entrepreneurialism is Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto’s 
research which focuses on the links between informality and poverty in 
developing countries (1989, 14). Through the study of the informal economy 
in Perú, De Soto argues that people work in the informal economy because 
the legal norms regulating the license and permits to operate within law are 
complex, time-consuming and costly, making formalization more or less 
impossible (1989, 146). His book The Other Path, dedicates a chapter to the 
analysis of street vendors in Lima, and De Soto uses this example to prove 
his hypothesis about the cumbersome bureaucracy that vendors must deal 
with in order to obtain licenses.  
Finally, there are few studies in post-colonial literature that criticize the 
explanations for informality, because they depart from the assumption that 
formality is the ”model to follow”, while informality is seen as pre-modern 
and typical of less developed societies (Kinyanjui 2014; Novo 2003). 
According to Mary Kinyanjui, the imposition of vending licenses in many 
African cities was used as a way to limit the commercial activities of the 
native population, since trade was reserved exclusively to Asian or European 
groups (Kinyanjui 2014, 11).  
While all the explanations offer interesting insights into the phenomenon of 
street vending, I will pay special attention to De Soto’s legalist theory and the 
subsequent formalization approach for two reasons. First, formalization is a 
paradigm in the current political debate surrounding street vending and is 
used in many cities around the world (Gandolfo 2013; Nelson and De Bruijn 
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2005; ILO 2008). Second, from the perspective of social control, 
formalization seems to be a non-punitive method of state control.  
Formalization: Poverty, Empowerment and Development 
Attempts to formalize workers in the informal economy are part of the 
current debate on poverty, empowerment and development (Banik 2011). 
Formalization, commonly understood as the shift from informal to formal 
(Williams and Round 2007), is part of various national and international 
development policies. Formalization is a component of the World Bank 
agenda promoted through the ”Doing Business Report” that ranks how easy it 
is to register and create a business in the formal economy (Lyons and Msoka 
2010; World Bank 2015b). It was the main recommendation of the United 
Nations Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, which was co-
chaired by Hernando De Soto (CLEP 2008a) and it is also part of the Decent 
Work Agenda at the International Labour Organization (ILO 2008). More 
recently, formalization has been included as part of the Sustainable 
Development Goals for 2030, specifically ”to encourage formalization and 
growth of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises” as part of the goal 
eight: “Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full 
and productive employment and decent work for all” (UN 2015).  
In the context of businesses, formalization can be defined as “the process 
whereby previously non-compliant enterprises become integrated into these 
formal or state-sanctioned institutions, such as property registries and tax-
rolls” (Kenyon 2007, 3). However, in the case of street vendors the regulation 
is often regarding the use of public space and can include licenses, market 
relocation or zone, among others. For rickshaw drivers it often involves a 
license to provide public transportation. Formalization is based on the 
difference between formal (legal) and informal (outside the law). For the 
purpose of this study formalization is understood as the steps towards the 
legalization of previously non-compliant businesses. However there are 
strong criticism in the literature for using the formal/informal divide and 
instead many argue for a more or less continuum of the reach of official 
intervention (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom 2007, 16). Indeed, it is 
possible to find different levels of formality in terms of compliance to taxes, 
labour laws, business registrations, local laws of public space, health licenses, 
among others.  
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Formalization is considered a tool of economic empowerment that allows 
small entrepreneurs to access formal credit and the financial capital that is 
necessary for the expansion and growth of their businesses (De Soto 1989). 
According to De Soto, “The poor of the world — five-sixths of humanity — 
have things, but they lack the process to represent their property and create 
capital. They have houses but not titles; lands but not deeds; businesses but 
not statutes of incorporation” (De Soto 2000, 6). De Soto’s claim about the 
empowering effect of micro-credits is in line with the research in 
development economics concerning the need to create credit for the poor 
(Hossain 1988; Morduch 1999). In this regard, the most famous initiative is 
the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. This bank, and its founder Muhammad 
Yunus, became known worldwide after he won the Peace Nobel Prize in 
2006 for his efforts to provide micro-finance for the poor. The Bank serves 
now over 7,5 million people, of whom 97 percent are women (Yunus, 
Moingeon, and Lehmann-Ortega 2010). While micro-finance is promoted all 
over the world, the link between formalization, access to credit and poverty 
alleviation is not always clear (Woodruff 2001).  
De Soto’s work has inspired formalization reforms in countries such as Peru, 
Tanzania, China, Russia, Ghana, South Africa, India and Thailand (ILD 
2015). However, De Soto’s thesis and the formalization of businesses rights 
for the poor have been strongly criticized in different studies (Gandolfo 2013; 
Williamson 2010; Krueckeberg 2004, 2; Faundez 2009). One of the main 
critiques states that despite legal reforms to promote formalization, 
informality is growing around the world (Faundez 2009; Jütting and Laiglesia 
2009). Additionally, in Mexico City, street vendors have actively engaged in 
manifestations and demonstrations against formalization reforms because 
they consider these laws a way to exclude them from society (Pena 2000). 
Others simply ignore formalization laws and continue to work; they see no 
benefits in formalizing their businesses, and they fear upcoming taxes and 
fees (Faundez 2009). Similarly, Gandolfo’s ethnographic study in Lima 
shows that most vendors continue to operate informally, despite multiple 
formalization incentives (Gandolfo 2013). One of the vendors interviewed by 
Gandolfo explains that informality is “a culture deeply rooted in our country 
[Perú]”, and therefore formalization is condemned to fail (Gandolfo 2013, 
294).  
In a study of street traders in different African cities, the authors concluded 
that the formality imposed by the state is often in contradiction with the 
social practices of association and reciprocity that dominate many aspects of 
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people’s culture (Brown, Lyons, and Dankoco 2010). Similarly, Hawkins 
explains resistance to formality as a way for the urban poor to create spaces 
of autonomy, and to overcome the long-time exclusion they have experienced 
from state development projects that prioritize big economic enterprises and 
growth over the needs of small households (2011, 8).  
The claim that formalization can help small entrepreneurs to boost their 
businesses and lift themselves out of poverty has been also criticized (Guha-
Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom 2007, 9). For instance, Donovan illustrates 
how many street vendors abandoned formalization programs after their sales 
decreased which threatened the very existence of their businesses (2008). 
Many claim that formalization is often a way to cover up public space 
recovery initiatives and that formalization is only used as way to move the 
vendors off the streets. Hansen reports the case of “Keep Zambia Clean and 
Healthy”, a program launched in 2007 as part of the steps towards the 
millennium development goals. According to this study, the program 
included formalization measurements that in reality were aimed at getting rid 
of street vendors, in order to generate order and health in the cities (Hansen 
2010, 20). Similarly, a study by Slocum et al. (2011) showed how Tanzania’s 
national strategy for growth and poverty reduction, of which formalization 
was a main component, had a devastating effect on small tourist enterprises. 
Instead of providing economic benefits for the poor, the reform created extra 
costs for their businesses (Slocum, Backman, and Robinson 2011).  
Urban Development and the Recovery of Public Space  
There is a long-standing debate surrounding the struggle to control public 
space against the invasion of street vendors. This literature is prevalent in the 
fields of urban sociology and urban planning (Crossa 2009; Swanson 2007; 
Peña 2000; Yatmo 2008). The literature often shows that when the number of 
street vendors grow and concentrate in strategic zones, local governments use 
different strategies to establish order, including punitive measurements 
(Swanson 2007) and urban renovation projects (Huang, Xue, and Li 2014; 
Pádua Carrieri and Murta 2011).  
Some of the most commons arguments for controlling the number of street 
vendors include the high levels of congestion they bring, tax evasion, lack of 
quality control of the merchandise they sell, representing a source of 
uncleanliness that can pose a public health hazard (Bromley 2000). It is also 
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said that street businesses attract criminality and provide opportunities for 
pickpocketing (Ibid.)  
Probably some of the most famous punitive measurements to eradicate 
unwanted street behavior were the policies developed by Mayor Giuliani 
during the 1990s in New York City. Based on James Wilson’s and George 
Kelling’s broken windows theory, Mayor Guiliani and his chief of police 
implemented tough controls on unwanted “street people” such as 
panhandlers, drunks or the homeless, under the assumption that these kinds 
of disorderly behaviors allowed for more serious crime to flourish (Swanson 
2013, 973). The broken windows theory uses a metaphor to connect urban 
criminality with run down, graffiti-filled urban areas, abandoned cars or 
broken windows, and has inspired punitive control in many cities in the 
world (Lippert 2007).  
But not all control over street vending is punitive, and instead, multiple 
strategies to govern public space have emerged. At the city level, planning 
laws are used nowadays as a disciplinary tool to shape the lives of the poor 
through the regulation of space (Valverde 2011; Hunt 2009). In a recent book 
about the practices of urban law in the city of Toronto, Mariana Valverde 
illustrates the more subtle ways in which cities govern public space (2012). 
According to her, cities develop subtle strategies to control the use of public 
space from city renovation projects to post-cards. These more subtle forms of 
control can include ”urban renewal” projects (Huang, Xue, and Li 2014; 
Pádua Carrieri and Murta 2011; Swanson 2007), the preparation of cities for 
international events (Lindell, Hedman, and Nathan-Verboomen 2010; 
Ngonyama 2010), and educational campaigns to promote good citizenship 
(Hawkins 2011, 13), among other things.  
One of the most widely spread practices for controlling the number of street 
vendors in strategic areas, at least, is the ”urban renewal” approach, in which 
the construction of city infrastructure to revitalize and beautify the city goes 
hand in hand with the removal of unwanted street behavior. Urban renewal to 
remove street vendors has been popular in Latin American cities and includes 
programs such as Blanqueamiento (whitening) for street vendors and beggars 
in Quito, Ecuador (Swanson 2007, 709), Programa Rescate (rescue program) 
in Mexico City (Crossa 2009, 44), and the Re-location Program in Belo 
Horizonte, Brasil (Pádua Carrieri and Murta 2011). Street vendors are seen as 
”out of place” urban elements that need to be removed (Yatmo 2008, 387).  
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The world-class city ideal has also been used to exemplify a model of urban 
development that is integrated into the world economy and excludes informal 
street vendors. According to John Friedmann (1986), world class cities are 
designed to attract big business, to have world class hotels, be service 
oriented, and concentrate important financial capitals. Under the world-class 
city initiatives, urban space control is often concerned with specific areas 
such as city centers, bus stations, commercial neighborhoods, tourist areas, or 
business centers, which Bromley calls ”conflict zones” (2000, 22). Control is 
applied selectively since complete eradication is often difficult to achieve. 
And people such as street vendors resisting the new city model are seen as an 
obstacle to progress and modernity. The world class city model has been 
largely opposed by thousands of street vendors that see this development 
model as excluding them from the possibility to earn a livelihood, which 
contributes to further exclusion and displacement (McDonald 2012). 
There are more subtle ways to achieve control over street vendors, for 
instance through educational campaigns. Parra documents the use of 
”citizenship education” techniques in Bogotá to teach street vendors how to 
become good citizens that abide by the law and overcome informality (2009). 
Similarly, Valverde analyzes the use of post-cards to portray cities as places 
of order and beauty, where social actors such as street vendors are often 
absent. The thesis of Lucas Konzen also shows how post cards are used in 
tourist cities to create an ideal of order and beauty that excludes certain 
groups in society (2013). According to Bromley, the owners of large 
businesses are often in conflict with street vendors and try to maintain their 
surrounding areas free (2000, 7). 
The above literature illustrates that social control of street vending is 
exercised though multiple actors and different practices. However, control is 
also resisted, and often other forms of social control arise, such as social 
networks or associations.  
Organizations, Social Capital and Resistance  
Another set of the literature on street vending illustrates the strategies that 
people develop in order to resist control and removal from an individual 
perspective, or a collective approach (Crossa 2009). In this sense, studies by 
Bayat (1997), Cross (1998), Crossa (2009), Steel (2012) and myself (Vargas 
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and Urinboyev 2015) argue about the spaces of resistance for people who 
participate in the informal economy.  
Despite multiple attempts to remove street vendors, they remain present and 
active in many cities in the world. The persistence of street vendors has been 
documented in Latin American cities such as Cusco (Steel 2012), Bogotá 
(Donovan 2008), Lima (Gandolfo 2013), Caracas (Smilde 2004), and Buenos 
Aires (Whitson 2007) among others. In African cities, the persistence of 
street trades has also been largely recognized (Brown, Lyons, and Dankoco 
2010; Chirisa 2007; Elkan, Ryan, and Mukui 1982; Kinyanjui 2014; Musoni 
2010; Rogerson and Hart 1989). Similarly, many studies have documented 
the prevalence of street vending in India (Anjaria 2006; Bhowmik. 2001; 
Mani, Pai, and Aggarwal 2012; Williams and Gurtoo 2012) and in 
Bangladesh (Bhowmik 2005; Muzaffar, Huq, and Mallik 2009), just to give a 
few examples. In Europe, unlicensed street vendors are also common in cities 
in Italy (Harney 2004) and Spain (L’Hote and Gasta 2007). And in North 
America, the famous food trucks in Los Angeles (Crawford 1995) and street 
commerce in New York (Devlin 2011), are some examples.  
Individual strategies to avoid control are illustrated in the literature on street 
vendors using different analogies such as the game of ”hide and seek” 
(Yatmo 2008, 391), ”cat and mouse” (Swanson 2007, 721), or ”looking for 
birds in a cornfield” (Rogerson and Hart 1989, 32). Within the social context 
of poverty and inequality, the policies towards complete eradication and 
control in practice generate a game in which the police visit strategic places 
to evict street vendors who then move to neighboring areas to avoid control, 
and once the police have relaxed new and old vendors return. Rodrigo 
Menses explains this phenomenon in terms of mobility, which in turn 
constitutes one of the most important weapons street vendors have (2013). 
Individuals learn to resist the law in order to avoid punishment, and at the 
same time, they become resilient in order to adapt to new situations and 
continue with their work (Steel 2012).  
There is a wide array of research on the role of social capital, networks, and 
family ties of people in the informal economy. These studies look into the 
role of organizations and associations (Peña 2000; Cross 1998; Crossa 2009) 
and the use of other forms of social capital (Peña 1999, 363). Much of this 
literature demonstrates that people in street vending depend on access to 
social networks to conduct their businesses, such as the support of family 
members and access to informal credit. In this set of literature, strategies to 
resist control can be developed through associations (Peña 2000; Roever 
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2005a), or can depend on smaller social networks and family ties (Steel 
2012). This literature predominantly uses the term “social capital” to explain 
how people working in street vending create collective action in order to 
undermine the policies that try to control their work. The most relevant 
literature that comes to mind on street vendor strategies for resistance is 
Sergio Peña’s study on social capital and self-regulation among street traders 
in Mexico City. In this study, the author demonstrates that “social capital, 
family, friends, etc., play an important role among street vendors whenever 
access to stalls in the informal market is at stake” (Peña 1999, 363). In the 
absence of effective and efficient government regulation, vendors develop 
their own institutions to regulate themselves, improve profit, and avoid social 
chaos (Ibid.). Additionally, street vendor associations often try to re-negotiate 
evictions with the politicians, which in turn generates a system of patronage 
and corruption (Bromley 2000, 18).  
Individual and organized resistance is also exercised through legal actions, 
and many street vendors workers have brought their claims to courts or 
political arenas. In countries such as India (Rubin 2013) and Colombia 
(Donovan 2008) the rights of survival for street vendors and rickshaw drivers 
have been discussed in the Supreme Courts, producing favourable decisions. 
Roever considers the participation in political arenas a way to negotiate the 
terms of their formality (2005b). Probably the most favorable regulation of 
street trade has been developed in India, due to the constant push by people 
claiming their right to work. The Supreme Court’s decision in 1989 in favor 
of the right of street vendors to conduct trade in public space was the 
beginning down a road of policy debates to create a national policy and law 
to protect the rights of street vendors (Bhowmik 2010). Thus, the court’s 
decision was followed by the National Policy on Street Vendors in 2004, and 
finally a national bill was passed in 2014. While the law protects the rights of 
street vendors, it does so through licenses and leaves the problem of the great 
fluctuation of new vendors and seasonal vendors unattended. Although the 
bill brings up the protection of street vendors’ livelihoods to the national 
level, it imposes the need of a license, thus maintaining a formalization 
approach (Mathur 2014).  
Street business workers’ organizations have also mobilized at the 
international level through global networks that advocate for their rights 
worldwide (Batliwala 2002; Chen 2001). One of the most active 
organizations is WIEGO- Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and 
Organizing. Since its foundation in 1997, WIEGO has functioned as a 
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network of member-based organizations of informal workers, researchers and 
practitioners to influence the academic and political debate on the regulation 
of informal workers. The work has been developed in close relationship with 
the well-established Self-Employed Women's Association of India (SEWA). 
Other associations include StreetNet International which unites national street 
vendor associations. These international organizations are now widely 
recognized by the International Labour Organization, and their work has 
influenced policies such as the Decent Work Agenda (ILO 2002a), and the 
United Nation’s (CLEP 2008a). 
However, informal regulation and particularly control that is based in social 
capital is not good for everyone. A study by Portes and Landolt (2000) 
illustrates that social capital is not only a source of empowerment but can 
also have negative consequences. It can support the exclusion of outsiders; it 
can restrict freedom among group members, and it can impose excessive 
obligations. For instance, Steel observed in a study on street vendors in 
Cusco that, “the weaker the family support, the more vulnerable the socio-
economic position of the street vendor, and the higher the risk of destitution” 
(Steel 2008, 128). Bromley explains how street vending associations often 
include the most established and experienced individuals who can also seek 
the removal of competition from unorganized street vendors. Individuals 
fighting to keep good business locations often have to pay strongmen to 
defend their posts, or bribe the police to leave them outside the scope of raids 
and control (Bromley 2000, 14). Sally Roever’s study in Lima, Perú 
illustrates that despite the proliferation of street vendor associations, they face 
enormous difficulties to achieve collective action and self-regulation, and that 
“only with the support of both local officials and vending organizations that 
stable, comprehensive, sectoral governance becomes likely” (Roever 2005b, 
170). The study on street vendors in La Paz-El Alto, Bolivia, illustrates how 
high levels of competition also hinder the possibility to achieve cooperation 
and organization among street vendors (Agadjanian 2002). Thus, social 
capital may not always be available to street vendors.  
In this review, I have shown that when police control is tough, street vendors 
use different strategies to continue with their businesses, such as becoming 
mobile, going into less controlled neighborhoods, or creating associations or 
networks. In some cases, they may accept re-location offers from the 
government, but once control has relaxed old and new businesses tend to fill 
up the space (Hunt 2009). However, this review also shows that studies on 
informal control practices in the informal economy tend to focus on the 
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positive aspects of social capital, trust and organization. With some 
exceptions (Peña 2000; Agadjanian 2002), not much is known about how 
practices of control influence the lives of street vendors in different ways. 
Working Conditions, Decent Work and the Welfare State 
Finally, the last set of the literature that I wish to present explores the 
working conditions of street vendors. According to the International Labour 
Ofrganization, working conditions are the issues that affect workers’ well-
being in the workplace (ILO 2014b). It includes multiple aspects related to 
the work environment, such as employment conditions, health, organization, 
safety, development opportunities and the balance between work and private 
life. At the international level, the working conditions for informal workers 
have been addressed through the Decent Work Agenda, a framework for 
social policies created by the International Labour Organization (ILO) to 
promote policies, not only for wage workers, but also for workers in non-
standard relations of employment, particularly those in the informal economy 
(Vosko 2002). Presented in 1999, this new platform represents a shift in the 
regulatory frameworks of labor and recognizes that most workers around the 
world are outside the traditional protection of labor law (Vosko 2002). In this 
view, Guy Standing, former director of the ILO’s Socio-Economic Security 
Program criticized the division formal vs informal, and used the term 
”precariat” for most of the workers of twenty first century who are denied of 
labour rights and welfare protection (2011). 
Decent work is defined by the ILO “productive work in which rights are 
protected, which generates an adequate income, with adequate social 
protection” (ILO 1999). Using ILO’s definition of decent work, some studies 
have explored the working conditions for street vendors (Luebker 2008; Saha 
2009; Walsh 2010). A study of street vendors in Mumbai showed that their 
working hours and safety conditions in the workplace are some of the main 
problems experienced by this group of workers, together with the bribery and 
harassment activities of local authorities (Saha 2009). However, Vung Tau’s 
study of Vietnam evaluated whether street vending can provide decent work 
for this group and concluded that the vendors place high value on the 
freedom their work allows them, despite the tough working conditions 
(Walsh, 2010). 
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Vendors often have to carry heavy loads, and in the case of rickshaw drivers 
they are exposed to systematic health risks due to long hours of pedaling 
(Begum and Sen 2004). In line with this research, a case study on women 
working as street vendors in Mumbai showed that their work has low socio-
economic status, they have low literacy, difficulties in forming collective 
associations to voice their needs, they experience harassment from the police, 
and they are exposed to incidents of sexual exploitation (Sarkar and 
Srivastava 2009). Additionally climate change research has pointed out that 
in cities with increase temperatures, vendors and other workers will see a 
decline in their welfare due to heat but also to a decrease in their costumers 
(Das 2015). 
Since the initial assumption was that informality should disappear, the 
discussion surrounding the creation of social protection schemes for informal 
workers has been absent from the debate (Chen 2012; Hawkins 2011). Thus, 
the risks of their work such as illness, or disability are rarely discussed. 
Instead of the welfare state serving their needs, street vending become a 
safety net to replace the welfare state (Bromley 2000, 5). Thus some research 
suggest that the discussion about social protection for informal workers 
cannot be postponed (Lund and Srinivas 2000). However, an important 
exception has been the development of welfare boards for informal workers 
in India (Agarwala 2006). In a study on bidi (tobacco) rollers in India, 
Agarwala illustrates how this group of workers was able to negotiate basic 
welfare protection though their union, despite being informal. Also, in India 
the Self-Employed Women’s Association SEWA has created health 
insurance for its members in absence of welfare state protection (Ranson et 
al. 2006). While important, the provision of welfare outside the state often 
faces financial difficulties and has limited coverage (Ranson et al. 2006).  
One of the reasons why the role of the welfare state has been absent in the 
discussion is probably the link to the Bismarckian model of welfare 
protection. According to Martha Chen, the reason why there is a lack of 
discussion on the welfare rights for informal workers is the historical 
connection of workers’ rights to ”employment relation” (2012, 13). Indeed, 
formal employment and contributory schemes continue to be the way in 
which labor law protects workers’ rights, despite the fact that a great number 
of workers in the world are informally employed (McLaughlin 1987). Since 
informal workers do not have the same employment model, the role of 
welfare structures is not seen as playing a crucial role in long-term poverty 
and inequality in the world (Mesa-Lago 2008). While the family has been the 
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major provider of welfare in many countries, this has generated great 
pressure on the poor to supplement the welfare state, which in turn causes 
family conflicts, intergenerational poverty and further vulnerability (Roberts 
1994). In this regard, the main policy recommendation that exists, at least at 
the level of the International Labour Organization, is the creation of universal 
protection floors for health coverage and minimum pensions (Chen 2012).  
As explained above, the assumption that informality will disappear has 
limited the debate surrounding the working conditions and well-being of 
street vendors. Thus, we know very little about how the police, the 
government and other social actors develop practices of control that influence 
the everyday lives of street vendors.  
Social Control and the Working Conditions of Street Vendors  
The foregoing review of the literature illustrates that social control practices 
influence the work of people engaged in street vending. The literature also 
shows how the main response to the proliferation of street vending has been 
the recovery of public space, not only through punitive measurements based 
on police control, but also through other practices such as urban renovation 
projects, the privatization of public space, and the use of formalization 
programs. In addition to state control, a few studies expose that networks and 
organizations also influence street vendors. Thus, law and other forms of 
control influence the everyday lives of street business workers, and determine 
the conditions of their work and well-being.  
  
35 
Well-Being of Street Vendors 
There are numerous definitions of well-being, and at times even competing 
perspectives (White 2010; Taylor 2011; Sen 1993). Well-being can be 
analysed objectively as the result of different economic, social and 
psychological standards, or it can be defined by each individual subjectively 
(White 2010). There are different lists of objective indicators of well-being 
including income, employment, having good health, education, housing, 
security, and good quality of air and food. Subjective aspects of well-being 
depend on individual self-assessments of one’s position in life, including 
income satisfaction, happiness and satisfaction with one’s life. Sarah White 
(2010) differentiates between the material aspects of well-being (doing well) 
and the subjective aspects (feeling good). She also defines well-being as a 
relational process that relates to historical time and space. Time is relevant, as 
people’s expectations on the future and memories from the past influence 
how they perceive their present well-being. It is also dependent on space, as 
the person’s experiences of well-being can vary across geographical places. It 
also depends on the relation between the individual and society.  
Amartya Sen has studied well-being in relation to agency, freedom and 
capabilities. The term capabilities refers to “a person's ability to do valuable 
acts or reach valuable states of being” (Sen 1993, 30).2 This definition of 
well-being pays attention to the goals a person can actually achieve 
(functionings) and the freedom to choose among available choices. It 
concerns the material aspects of life that produce utility (having food, having 
good health, access to education) but also about the existence of freedom. 
Sen pays a special attention to the idea of the freedom to achieve well-being, 
which he calls “well-being freedom” (Sen 1985, 203). 
Sen’s definition highlights individual agency and freedom in the context of 
power, structures and choices. He emphasizes the importance of freedom 
using the example of a starving child and a fasting monk. According to Sen, 
while both of these individuals experience lack of food, the starving child has 
had no other choice while the monk was able to decide. Sen emphasizes this 
                                                     
2 Sen uses the terms functionings and capabilities to define well-being. Functionings are “the 
various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. The capability of a 
person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and 
from which he or she can choose one collection” (Sen 1993, 31).  
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difference to bring attention to the importance of understanding people’s 
experiences in terms of human diversity and constrained choices. 
For the purpose of this thesis I do not depart from objective definitions of 
well-being and instead I want to uncover the ways street vendors describe 
well-being in their own terms. 
Aims and Research Questions 
As explained previously, different social control practices, such as police 
harassment, formalization projects, mafias, social organizations and 
individual control influence the everyday work of street vendors. However, 
the current understanding of the working conditions of people earning their 
livelihoods in street vending, and the debate on how to broadly alleviate 
urban poverty, continues to be trapped in the ideal of formalization. In this 
sense, the assumption that informality is bad continues to frame the debate.  
Meanwhile, the pressing needs of a large number of workers in today’s world 
continue to be unattended. In the specific case of street vendors in Bogotá the 
key question at the political level has been how to recover public space and 
how to achieve order and compliance in the streets (Hunt 2009). While 
important, the focus on public space and state control has been dominant in 
the discussion, and the everyday working conditions are often outside the 
debate.  
The primary aim of this thesis is to provide insights and knowledge that can 
guide reforms that are driven by an ambition to improve the lives of street 
vendors operating outside the law. A secondary aim is to show how social 
control informed ethnography can be a useful approach within the discipline 
of sociology of law. To accomplish that, the main research question guiding 
this thesis is: 
How does formalization of street vendors in Bogotá enable and/or hinder their 
well-being?
3
 
  
                                                     
3 Formalization is understood here as steps towards the legalization of previously non-
compliant businesses. 
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In order to answer this question, it is necessary to explore the following sub-
questions: 
1. How do street vendors themselves describe their own well-being? 
2. How do street vendors experience law and other forms of social control in 
their everyday work life? 
3. Based on street vendors’ own descriptions of well-being, how does law and 
other forms of social control enable and/or hinder their well-being? 
Each of these research questions will be addressed and answered through this 
ethnographic study of street vendors in Bogotá. 
Which Streets? The Sites of this Ethnography 
In this thesis, I use an ethnographic approach to the study of street vendors. 
Ethnography provides a rich ground to understand the experiences of people 
in the natural context in which they occur, and to give account to the 
complexity of the phenomenon being studied (Hammersley and Atkinson 
2007). This approach allows me to describe in depth the everyday working 
conditions of people in the streets of Bogotá, as well as to uncover stories of 
resistance and control of street businesses, which are often hidden. 
Additionally, understanding the relations people experience with other 
businesses, the police, social organizations, and multiple power structures, 
was only possible through long stays in the field, my previous experience of 
vendoring during my university studies, and my situation as a local 
researcher. The different ethnographic encounters in this research allowed for 
a more thoughtful and comprehensive study of street businesses which can 
bring a meaningful contribution to this academic debate. 
My fieldwork started properly while on a trip to the city of Bogotá in 2012, 
during which I visited one of the decentralized offices of the Institute for 
Social Economy (IPES), which deals specifically with the issue of 
formalization of street vendors. During that visit I met the leaders of some 
street vendor organizations, and through them I came in contact for the first 
time with the ”transitional zones of vending”, i.e. the project that I studied 
during this first field trip. The vendors present at this meeting explained that 
the vending zones were a government initiative to help them formalize their 
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businesses. The vending zones allowed vendors to work in public space 
through a collective permit given to the vendor associations in each zone, and 
additionally, vendors received tents for a period of two years. During these 
two years, vendors were supposed to improve their businesses and move 
toward the formal economy. Although that sounded like an interesting 
solution, the vendors at this meeting complained about the terms of 
formalization and the two year limit to move off the streets. This first 
encounter with some street vendors inspired me to direct my focus towards 
the transitional zones. I was curious about how these zones operated, whether 
vendors could work more freely and without fear of police harassment and 
control, and whether that had led to an improvement in their working 
conditions and well-being. While the vending zones were a good start, there 
were only 458 vendors in the city included in this project, and despite other 
formalization projects the majority of them were working in the streets. I 
decided then to expand my fieldwork to formalized and non-formalized 
vendors as well as rickshaw driver and ice cream sellers, as all of them were 
present in the same streets, sidewalks and bus stops.  
The specific streets, or in ethnographic terms the ”fields”, were selected 
through spontaneous encounters, although I tried to include different 
geographical areas of the city, in a multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995). 
The first site for this ethnographic research was the neighborhood of Santa 
Librada in the south east of the city. The second site was the sidewalk outside 
a large bus station called Portal de las Americas located in the south west of 
the city, which was Maria’s working place, the vendor I introduced earlier in 
this chapter. The last field site was the area around a large mall in the north of 
the city called Santa Fé Mall. Each of my field trips in 2012, 2013, and 2014 
focused on one of these sites, although I returned to previous sites on 
subsequent visits to talk to the vendors and rickshaw drivers for shorter 
periods of time. As part of my fieldwork, I also visited the government 
offices dealing with street vendors.  
Scope and Delimitations 
There are temporal and geographical delimitations in this study. This study is 
concentrated to certain streets; it was developed within a specific time 
framework (2012-2014), and it is based on observations and informal 
interviews that are unique to each of the individuals that shared their 
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experiences with me as a researcher. Additionally in this study, the working 
conditions of street vendors are explored through the lens of personal stories 
and observations in the field.  
Another delimitation derives from the conceptual understanding of social 
control as well as well-being. In this study, social control is understood from 
the viewpoint of the experiences and perceptions of the street vendors. 
Although social control, particularly legal control, can be studied from the 
controller’s point of view, in this case the police or the government, the main 
focus here is how different practices influence the work of people in street 
businesses from their perspectives. Similarly, well-being is also approached 
from the perspective of my informants’ experiences who were asked in 
general about their feelings and ideas surrounding their work. Consequently, 
the psychological and physical aspects of well-being are explored only 
through my observations and the fieldwork interviews, and not through other 
methods of inquiry.  
While the previous delimitations may leave aside some aspects of well-being 
and social control, the theoretical analysis of the findings in this thesis will 
bring up a broader understanding of the phenomenon studied. Still, a people-
centered approach provides possibilities to explore a phenomenon as it is 
experienced in everyday life. 
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2. Theoretical Considerations 
Since one of the main characteristics of ethnographic research is the thick and 
contextual description of social phenomenon (Murchison 2010), transcending 
the specific context toward more abstract levels of analysis can be a complex 
venture. Therefore, this chapter has two main sections: (a) an explanation of 
how theory is used in this ethnography, and (b) the conceptual framework of 
social control. The concept of social control was not present from the 
beginning; rather, it was added after the first fieldwork. During my first trip 
to Bogotá, I wanted to study, from a sociology of law perspective, how street 
vendors operate outside the law and their experiences with formalization 
programs aimed at legalizing their work. However, the multiple actors and 
complex processes I encountered during my first fieldwork influenced me to 
turn the project theoretically towards the study of social control of street 
vendors.  
The Role of Theory in Ethnography 
Scholars of ethnographic studies are rather ambivalent about the role of 
theory in their research, and while some advocate for the “let the data speak 
for themselves” approach (Walford 2007a), others insist on the need to 
engage in broader theoretical analyses (Wilson and Chaddha 2009). In the 
words of Wacquant, the problematic relation between theory and 
ethnography can be described as the problem of getting too close or too far 
from the data (2002). If one gets too close to the data, the study may 
represent only a collection of folklore notions and vocabulary. In doing so, 
one runs the risk of presenting observations and interpretations in a social 
vacuum without connecting them to the broader systems of material and 
symbolic relations in which social action is embedded (Wacquant 2002). 
However, if one gets too far from the data, the ethnographer may end up 
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forcing observations into pre-determined concepts, and the value of 
contextual and rich explanations can get lost (Ibid.).  
Therefore, the challenge is how to pursue a theoretical analysis that is 
grounded in the richness of the ethnographic data, that pays attention to the 
social context in which the data was collected, and connects the data to the 
larger photograph. This study is concerned with this challenge. Therefore, I 
try to provide a relevant place for the data collected in the field, but I also 
engage in broader debates. Before explaining my approach to theory building 
in detail, I will first discuss how ethnographers have dealt with theory 
building in their studies. Being aware of the approaches used by other 
scholars, as well as the implications of the approach one adopts, will be of 
great use. Thereafter, I will present more practical issues concerning how to 
go about theory building in ethnography.  
Theory Building in Anthropology and Sociology 
The challenge of going from rich data to theory building has been approached 
differently by the two main disciplines in which ethnography is grounded: 
anthropology and sociology (Bryman 2001). Although ethnography is also 
used in other disciplines such as literature and history (Clifford and Marcus 
1986), as well as marketing and consumer studies (Kozinets 2002), most of 
its development is found in the anthropological and sociological traditions.  
The most common approach to theory building in ethnographic studies 
grounded in the discipline of social anthropology is known as the “let the 
data speak for themselves” approach (LeCompte and Schensul 2015). Using 
this approach, the job of the researcher is limited to the description of the 
group or culture being studied, and the role of theory is rather limited or 
different. Most anthropologists prefer to refrain from generalizations and, 
instead, look at the contributions of single case studies and the value they 
have in their own right (Walford, 2007b, 164). Theory is seen as an 
imposition of meaning (Anderson 2002), and thus, it is preferred to leave 
judgments and broader explanations to the reader. The work of a good 
ethnographer is not to explain but to describe in detail the local culture (Katz 
1997). Instead of being preoccupied with macro-explanations, the main task 
for ethnographers is to be rigorous when it comes to conducting fieldwork 
and describing the data collected (Walford 2007b).  
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The analysis of the data is often done as a way to organize and present the 
extensive and fragmented material collected in fieldwork, and concepts are 
used to illustrate the findings (Randall, Harper, and Rouncefield 2007). While 
some analysis can be conducted in order to explain certain social phenomena, 
the analysis is limited to the culture studied, and ethnographers in the 
anthropological tradition often try to stay away from broader discussions and 
generalizations. Let the data “speak for themselves” is seen as a strength of 
ethnography, and efforts are made to limit the influence of the researcher in 
the production of results (Graves 2004, 30). This is a rather inductive process 
where themes and explanations are built from the data without reference to 
external theories (Ibid.).  
While initially anthropologists were mostly concerned with the thick 
description, the use of ethnography in anthropology made an important turn 
in regard to theory building with the contribution of Clifford Geertz (1926-
2006). In his seminal work The Interpretation of Cultures, Geertz argued that 
knowledge of a culture is not an experimental endeavor searching for the 
laws that determine behavior but instead an interpretative task in search of 
meanings (Geertz 1973, 5). Subsequently, the use of ethnography was highly 
influenced by the interpretative approach as a theoretical framework (Bryman 
2001).  
However, the emergence of theory from the data is rather problematic. Daly 
criticizes this as a “magical businesses of emergence” in which concepts and 
explanations are supposed to arise from the field with little or no intervention 
by the researcher (1997). Early ethnographers were criticized for making 
authoritative representations of other cultures without discussing their own 
views, and making claims that this was the ”native’s view”, without taking 
into account the historical development of the culture they were studying 
(Myers 1988).  
The characterization I have presented about how theory has been used in 
ethnographic studies among anthropologists is only a tendency, and more 
recently, anthropologists are also increasingly concerned with connecting 
their studies to broader debates (Metz 1984). In this regard, I agree with 
George Marcus when he explains that although disciplines are fictional, 
understanding the standpoints of a discipline are useful to contribute to an 
interdisciplinary debate (2008). Indeed, regardless of one’s theoretical aims, 
the close engagement with rich descriptions, based on fieldwork, is still the 
essence of good ethnography (Marcus 1998).  
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While anthropologists often claim to be the genuine ethnographers due to 
their training in the analysis of cultures, sociologists consider themselves to 
be well trained in research methods and the theoretical tools that often are 
lacking in anthropology (Agar, 2006). Sociologists conducting ethnographies 
are often confronted with the need to present the results of their studies in a 
theoretical framework, to specifically respond to the question of “So what is 
this study useful for?” Therefore, they have to clearly explain the 
contribution of ethnography beyond contextual and unique descriptions (Katz 
1997). 
On the other hand, some sociologists refuse to engage in wider theoretical 
discussions. In an article on the need for theoretical justifications in 
ethnography, Jack Katz mentions different motives, such as the historical 
relevance of a social phenomenon, the emergence of theoretically relevant 
data from the field, the need for the narrative to illustrate a theory, and the 
relevance of the study to police (1997). Katz explains how ethnographers in 
sociology have been interested in the study of historical processes that change 
common forms of social life (1997). Consider, for instance, the urban 
ethnographers of the Chicago school studying the growth of urban migration 
in the city, or contemporary studies of the role of technological devices in 
certain social settings (Hei-Man, 2008). Social changes are occurring all the 
time, and thus, ethnographers can find a great amount of data worth 
considering. In this case, the ethnographer not only describes the group in 
detail, but she also explains the historical relevance of the case and connects 
the findings to a broader debate.  
Another possibility to connect a study to a broader debate is a posteriori 
analysis. A phenomenon may be an example of everyday life which can 
suddenly become relevant when the researcher discovers something that is 
worth discussing with a wider audience. Katz calls this theoretical 
emergence. For instance, in a study of gyms in Brooklyn, USA, Trimbur 
connects the discourses of the trainers and the trainees to the neoliberal 
ideology that requires people to succeed as individuals and deal at the same 
time with racist structures (2011).  
Finally, ethnographic studies are also used to provide narratives that can 
demonstrate or refute a theory developed with other methods. In a study of 
juvenile detention rates in Australia, Travers illustrates how ethnography and 
quantitative methods can complement each other to provide better 
explanations of a phenomenon (2014).  
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So far, I have presented some of the main differences between the 
anthropological and sociological approach to the use of theory in 
ethnography. While generally both disciplines take different stands on the 
role of theory, in practice, scholars from these disciplines as well as from 
other social sciences engage in theoretical debates at different levels. Some 
try to present the data as raw as possible, while others see the need to go into 
more abstract levels of analysis. In the following section I will explain how 
this ethnographic study is closer to the sociological tradition of ethnography 
and, more specifically, how this study is in line with previous ethnographic 
studies within sociology of law (Urinboyev 2013; Flood 2005).  
Two Approaches to Theory Building in Ethnography  
Two specific approaches can be found to theory building in ethnography: 
theory in the context of discovery, and theory as complement. Theory 
building in the context of discovery implies approaching the field with an 
open mind to construct a theory or hypothesis based on the data collected. In 
contrast to the preoccupation of traditional interpretative ethnography with 
describing what is found in the field, ethnography can also include a greater 
theoretical ambition (Snow, Morrill, and Anderson 2003). Some argue 
against theoretical claims: Geoffrey Walford, a sociologist in the field of 
education, argues that ethnographers should resist the temptation to draw 
generalizations from their studies (2007b). He argues that ethnography sites 
should be chosen because of their intrinsic importance, and the results should 
illustrate the specific context and diversity of the places studied (2007b, 164). 
Thus, a lack of generalization and engagement in abstract theories should not 
be seen as a weakness but as a strength. While I agree with Walford on the 
importance of bringing up the uniqueness and richness of the data collected, I 
believe that theory can play an important role in ethnography by connecting 
the individual to broader questions. One way of doing this is through 
induction.  
Induction is a process of drawing theory from the data. However, to be 
entirely inductive or completely blind to theory seems very difficult in 
practice, since researchers often have theoretical understandings that guide 
different methodological decisions in the field (Merriam 2009). In this 
regard, some ethnographic studies use grounded theory based on fieldwork 
descriptions (Glaser and Strauss, 2009; Pettigrew, 2000). In Anderson’s 
response to the critique of his ethnographic book, he argues that although 
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researchers bring with them a theoretical background which, in turn, 
influences their work, “the orienting questions should emerge from the local 
knowledge the researcher gains from the field setting, not just from his or her 
intellectual preconceptions” (2002, 1536). 
So how does one go about induction and theory building? The data collected 
in ethnography is often rich and it can be overwhelming, diverse and complex 
to analyze (Walford, 2007b, 158). One way to solve this problem is to view 
the theoretical process at different levels, starting from the structuration and 
coding of the data collected to more abstract levels of analysis.  
Vivid Data and Theory as Complements 
When approaching the field, my aim was not to describe the problem of street 
businesses in its entirety; instead, I focused on their relation with law. While 
I allowed the research to remain open to the emergence of different themes, I 
kept one question in mind: How do street businesses operate outside the law? 
Although I could also have looked into the commercial and economic aspects 
of their work, I focused on their experiences with law with regards to their 
well-being. It was in this context that the concept of social control emerged 
as a useful framework.  
According to Wilson and Chaddha, ethnography can be used for theory 
testing in smaller communities, it can help to build alternative hypotheses for 
further research, or it can be used in a combination of both deduction and 
induction (2009). In practice, researchers often combine both induction and 
deduction, and even the most inductive approaches are influenced by some 
theoretical explanations and previous studies (Wilson and Chaddha, 2009). 
Wacquant’s critique of Anderson’s study mentions two main problems with 
ethnographic studies that abstain from discussing the socio-economic 
constraints and context in which social life takes place (2002). First, there is a 
risk of maintaining established norms without reflecting on how “ people’s 
views” develop. Second, if one does not reflect critically on the context in 
which the data is collected, one will not be free from bias but, instead, will 
bring the lens of the status quo into the research. According to Wacquant, the 
best way to present the results of ethnography is through “vivid data” and 
theory that complement each other (Ibid.). 
While I believe the theoretical challenge in ethnography is complex, I agree 
with Daly that leaving aside theory completely is a disadvantage for scientific 
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work (1997, 353). However, my aim is not to provide explanation, but to 
connect the results of the empirical data with previous research and theory.  
The Concept of Social Control 
According to Ellickson, law-and-society scholars have a long history of 
studying informal controls that supplement or supplant the legal system: 
“they have concerned themselves with the interplay between the legal system 
and less formal systems of social control” (1987, 92). Some socio-legal 
scholars that have studied the relations between legal and less formal forms 
of social control include Black (2010), Hydén (2011), Griffiths (1984), and 
Macaulay (1963).  
In the case of street vendors, some scholars have studied the role of informal 
forms of control, based on networks, associations and in some cases mafia 
groups (Peña 2000; Steel 2012). Thus, a theory of how different controllers 
use sanctions to achieve conformity and, more broadly, of how different 
systems of social control operate and interact, can provide some clarity in the 
complexity involved in the regulation of street vendors, as well as other 
forms of informal work.  
To transcend the debate about legal regulation and legal control, this study 
uses the broader concept of systems of social control, which includes 
different controllers, sanctions and norms. The concept of social control is 
not used here with the aim to provide explanations, but instead as an 
analytical concept. It helps to problematize simplistic approaches by people 
that focus either on strong control by the legal system, those that argue for 
de-regulation (market approaches), or those arguing for formalization of the 
informal economy.  
As described in the first part of this chapter, engaging in theoretical debates 
in ethnographic studies is a complex venture because the concepts and 
explanations should come from the field (Murchison 2010). Therefore, in this 
section, I present different definitions of social control and a typology of 
systems of social control (Ellickson 1991). My intention is not to provide 
explanations but to connect the findings of my research with similar studies 
in other contexts and to achieve a more abstract level of analysis, that allows 
me to establish a dialogue with previous research and to explore comparisons 
with similar studies.  
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Defining Social Control  
The literature on social control is extensive, ranging from early studies in 
sociology on the question of social order in modern societies (Ross 1901) to 
studies developed in the mid-20th century within the sociology of deviance 
and criminal behavior (Boeri 2008). Contemporary studies in social control 
include issues of surveillance (Gandy 1989), urban control (Weiss and 
Dresser 2001), general deviance (Gustafson 2011), welfare and control 
(Larkin 2007), and more recently control on the Internet (Kollock and Smith 
2002; Brignall 2002).  
One of the pioneers in the study of social control was Edward Ross, who was 
concerned with how society establishes order and conformity, and how 
individuals adjust their behavior in order not to collide with others (Ross 
2009, 2). In trying to understand the processes of achieving social order and 
successful cooperation, Ross found that individuals were persuaded or 
manipulated by different social mechanisms of control such as norms, 
institutions, technology, capitalism, and ecology (Gross 2009, xiv).  
Norms are an important element in the study of social control. For instance, 
Reiss defines social control as the “capacity of social groups or institutions to 
make norms effective” (1951, p. 196). Similarly, Griffiths stated that social 
control is “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules”, (Griffiths 2003, 23). Donald Black defines social control as “the 
normative aspects of social life, or the definition of deviant behavior and the 
responses to it” (Black 2010, 1–2). Cohen describes social control as “the 
organized ways in which society responds to behavior and people it regards 
as deviant, problematic, worrying, threatening, troublesome or undesirable” 
(1985, 1).  
Social control practices can also be unintentional, “as when adults 
unconsciously implant habits of behavior in their children” (Black 1984b, 
1:4). While unintentional social control is also important in everyday life, 
empirical understanding of it requires a different approach. Instead, I focus 
mostly on intentional forms of control mentioned or observed in the field. 
Consequently, the more cognitive and psychological aspects of social control 
are not included in this theoretical framework. However, because 
ethnography is an open methodology that develops in a rather spontaneous 
way, the empirical data I will present may also illustrate some internal 
feelings or motives, as they are a part of everyday life. Additionally, 
following an ethnographic methodology I do not start at the state level, but 
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instead I use a bottom-up approach based on ethnographic data of the 
everyday working lives of street vendors. In other words, my methodological 
approach starts “outside the law.”  
Typologies of Social Control 
Social control is not only about legal control, but also includes more informal 
controls that are part of our everyday lives (Black 1984b; Warner and 
Rountree 1997; Sampson 1986; Ellickson 1987; Ross 2009). Schwartz 
distinguishes between legal and non-legal control (Schwartz 1954, 473). He 
defines legal control as, “carried out by specialized functionaries who are 
socially delegated the task of intra-group control”, while informal control is 
not so delegated (Schwartz 1954, 473). According to Griffiths, the dual 
division between legal and non-legal control, sometimes called formal vs. 
informal, seems not very appropriate to understand social reality (Griffiths 
1984, 38). In practice, individual relations are regulated by multiple and 
overlapping forms of control, and additionally, individuals have their own 
will and can decide against control (for instance, through a rational choice 
perspective or based on emotions). Instead, Griffiths sees social control as 
varying from “more or less” legal, and “as exhibiting a greater or lesser 
degree of division of labor” (Griffiths 1984, 38).  
Systems of Social Control  
A system of control can be defined as being composed of rules of appropriate 
behavior, sanctions (rewards and punishments) and controllers (actors that 
enforce rules). This definition is based on Ellickson’s statement that control 
consists “of rules of normatively appropriate human behavior. These rules are 
enforced through sanctions, the administration of which is itself governed by 
rules” (1991, 124). Ellickson differentiates between five subsystems of social 
control: self-control, promisee-enforced contracts, informal control, 
organization control and legal system. The following table summarizes the 
typology of social control systems according to Ellickson. This typology 
offers general types of controllers, rules, sanctions, and combined 
subsystems. While it is a general framework, some of the experiences of 
street vendors in Bogotá are similar to the ones described in this typology, 
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such as the study of every daily relations with the police, which is an example 
of state enforcement.  
 
Figure 1 Elements of a Comprehensive System of Social Control  
Source: Ellickson (1991, 131) 
First party control refers to an actor imposing rules and sanctions on the 
individual (Ellickson 1987, 71). Second-party control refers to the acts of the 
individual acted upon (one of the parties in the contract) that “administers 
rewards and punishments depending on whether the promisor adhere to the 
promised course of behaviour” (Ellickson 1987, 72). Third party control 
“differs from second party control because the rules are ones to which the 
actor may not have agreed; “in addition the sanctions may be administered by 
persons not involved in the primary interaction” (Ellickson 1991, 127). Third 
party controllers can be “non-hierarchically organized social forces, 
organizations (non-government hierarchies that make an enforce rules) or 
governments (state hierarchies)” (Ellickson 1987, 72).  
In Ellickson’s typology of social control, he differentiates five types of rules, 
including personal ethics, contracts, norms, organization rules and law (1991, 
131). Personal ethics are defined by Ellickson as the rules that emanate from 
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first-party controllers (1987, 72).
4
 Contracts are defined as “second party 
rules that two or more parties negotiate” and they require that both parties are 
in voluntary association (1991, 246, 127). Norms (also called informal rules) 
are those that emerge from social forces and denote what is normal, but also 
the behavior that should be mimicked to avoid punishment (Ellickson 1991, 
126–7). Organization rules are those that emanate from organizations 
(Ellickson 1991, 127). Organizations can be defined as “collectivities 
oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibit relatively highly 
formalized social structures” (Scott 2003, 27). Finally, the law is used to 
describe specifically, “governmental social control.”5  
An important element in the ethnographic study of social control is the 
concept of sanctions. According to Ellickson, behavior can be divided 
between good behavior that triggers rewards, bad behavior that triggers 
punishment and ordinary behavior that brings no response (1987, 69). He 
distinguishes between two main sanctions, rewards and punishments (carrots 
and sticks). While not all social control is about sanctions, and subtle forms 
of control have an important role, it is often easier to observe the application 
of sanctions in an ethnographic study. According to Ellickson (1991, 128) 
“The best, and always sufficient, evidence that a rule is operative is the 
routine (though not necessarily inevitable) administration of sanctions –
whether rewards or punishments- upon people detected breaking the rule.”  
Consequently, there are sanctions that are typical of each subsystem of social 
control. Within the system of self-control, they are called self-sanctions and 
refer to the sanctions one administers on oneself. In the second-party system 
of control (based on bilateral contracts) the sanctions applied by the person 
acted upon are called self-help. In the case of informal control, the sanctions 
are called vicarious (delegated) self-help (Ellickson 1991, 131).
6
 The fourth 
type of sanctions are organization enforcement. Organizational control is 
often based in the power to sanction and is attached to positions within the 
                                                     
4 This definition does not have a normative content. However, ethics are commonly defined as 
“rules for distinguishing between right and wrong” (Resnik 2011, 1). 
5 This is the definition of law used by Ellickson (1987, 72), following Donald Black’s 
definition (2010, 2). 
6 While self-help means “an individual’s effort to administer sanctions in his own behalf”, in 
Ellickson’s theory this is called personal self-help, and the administration of sanctions by a 
third party (friends, relatives, gossips, and other non-hierarchical forces) is called vicarious 
self-help (1991, 131).  
52 
organization (Scott 2003, 311). Finally, the sanctions of the legal system are 
called state enforcement (Ellickson 1987, 76).  
Hybrid-Systems of Social Control  
There are various problems in achieving order through social control. First, it 
is common in modern societies to find contradicting normative systems and 
values (Åström 2013; Hydén 2011).
7
 Second, individuals have agency and 
therefore the freedom to choose whether to accept or to resist social control.
8
 
And third, people have difficulties to accept social control when the results 
can undermine their personal benefits (rational economic behavior). In the 
following section, I will explore the idea of hybrid-systems of social control 
(Ellickson 1991, 254) in order to study how multiple controllers use different 
norms.  
According to Ellickson, “a hybrid system of social control is in place when 
one controller enforces another’s rules”, for instance, when a judge uses 
customs or when a person who is not a law enforcer uses the law (Ellickson 
1991, 254–5). Hybrid systems of social control are common in everyday life 
(Ellickson 1991, 254). For this reason, Ellickson argues that in a society that 
encompasses government, organizations, contractual agreements, social 
forces, and individuals capable of self-control, there must be rules that 
determine the division of labor of social control (1991, 134–35). Ellickson 
calls these rules “controller selecting rules.” They tell us what and how to 
choose between conflicting norms that regulate the same behavior and about 
who should exercise control. In a comparison with legal rules, Ellickson 
explains that controller selecting rules are similar to choice-of-law rules and 
jurisdictional rules (Ellickson 1991, 135).  
Legal pluralism is a concept that can be helpful to describe the existence of 
different norms in society and hybrid systems of social control. Merry states 
                                                     
7 Åström argues in the context of welfare law, legal nomrs are often in competition with social 
norms, in particular professional norms (2013) 
8There are multiple reasons for an individual to act in certain way and social control is only 
one of this aspects. Individual rationality, feelings, emotions are also important. The 
concept of social control is criticized for not paying enough attention to the individual’s 
agency (Sutton 1996). One o the neo-classic economics’ premise is that individuals are 
rational maximizers of their benefit. However, people do not always make rational 
decisions or at least not completely rational.  
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that legal pluralism is generally defined as “a situation in which two or more 
legal systems coexist in the same social field” (1988). Specifically, she 
defines legal pluralism as “forms of social regulation that draw on the 
symbols of the law, to a greater or lesser extent, but that operate in the 
shadows, its parking lots and even down the street in mediation offices.” John 
Griffiths’ contribution connects legal pluralism to social control (Griffiths 
2006; Griffiths 2003; Griffiths 1986). According to him, “‘legal pluralism’ 
designates the situation in which an actor's behavior is subject to the social 
control of more than one semi-autonomous social field” (2006). His 
argument is that it is “‘social control’, and not ‘law’ that is the proper subject 
of sociology of law” (Griffiths 2006, 49). Consequently, Griffiths’ argument 
is that “the expression ‘legal pluralism’ can and should be reconceptualized 
as ‘normative pluralism’ or ‘pluralism in social control’” (2006, 64). Thus, 
this thesis adds empirically grounded material about the ways control 
pluralism develops in the everyday life of street vendors in Bogotá.  
Not Everything is about Social Control  
While the concept of social control is useful to illustrate street vendors’ 
experiences of work outside the law, the ethnographical material indicates 
that social control often encounters resistance. According to Griffiths (2003, 
57), actors have alternatives to social control that can include “lumping it, 
avoidance, exit, mobilizing some other (perhaps ‘non-legal’) rule, jotting the 
incident down in one’s mental moral balance-sheet of the relationship.”9 Not 
everyone accepts social control. Rather, one actor may decide not to follow 
some rules. Resistance to legal or other forms of social control is common. 
Sometimes, the controlled can use direct confrontation to challenge and defy 
social control. She can also use avoidance as a subtler form of resistance. 
This avoidance is similar to James Scott’s everyday acts of resistance, 
explained in his book The Weapons of the Weak. His thesis is that resistance 
does not only consist of historic events such as organized rebellions or 
collective action, but can also be exercised though less direct but powerful 
forms of “everyday resistance.” He includes examples from his study of 
peasants, such as foot dragging, evasion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned 
ignorance, slander and sabotage (1985). Bayat also writes about subtle forms 
                                                     
9 In this citation Griffiths makes reference to Ellickson (1991). 
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of resistance and he uses the term ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’, in 
order to explain “a silent, patient, protracted and pervasive advancement of 
ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in order to survive hardships 
and better their lives” (Bayat 1997, 57).  
Finally, the concepts presented in this chapter were chosen to illustrate a 
broader phenomenon and to allow for comparisons with other cases. These 
concepts are not meant to provide explanations, instead they are useful when 
describing and comparing the experiences of street vendors in Bogotá.  
Ethnography of Law 
The use of ethnography to study law was widely developed among 
anthropologists scrutinizing foreign cultures, before it was incorporated into 
socio-legal studies (Flood 2005, 37). According to Flood, while ethnography 
is open, dynamic and flexible, the use of law as a topic of research has 
brought important theoretical questions. Law in ethnography is not taken for 
granted; instead, it is part of the social and cultural practices of particular 
communities, and therefore it is a field of discovery. In anthropology of law, 
the definition of law is not an idealized form that comes from the state, but 
rather, it is loosely defined (Flood 2005, 36). Thus, in anthropology of law 
there is an assumption that “We live in a normative pluralistic world” (Ibid.).  
Legal anthropology or anthropology of law is a sub-discipline in 
anthropology concerned with empirically grounded studies of law, and 
explores issues concerning how law is manifest in different cultures, and 
what people consider to be law (Pirie 2013). An example of a classical study 
in anthropology that used an ethnographic methodology is the research of the 
legal system of New Guinean highlanders by Leopold Pospisil (1964). In this 
study, the author records the conflict resolution methods used by the 
community he studies and discusses the abstract rules that he was able to 
capture (French 1993). Pospisil started his analysis by looking into the 
polysemic definition of law in English language that includes scientific laws, 
moral laws and jural laws (1964). In more recent times, the field of 
anthropology of law has developed in an on-going debate with socio-legal 
scholars (Merry 2012, 105). They have shared concepts such as legal 
consciousness, legal culture and legal pluralism (Merry 2012).  
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A classic example of the use of ethnography in the study of non-Western 
forms of law is the book The Cheyenne Way, which explores how, despite its 
nomadic practices, The Cheyenne group has an organized set of rules 
(Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941). Ethnographic studies of law argue about the 
importance of context and how law is embedded in societal culture and 
values. According to Laura Nader, a prominent scholar in ethnography of 
law, “law cannot usefully be isolated from other social and cultural systems 
of control that serve many purposes” (Nader 2002, 27). In regard to theory 
building, Nader makes an important point in that, as researchers, we are 
shaped by Western ideas and that, often, our informants in the field are also 
shaped by these same ideas (2002, 33).  
Ethnographic studies of law and society are concerned with understanding 
law in everyday practices both in the courts but also among regular people 
(Halliday and Schmidt 2009, 83). In this regard, the use of ethnography to 
study every day law has produced interesting results, such as Greenhouse’s 
study of attitudes towards justice and law in a small, religious community in 
the USA (1989), or Urinboyev study of the informal economy in Uzbekistan 
(2013). Other examples of ethnographies of law include the study of the legal 
profession (Flood 1981), legal consciousness (Sarat 1990), formal and 
informal systems of performance evaluation (Kratavičiūtė-Ališauskienė 
2014), and legal pluralism (Goodale 2002), among others.  
The most recent collection of studies of ethnography of law is to be found in 
the anthology Ethnography and Law. This book compiles a variety of socio-
legal studies that deal with ethnography (Darian-Smith 2007). According to 
the editors of the book, one can identify some trends in the use of 
ethnography in socio-legal scholarship. First, ethnography is no longer only 
concerned with the studies of other cultures; instead, scholars from both 
Western and non-Western cultures are increasingly scrutinizing their own 
societies. Additionally, scholars are less concerned with long fieldwork stays, 
and there is a trend towards multi-sited ethnography. And finally, there is 
also a trend towards the need to be ethically responsible about the 
predominance and imposition of Western legal thought (Gillespie 2009).  
Most of the studies I have mentioned have been conducted by anthropologists 
that share an interest in the interdisciplinary study of law. Nevertheless, 
ethnography is still rarely used in sociology of law (Flood 2005, 37). With 
few exceptions (Urinboyev 2013; Flood 2005), the ethnographic approach is 
still a field in development within sociology of law to which this study makes 
a methodological contribution.  
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3. Methodology 
I can give an interview that is no problem, but you staying here with 
me all day to see how I work, I am not sure that is a good idea. Why 
don’t you start selling something instead? (Field note from August 12, 
2014) 
These were the words of one of the vendors near the Santa Fé Mall in Bogotá 
when I asked whether I could sit next to her while she worked. I was carrying 
out ethnographic research, and my goal was to take part in their daily 
routines, get a feeling for their work, and be able to observe the street 
vendors as an insider. However, many of the people I encountered were more 
comfortable with being interviewed rather than sharing their ”work space” 
with me watching what they were doing. The idea of simply observing their 
work felt very strange to them, and I do not blame them. I might have felt the 
same way in their place, and therefore I had to change my approach. First, I 
asked people for an interview, and then I asked if I could stay with them for 
some hours or days. 
While different methodologies are suitable to study street vendors, I am 
convinced that the ethnographic approach is particularly insightful and 
relevant because it offers more ways to interact with the people running small 
businesses in the streets, and to participate in their daily activities. This is 
what distinguishes ethnography from other methods, the possibility of 
spending longer periods of time observing and participating in the field, the 
flexibility to adapt the research to the field, and the rich descriptions that 
result from these interactions. Since I wanted to better understand the ways in 
which laws affects street vendors, it was not enough to collect data through 
interviews or surveys; instead, it was important to re-create the environment 
that enabled me to observe them and then describe their work and daily 
experiences in-depth (Madden 2010). 
Ethnography as a methodological approach is well suited to the study of 
social phenomena and social groups, because it pays specific attention to 
cultural understandings and the social context in which data is collected 
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(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). In addition, conducting an ethnographic 
study is predominantly about having first-hand and direct interactions that 
lead to “thick descriptions” of the phenomenon and the social group that are 
being studied (Geertz 1973). 
In my case, ethnography provided me with the methodological, analytical and 
theoretical tools to problematize current explanations for the regulation of the 
informal economy. It also allowed me to bring a more complete photograph 
of what is going on in the streets to the debate.  
Because of the different initiatives of the government of the City of Bogotá to 
regulate and formalize the work of people engaged in street businesses, it was 
an ideal site to study how law influences the welfare of this group. I was able 
to use my personal experience during the years I had studied and worked in 
Bogotá (1999-2004), which I combined with four and half months of intense 
fieldwork. I collected ethnographic data on the operations of street vendors 
and rickshaw drivers in Bogotá. Fieldwork was conducted between 2012 and 
2014.  
Three particular groups were studied: vendors inside the transitional zones, 
organized rickshaw drivers and itinerant ice cream vendors. Although the 
cases selected are not exclusive and other groups could have been included, 
these cases illustrate three different types of control. Formalized street 
vendors illustrate how state control operates. In the case of rickshaw drivers, 
they operated illegally, yet they conducted their businesses through their 
associations. Therefore, their case illustrates social control of associations. 
And in the case of ice cream sellers, they too operated illegally, however, 
they conducted their businesses under the command of big companies. These 
different types of businesses presented opportunities for comparisons of how 
law interacts with other forms of social control in the regulation of street 
vendors.  
The 307 square kilometres of Bogotá is a large area of study and required 
further delimitation. In the case of formalized vendors in the transitional 
zones it was possible to visit all the vending zones, since there are only 
sixteen. However, I conducted longer fieldwork stays in two transitional 
zones: one located in the north of Bogotá and the other in the south east. In 
the case of rickshaw drivers I chose Portal de las Americas located in the 
borough of Kennedy, which is the locality with the larger number of 
rickshaws in the city. Since two rickshaw associations controlled this 
rickshaw stop, it was possible to make comparisons at this location. Finally, 
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the case of ice cream sellers was mainly developed near the Santa Fé Mall. I 
selected this location because it illustrates the role of multiple private actors 
within the regulation of street businesses; in this case, the ice cream 
companies and the managers of the mall.  
The results I present are to a large degree based on informal conversations 
and observations during fieldwork. However, I complement these with an 
analysis of legal documents and interviews that I conducted with 
representatives from the city government, leaders of vendor and rickshaw 
associations, and people working in street businesses. While I engaged in 
conversations with a large number of people, I draw to a large degree on the 
conversations and interviews with 40 street vendors, 12 rickshaw drivers, 10 
ice-cream vendors and 7 government officials. A complete list of the main 
interviewees is available in Appendix A. I also conducted a questionnaire 
with 169 vendors in the transitional zones (Appendix B).  
Methodological Considerations  
The term ethnography has its roots in the Greek word “ethnos” (people) and 
“grapho” (writing), which translates to “writing about people.” Unlike other 
research methods that are pre-designed by the researcher such as 
experiments, surveys, or formal interviews, ethnography aims to understand 
social reality as it occurs in everyday life. Therefore, ethnographers do not 
intend to control what happens in the field. Instead, they try to gain access to 
research subjects, that is people, in a non-intrusive way (Madden 2010). 
Consequently, ethnography is not only flexible, but also uses different 
methods in order to explore a social phenomenon in the social setting where 
it takes place (Thomas 1993).  
Research methods that can be combined in ethnography are both qualitative 
and quantitative. However, ethnography as a research approach gives 
preference to more natural and everyday life encounters. The main value of 
ethnography is that it reports not only what people say about their lives, but 
also adds to it with rich descriptions of what they do, the social interactions 
between people, and in the case of Bogotá, also the interactions with 
institutions and authority, based on the observations of the researcher in the 
field (Grills 1998). The primary means to collect data in ethnography is 
through fieldwork. Fieldwork allows the researcher to make observations, 
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conduct interviews that are more natural and spontaneous, or employ 
questionnaires as a more structured way to obtain data. Moreover, a 
distinctive characteristic and aim of ethnography is that it allows the 
researcher to present the data collected as part of wider narratives, including 
the aforementioned thick or rich description of the context where the data 
was collected (Madden 2010).
10
 
Before I describe the main elements of ethnographic research in more detail, 
and how I have applied them in my thesis, I will briefly discuss the history of 
ethnography in social sciences.  
Sociological and Anthropological Approaches to Ethnography 
Ethnography as a methodology has developed within the disciplines of 
anthropology and sociology over the last hundred years (Creswell 2003). 
However, nowadays, a wide range of scientific disciplines use ethnography in 
different contexts (Scott-Jones 2010). 
Historian and ethnologist Gerhard Friedrich Müller, in his studies of the 
Siberian people, was the first to use the word ethnography (1733–1743). 
After that, the development of ethnography as a research method became a 
central part for anthropology, particularly within British social anthropology 
in the early twentieth century (Vermeulen 2008). The early development of 
ethnography in anthropology was related to participant observation and 
fieldwork, mainly in non-western cultures. For this reason, ethnographers 
were criticized for supporting the stereotype that Western cultures were 
superior and, therefore, many anthropologists were criticised for reproducing 
the colonial agenda of domination (Bryman 2001).  
In the meantime, ethnography also started to be used by sociologists. The 
connection between sociology and ethnography can be traced back to Max 
Weber (1864-1920) and his approach known as verstehende Soziologie (the 
sociology of understanding), or the study of a group from the point of view of 
its members (Gold 1997). Weber’s verstehende Soziologie is regarded as one 
                                                     
10 Consider the book “Heat Wave” in which Eric Klinenberg analysed the vulnerability of the 
urban poor in Chicago during the heat wave of the summer of 1995. In this persuasive 
story, Klinenberg made use of formal interviews, participant observation, archival research, 
and quantitative data analysis to construct a powerful story of why some residents were 
more vulnerable to heat waves, and why the government had only insufficient responses to 
their needs (Klinenberg 2003). 
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of the foundations of ethnography in sociology because it marked a shift in 
how research was conducted at that time, and prompted researchers to try to 
abstain from putting their own views of the social phenomenon forwards and 
instead rely on the views and experiences of those being studied (Gold 1997). 
However, it was the scholars of the Chicago School (1915-1935) who put 
ethnography into practice within sociological research. 
Sociologists in the early twentieth century often focused on urban settings in 
order to record the problems experienced among marginalized and troubled 
urban groups such as gangs, migrants, and deviant youths (Deegan 2001, 11). 
While these studies were also criticized for their fascination with deviance, 
they marked the development of sociological ethnography and, unlike 
anthropology, sociologists who used ethnography were more often interested 
in the discussion of theory, as I discussed in Chapter Two. 
More recently, ethnography has moved from a narrow approach to studying 
“native or local cultures” to a more interdisciplinary methodology used for 
the study of a variety of groups or social phenomenon, in whichever context 
they occur (Wolcott 1999). Contemporary ethnographers often combine 
different methods in order to enrich their descriptions of social life, and this 
methodology is now used in many fields (Wacquant 2009; Anderson 2000; 
Duneier and Carter 1999; Jerolmack 2013). 
The development of ethnography in both anthropology and sociology 
influences the way I employ ethnography. While the differences between 
sociologists and anthropologists conducting ethnography are often blurred, 
my approach is closer to sociology. I have studied a social phenomenon in 
my home city, using my mother tongue, in a context quite familiar to me. I 
felt that I would not have to be overly concerned with otherwise common 
issues, such as understanding or even gaining access to the specific culture 
and the specific context. However, I had to learn that even though I am 
Colombian, speak Spanish, and understand the culture because I am part of it, 
often this was more of a superficial understanding of the context and the 
reality that street vendors experience every day. I had to learn that I was more 
of an outsider to this culture and this group of people than I could have 
imagined. While I was not coming from an upper class family, I was 
pursuing a PhD degree in Europe which marked a class difference with most 
street vendors. In addition, my interest in how the law operates in everyday 
life for people who work as street vendors also influenced my methodological 
and theoretical approach. Nevertheless, the core ideas and values of 
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ethnography played a crucial role in this methodology and will be discussed 
below. 
My Role as a Local Researcher  
Ethnography embraces the active role of the researcher who needs to engage 
in a permanent process of reflection regarding the decisions she makes during 
the research process and the interpretation of the data. Therefore, 
ethnography accepts subjectivity in research.  
In the cases where ethnographers study their own national culture, their 
previous experiences play a role that influences and potentially supports, yet 
also hinders, research. This is true for my case. I have lived in Bogotá for 
many years, and I was aware of and could see street vendors daily. 
Sometimes I was a customer, and on a few occasions I worked as a street 
vendor myself. This personal experience allowed me to gain insights into this 
culture which have shaped my understanding and influenced my decision to 
study street vendors in Bogotá. In that sense, I do not only write about others, 
but to some extent about my own experiences as well (Denshire 2014).  
I was close to the street business culture not only as a customer but also due 
to having worked as a street vendor myself during the Christmas holidays in 
1999, as well as during my student years at university (1999-2004). While the 
time and places I visited this time were different, I felt comfortable talking 
with people engaged in street businesses, and it was relatively easy to gain 
access to the field. My situation as a local researcher allowed me to collect 
rich data during my visits to Bogotá; however, I tried to step out of the field 
in order to avoid internal view bias. The analysis of my data in between 
fieldwork helped me to transcend some of my initial assumptions and 
allowed me to explore issues that were not relevant to me at first.  
In order to differentiate my role as an ”insider” in street business culture, I 
openly discuss my position and separate my memories, observations and 
interpretations from those of the people I met. I also look carefully into cases 
that contradict my assumptions, and I strive to keep the research process open 
to different interpretations.  
While highly dependent on interpretations and intersubjectivity, ethnography 
strives for a balance between subjective aspects and the objective accounts of 
reality (Madden 2010). Thus, ethnographers often accept that their findings 
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are socially constructed and highly dependent on the context where the social 
interaction has taken place. However, this does not imply that the data does 
not represent a more generalizable social phenomenon (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007).  
Multi-Sited Ethnography 
The academic literature on ethnography describes the kind of fieldwork that 
includes different places as multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995). In 
contrast with fieldwork that develops around one site such as the 
neighbourhood, the company, or the school, multi-sited ethnography aims at 
understanding a subject that takes place in different geographical or social 
spaces. While ethnography that concentrates on one single site aims at 
acquiring deep knowledge of a culture that takes place within the limits of a 
determined location, multi-sited ethnography traces a problem across a 
variety of places. Multi-sited ethnography provides the researcher with a 
variety of perspectives on the same issue and the opportunity for theoretically 
driven comparisons between the different sites studied. However, it sacrifices 
extended periods of time, and therefore the level of interaction in the field 
can be more superficial (Marcus 1995).  
Multi-sited ethnography is more common in multi-disciplinary ethnography 
and sociological research that aims at developing theory (Nadai and Maeder 
2005). It allows for the testing of ideas in different places and provides 
researchers with the possibility to explore alternative explanations. 
Additionally, multi-sited ethnography is comparative, as it needs to reflect on 
the selection of sites and on how they contribute to the research (Ibid.). This 
in turn requires a thoughtful analysis of the field under study in relation to the 
theory of interest. In my case, because I was not interested in all the aspects 
of street businesses, and was more interested in their relationship with the 
law and their experiences of social control, I could have a theoretical focus 
that allowed me to look in detail across different fields. Because the legal 
status of people engaged in street businesses was often informal, their 
relations with the law were of special interest from an empirical and 
theoretical point of view. 
In my case, soon after I had started studying people in street businesses, I 
realized the crucial role of the location in relation to social control. There 
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were differences between congested places versus calmer and more isolated 
streets. So, instead of limiting my study to one street corner that allowed me 
to describe in detail the social interaction in a single location, I travelled 
around the city and observed differences in terms of location.  
Description of Fieldwork  
Transitional Zones  
I travelled for the first time to the city of Bogotá in order to conduct my first 
fieldwork, between July and August 2012. During this fieldwork, I studied in 
depth the transitional zones, one of the formalization initiatives in the city of 
Bogotá. There were in total 16 vending zones in the city in 2012, covering 
458 street vendors (IPES 2012). I developed intensive fieldwork in two of the 
vending zones, one in the north and one in the south. I chose the first 
location, the vending zone in the north, after having met their leader Marisol 
in a meeting at the local mayor’s office. I spent one week at Marisol’s 
vending zone and learnt about their business operations, the conflicts they 
had, and the influence of law on their well-being.  
Then I visited one of the largest vending zone in the city, located in the 
borough of Usme in the south east of Bogotá. There were 110 vendors 
operating in this zone. I visited this zone for about a month and hung around 
during their working hours. There I met Clara who let me sit next to her tent 
and participate in her daily activities. Clara was to a certain extent a gate 
opener, and although I only met her randomly during one of my visits, she 
was a sympathetic woman who maintained a good relation with the other 
vendors, and she agreed to help me during the course of my fieldwork. Prior 
to meeting Clara I would walk around the tents and talk to some of the 
vendors about their work, and conducted some informal interviews. After I 
had met Clara, my fieldwork felt much easier, as I had a place I could come 
and visit, I could participate in the daily activities of the vendors, and they 
started to see me as a member of the group.  
I finished my first fieldwork conducting a small questionnaire in the 
transitional zones. While questionnaires are not the main source of data in an 
ethnographic study they can be useful to collect demographic information 
and explore the magnitude of the phenomenon being studied (Fetterman 
2010). In this case, the questionnaire helped me to collect general 
demographic data about formalized vendors as well as their perceptions of 
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how formalization had influenced their lives. I conducted the questionnaire 
among 169 vendors in 16 transitional zones, and the results are carefully 
described in the Appendix C.
11
 
Portal de las Americas 
During my second visit to Bogotá in June 2013 I conducted fieldwork among 
rickshaw drivers at Portal de las Americas. I came in contact with this group 
on my previous trips visiting the vending zones, where rickshaw provided the 
easiest way of transportation. I took the bus and then rickshaws to the 
vending zones, but also on my visits to the government. While there were 
few rickshaws prior to 2000, after 2010 it was possible to find rickshaw 
drivers outside many bus stops in the city. Unlike vendors in the transitional 
zones they were illegal, but the operation of their business was highly 
regulated by small associations of rickshaws.  
The rickshaw stop outside Portal de las Americas was an excellent location to 
conduct fieldwork for different reasons. First, most rickshaw drivers in the 
city were located in the boroughs of Kennedy and Bosa, and Portal de las 
Americas was located right on the border of these two boroughs. Second, at 
Portal de las Americas there were two different rickshaw associations 
controlling this route, and therefore, it was possible to establish comparisons. 
This was a relatively large rickshaw stop with 70 drivers, so I was able to 
conduct various interviews. Finally, the leader of one of the rickshaw 
associations at Portal de las Americas was highly engaged in the negotiations 
for a future law for rickshaws and he allowed me to observe and participate 
in some of the activities of the association.  
 
                                                     
11 The questionnaire used for the interviews consisted of 18 questions about vendors’ socio-
economic status, working conditions, and their perceptions of their situation after the 
formalization of their businesses. I used a systematic sample in which half of the total 
vendors (458) were asked to answer the survey. Since the vendors were located in rows (in 
their respective zones), I asked every second vendor to obtain a random sample of 229. 
However, from this sample, 22 respondents were not in the tent at the time I conducted the 
survey and 38 refused to answer. The respondents were selected from the 16 transitional 
zones where the program was operating in order to ensure a complete geographic 
representation of the sample. In addition, respondents were guaranteed confidentiality to 
avoid bias in their responses. When the vendor did not know the exact answer, I asked to 
provide an estimation. This simple survey should not be viewed as a fully fledged 
statistical study, but rather as an initial way to capture the magnitude of the phenomenon. 
In total 169 vendors (93 women and 76 men) agreed to respond. The survey questions are 
listed in Appendix B and a summary of results is presented in Appendix C. 
66 
I interviewed rickshaw drivers during their work, followed their daily 
routines, share rides and spent long days with them at the rickshaw stop. I 
also interviewed the leaders of the two rickshaw associations while working 
and I followed Miguel, one of the leaders of the associations, for a few days 
of work. During the time I followed Miguel he was trying to produce a video 
to illustrate the daily work of rickshaw drivers in preparation for negotiations 
at the Ministry of Transportation. I agreed to involve my sister and help the 
association to edit this short video as a way to reciprocate all the time that 
Miguel had spent with me during my fieldwork.  
While this favour could have affected the results of my research, the 
documentary project was only developed during the last three days of my 
stay in the field, and my sister completed the video while I was away in 
Sweden. In ethnography, the researcher must strive to gain trust in the field 
but also to be able to keep a distance in order to think critically about the 
research (Fetterman 2010). On the other hand, some scholars argue that 
ethnography tends to be exploitative in the sense that participants, in some 
cases, do not have the power to confront the researcher and ask for equal 
terms of exchange (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Madden 2010). 
Appreciation and reciprocity are part of the researcher’s commitment to keep 
a respectful relation with the group studied. It is also a commitment to the 
avoidance of exploitation or harm to the people involved in the study, and to 
establishing fair relations in the field (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). In 
this case, with the help of my sister, I did not have to compensate 
economically for the documentary since she agreed to produce it free of 
charge. Instead, this became a way to achieve a balance between my interest 
in studying this group and the association’s interest in recording a short film 
to use in their political activism for the regulation of their work.  
Vendors Near the Santa Fe Mall  
During the last fieldwork of this study between December 2013 and January 
2014, I revisited formalized and non-formalized vendors and the rickshaw 
organizations. I went back to the vending zone of Santa Librada, but this time 
I focused on the vendors outside formalization programs, specifically the 
ones surrounding the formalization zone. This helped me to better understand 
non-formalized vendors’ experiences with law, but also uncover tensions and 
conflicts among formalized and non-formalized vendors. I also visited 
Miguel, the leader of the organization of rickshaw drivers at Portal de las 
Americas.  
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To have a closer look at the experiences of non-formalized vendors, I decided 
to stay near the Santa Fe Mall. While Portal de las Americas and the 
neighbourhood of Santa Librada are located in the less wealthy south, the 
Santa Fe mall was one of the newest and most luxurious malls in the north of 
the city. This was an excellent opportunity to see how social control operates 
in wealthier neighbourhoods. Here, outside the Santa Fe mall, I interviewed 
the vendors operating on both sides of the highway and observed their social 
interaction. During this fieldwork the group of ice cream vendors caught my 
attention since they were, among street vendors, the group with a lesser level 
of organization, but also the group that experienced less police control 
probably because they use smaller pushcarts that allow them to move easily. 
All of them worked for well-established ice cream companies that provided 
them with ice cream, uniforms, and refrigerators. However, despite being 
financed and supported by big private companies, they were also illegal.  
This last fieldwork was the most challenging, but also one of the most 
exciting, in terms of my findings. While in the two previous fieldworks the 
people I met were often the same individuals, the population of vendors 
outside the Santa Fe Mall was more itinerant and mobile. Although I met 
some people working in the same places, many of the vendors moved from 
place to place, and often did not come on a daily basis. In the case of itinerary 
vendors such as ice cream vendors I had to walk around with them in order to 
share longer conversations. Some of them were very hostile to my presence, 
while others were friendly and trusted me with their ice cream carts while 
they went to the toilet or needed to exchange a large bill.  
The three sites included in this research allowed me to compare and contrast 
different settings where social control operates. Although these sites are 
diverse and illustrate interesting theoretical issues, they are not representative 
of the city, and further studies could compare the conclusion of this thesis to 
other cases and places. However, for the purpose of this thesis these three 
cases provide illustrations of some of the practices of social control that are 
present in the everyday working lives of people engaged in street businesses.  
Visiting the Government  
I would like to end this section by briefly explaining my visits to government 
offices in Bogotá, particularly to the Institute for the Social Economy (IPES). 
There, I was able to interview the director of this office and the person in 
charge of the transitional zones. However, because they were often busy 
during my visits, I had time to spend in the corridors of this office, and I met 
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two other officials that shared some of their experiences working inside this 
organization. I also interviewed the person coordinating the Decent Work 
Agenda for the city and the government official in charge of the draft of the 
new regulation for street vendors. Among the rickshaw drivers, I interviewed 
the person working on the draft of the regulation for rickshaws at the 
Ministry of Transportation by telephone. The visits and interviews with the 
government allowed me to grasp some of their views on the issue of street 
businesses. The following map illustrates the main locations of fieldwork.  
 
Figure 2 Fieldwork sites 
Location of Bogotá, Colombia in South America, (1) Santa Fé Mall, (2) Portal de las Americas, (3) Vending 
Zone in Santa Librada, (4) Institute for Social Economy (IPES).  
Source: Cadastre of Bogotá 2016. Map developed by Karen GarcíaAccess to the Field 
Since I conducted most of my fieldwork in public spaces, initial access to the 
field was relatively easy. While entering the public space where people 
conducted street businesses was not a problem, getting access to their 
activities was more complicated and required a careful process of gaining 
trust and sympathy from the people in the field. Each time I met a new person 
in the field, I introduced myself as a PhD student conducting a study on the 
regulation of street vendors. Sometimes people rejected my presence 
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immediately and said they did not have the time, other times they asked me if 
I was from the government, or thought I was from the Office for National 
Statistics (DANE). The first time I visited a new place where I had not made 
previous contacts, I felt anxiety in my stomach that was similar to the feeling 
I have when I have to ask a stranger for a favour on the street. Obviously, I 
had a fear of being rejected, and yes, I was rejected sometimes. Sometimes 
people thought I was coming from the government and did not want to talk to 
me. Other times they simply said they were working and I should leave them 
alone. However, most of the time people were pleasant and said they could 
share some words with me while they were working. After introductions, the 
problem was how to explain them that I wanted to “hang around” and 
observe their daily lives. I felt awkward, and people often asked whether the 
interviews would not be enough. I had to explain that I was more interested 
in their everyday lives, and that I only wanted to spend time in the streets to 
get acquainted with their work.  
Key contacts in the three locations where I conducted fieldwork helped me 
feel more comfortable during my visits. In turn, those key contacts facilitated 
conversations with their colleagues, and people that initially had refused 
sometimes talked to me once they felt they could trust me. However, this also 
got me in trouble since some of my key contacts had conflicting views with 
other people, and therefore, I had to manage to gain trust from the other side. 
For instance, in the vending zone near the Santa Féa mall, Marisol introduced 
me to some of her colleagues, making it easier for me to enter this territory. 
However, later I realized some vendors were in conflict with her, and I had to 
avoid spending too much time with her in order for other vendors to feel 
comfortable talking to me. As explained by Hammersley and Atkinson, 
relations in the field can be facilitative or obstructive (2010, 74). Getting too 
close to a person in the field may complicate achieving independence in the 
field, and I had to balance trust and closeness with some distance in the field.  
I believe my situation as a middle class woman also helped me gain access 
and trust in the field. Being a woman, I believe was helpful so that people 
could feel no threat of violence. I also dressed in a very informal way since 
researcher appearance can be important in shaping relationships with people 
in the field (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). While the people I met were 
often impressed by me studying in Sweden, I also told them about my law 
studies at the university in Bogotá. This helped them feel more familiar with 
the kind of studies I was conducting, and sometimes they had legal consults 
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with me. In those cases I tried to help when I could, and in other cases I 
provided people with the phone number to the law clinic at my olduniversity. 
Informal Conversation and Interviews  
During my fieldwork I initiated conversations with most of the people I met 
in the field. I will describe how conversations and interviews were conducted 
and the questions I often asked during my fieldwork in greater detail. These 
encounters varied from informal interviews in the street, spontaneous 
conversations during fieldwork, and semi-structured interviews with 
government officials and leaders of the associations of street businesses. Let 
me consider each of them.  
When I visited a new field site for the first time, I often had to negotiate my 
entrance through informal interviews. I would arrive at one place and 
approach the first vendor I found and ask whether he or she could spare a few 
minutes for an interview. If the person agreed, I started by asking them 
general questions about their work, how long they had worked, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of working in street businesses. I took notes 
during these short interviews that lasted about 10 minutes.  
After the short interview I asked the informants whether I could stay and 
accompany them during their work day to get a better feeling of what is like 
to be a street vendor. If the person agreed I was able to stay for a longer 
period of time. I got somewhat involved in the businesses, so that my 
presence was not merely a hindrance to their work; for instance, I was 
prepared to tell costumers about the prices, or I would watch their pushcarts 
when the vendors needed. Sometimes costumers approached me thinking I 
was the vendor, and I would re-direct them to the person in charge. This 
lengthier interaction was not always possible and required me to grasp 
whether the person felt easy about my presence. In this case, I not only 
observed the vendor’s acceptance when asking whether I could stay and 
accompany them, but I also noted whether the conversation was flowing 
spontaneously and whether both vendor and I felt comfortable with each 
other. In some cases, I decided to thank the vendors for their time with me 
and leave, while in other cases I was able to share several days with the same 
vendors. During that time, I often asked questions about their encounters with 
the police, about how it is to start a street business and in general about how 
they see they work.  
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When I was able to meet someone for a few days, the other vendors would 
often start to wonder what I was doing. Many times they started to talk to me 
and ask me about my research. They asked me whether I wanted to become a 
vendor, they asked me about my life in Sweden and how I had managed to 
get to study there. I shared some details about my private life, which often led 
to more interesting conversations about their children, their dreams, and their 
thoughts on the political situation of the country.  
Transcriptions and Analysis  
Writing field notes is a central activity in ethnography and helps to ensure the 
quality of the research (Gold 1997). I recorded jottings from participant 
observations and informal interviews. I often started with short interviews 
during which I took notes in my journal. Then, I put the journal in my bag 
and tried to participate in a more spontaneous way. I took some photographs 
when I was allowed and used them to write contextual notes later about the 
setting where my fieldwork had taken place. The jottings were used to 
develop longer notes that make readable what was happening on the field. 
Those are what I call field notes. I also use exact quotes when I have them. 
The jottings, quotes and field notes were taken in Spanish and translated by 
me.  
I wrote a total of three journals, one for each trip. I have re-read the journals 
on different occasions to add descriptions and complement my initial 
observations. However, the participants’ quotes are taken exclusively from 
the jottings made in the journals in order to differentiate them from my 
observations, memories, and feelings during fieldwork. While most 
interviews were informal, I recorded six interviews with the leaders of 
different associations of street vendors, one interview with the leader of the 
association of rickshaw drivers and three interviews with itinerary vendors.  
I analysed my field notes using two approaches. First, I shared these 
fieldwork reports with my colleagues and my supervisors in Sweden during a 
workshop in May 2015. They read the field notes and shared with me their 
interpretations of relevant themes that could be extracted from the field. This 
allowed me to take a step outside my own view of the research and try to see 
what my field notes tell other readers. From this workshop, the following 
main themes came up: a) the contradicting feelings of freedom and hardship; 
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b) the absence of reflections on welfare structures, and instead the importance 
of everyday needs; c) the authorities’ views on the need to clean up the 
streets; d) the mix of law and other forms of social control; d) the discourses 
of legitimation and neutralization of street vendors about their work and e) 
the blurred line between private life and working life.  
The second approach for the analysis was to use the software Nvivo to 
identify common themes. I inserted my field reports into Nvivo and ran a 
frequency word analysis, and found the most common words used in my 
notes. I grouped the words into similar themes from which the following 
nodes appeared: place (the street, the route, the tent, and the zone), time (at 
night, the weekend, and the busy hours), the police and the business (the 
money, the stuff, payments, and the fees). Then, I conducted a second round 
of groupings among repeated themes, and from this process I extracted the 
following themes: a) relations with the police, b) the role of big companies, c) 
relations between old and new vendors in the use of public space, d) conflicts 
and violence among people engaged in street businesses, e) competition for 
good business spots, f) comparison of working conditions in street businesses 
and jobs outside the streets, g) strategies to avoid and resist control, h) 
coming everyday and the role of perseverance in the streets and i) the 
emerging discourse within the government about street mafias and vulnerable 
groups.  
The themes from the expert workshop and the Nvivo analysis were further 
combined. Then I conducted a deeper level of analysis around the issue of 
social control, which is my theoretical concern. At this level of analysis, I 
group the field notes in two five types of social control and one theme on 
well-being (See Chapters Five to Ten). 
I combine stories, anecdotes, observations, and memories with the goal that 
the empirical chapters will provide powerful imagery that allows the reader to 
mentally travel the streets of Bogotá. After all, the thick and rich descriptions 
of social life are a way for the ethnographer to present her findings 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). 
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Limitations of Ethnography 
As I explained in the introduction chapter, ethnography is a rich and flexible 
methodology that allows the researcher to uncover the complexity of social 
life, it is also limited to drawing generalizations from the field. First, 
ethnographers often study only a few cases, and therefore their data can be 
limited in scope (Davies 2008). Another limitation is the role of the 
researcher as the primary source of data; field notes and more or less all data 
depend on a presence in the field, and therefore the data relies on people’s 
interpretations of their lives, and subsequently on the researcher’s 
interpretations of what was observed and collected in the field. While these 
limitations are important, I agree with the argument of other ethnographers 
that being aware of those limitations is the first step to gaining validity and 
reliability of the data collected (Fetterman 2010; Davies 2008).  
Raymond Gold, who studied sociology at the University of Chicago, 
proposed to use at least four strategies to achieve reliability and validity in 
ethnography (1997). First, there is a large concern about sampling and the 
selection of informants in the field. Sociologists give great importance to 
making explicit why some groups and not others are included, and there is a 
conscious effort to generate a theoretical sample that allows the researcher to 
include different groups, categories, and contradicting cases (ibid.). In my 
case I actively looked to include different cases that could provide alternative 
explanations. I relied on formalized and informal vendors, vendors in conflict 
areas where police control was strong, as well as in more relaxed areas.  
A second important step to achieve validity in ethnography is to explore 
different and alternative explanations for an issue. The inclusion of 
contradicting stories is carefully used as a way to avoid single views of social 
life. Additionally, discussing the findings with informants and sharing the 
researcher’s interpretations is seen as a way to produce more accurate and 
validated knowledge. In my case, I constantly discussed some of my findings 
with my informants in the field, and I also returned to the field on subsequent 
trips and discussed my research with some of the vendors.  
Finally, by placing the study within a historical and socio-economic context 
and revealing the way I conducted my analysis, ethnography aims to 
overcome bias and expose the entire research process to scrutiny. 
Consequently, in this chapter I have explained the sampling process, access 
to the field, and how I extracted different themes of analysis. I have also used 
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a “self-check” of my field notes allowing other researchers to analyse and 
interpret my data in alternative ways (Murchison 2010, 25:188). Furthermore, 
I have reflected on my situation as a local researcher and am aware of the 
subjectivities involved in the process of collecting and writing ethnographic 
research; yet, I have tried to take the necessary steps to gather data that can 
contribute to the development of academic knowledge.  
Ethical Considerations  
Upholding ethical standards implies a commitment to basic human rights of 
autonomy and dignity and is therefore essential to any kind of research 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 209). In ethnography the code of ethics of 
the American Anthropological Association is often used as a guide to 
determine the basic values that must be respected throughout the research 
process (Madison 2011). This code lists at least three relevant ideas: to avoid 
harm or wrong, to respect the well-being of humans, and to consult actively 
with the affected individual on their role in the research in order to establish a 
relation that is beneficial to all parties. Ethical considerations in ethnography 
are part of the design and development of the research process as well as the 
presentation of the results. Because of the flexibility and high involvement of 
the ethnographers during their research, they have a greater deal of 
responsibility in upholding ethical standards throughout the entire research 
process. Therefore, upholding ethics in ethnography is a constant “practice” 
(Scott-Jones 2010). I will discuss these ethical considerations in more detail, 
and how they were practiced during my academic work. 
Informed Consent 
It is stated that researchers must approach the field in an open way, explain 
the aims of their study, and ask participants for their agreement to participate. 
However, ethnographers often enter the field without knowing the final aims 
and questions of their research, and therefore they must negotiate informed 
consent throughout the entire research process. People should have the right 
to re-negotiate their consent at any time, to request the confidentiality of the 
information they provide, or to simply withdraw from the research.  
In practice, obtaining ”free informed consent” depends on the way one 
approaches people in the field, and requires closer examination. The way I 
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often started my fieldwork interactions was by presenting myself to the 
person in the street and telling them I was a university researcher conducting 
research on street business regulation. I showed them my university ID as a 
way to provide proof of my identity. I told them this was an informal 
interview and that I would not record their names, and that I would guarantee 
confidentiality of our conversation. I also explained they could continue 
working and that I could just sit next to them or accompany them while they 
worked, but I also told them I did not want to disturb them and that they 
could say no if they did not want to participate.  
Informed consent was constantly negotiated through my interaction in the 
field, and I paid attention to the interest people showed in my research. In a 
few cases, the person told me they were busy and that the interview would 
have to be enough, and I understood this as a clear sign of them denying 
consent and moved on. While the streets are open to anyone, I respected the 
autonomy and privacy of the people I met, and I preferred to move to a new 
street rather than to make them uncomfortable with my presence. However, 
most of the time I met friendly vendors who shared their time and knowledge 
with me.  
During the development of fieldwork, the research is responsible for the 
questions posed to the participants. The questions should avoid judgment and 
be formulated to try to understand the point of view of the people in the study 
(Madison 2011, 100). In this regard, Madison suggests ethnographers must 
avoid stereotypes, ensure that their interactions develop within the terms of 
the group, and reject an arrogant approach (Madison 2011, 118). When 
meeting people in the streets, I would try to avoid the distance that can arise 
from my cognition as an academic researcher in a university in Europe. Still, 
sometimes I met people in the field that did not like my presence. They had 
all the right to manifest their discomfort, and on such occasions I would try to 
gain their trust through patience and over time, and at other times I simply 
left the field.  
Harm and Negative Impact  
Reflecting on the harm and negative consequences of research is of great 
importance. In considering the possible harm that research can cause before 
and after the study’s publication, the interests of the people in the study must 
always come first (Madison 2011). The researcher must identify, as far as 
possible, the implications of the research for the group studied. In order to 
avoid harm and negative impacts, Madison lists the following steps: 
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researchers must discuss their findings with the group in order to identify 
sensitive issues that cannot be accounted for by the researcher (Madison 
2011, 134). The data must be contextualized as much as possible to avoid 
oversimplifications and the perpetuation of stereotypes that can further 
marginalize a group. The researcher must explain the importance of the study 
for the community and avoid the study of a group only for the sake of 
extracting knowledge for the outside world.  
I have taken into consideration the possible consequences of this research for 
the group studied. Few delicate issues arose during research, and I tried to 
deal with them in order to respect the integrity of the people in my research. 
Some of these issues included corruption, violence, and illegal activities 
among the vendors and rickshaws organizations, as well as within the 
government. When these kinds of accusations were made in the field, I 
treated them with respect, but I also tried to explore them in detail and to find 
contradicting stories in order to provide a more complex photograph in my 
results. Since these accusations could harm the persons involved, I have 
changed the names of all the people that participated in this research to 
ensure privacy and confidentiality. While changing the names can reduce the 
ability of other researchers to confirm my findings, when dealing with issues 
such as corruption and street violence I believe the respect for confidentiality 
comes first.  
Compensation and Avoiding Exploitation  
During this research I have asked participants to help me with their time and 
knowledge in the provision of data for my doctoral degree and explained that 
they could not expect to receive anything in return. Engaging in this kind of 
exchange in which people give and the researcher takes requires ethical 
consideration of the possibilities of exploitation during research. Hammersley 
and Atkinson (2007) put it in these words: in ethnographic research people 
“supply the information which is used by the researcher and yet get little or 
nothing in return.” However, unpaid participation in research is common and 
people often agree to provide information to researchers for non-economic 
reasons. A few times, I asked my informants why they had decided to share 
their valuable time with me and received very different answers. Some 
people said talking to me was not much work, others felt they were able to 
reveal their problems, some of them were friendly to everyone and often 
engaged in altruistic behaviour, while many others simply answered “why 
not.”  
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While remuneration is not common in ethnographic studies, researchers can 
compensate participants for their time, they can engage in community work, 
or they can show appreciation in other ways (Hammersley and Atkinson 
2007). In my case, I was never asked for payments in exchange in the streets, 
and I saw no reason to provide them except in some cases when I saw the 
person could not work while talking to me. This was the case for Luis the 
rickshaw driver who let me ride with him for a day. Although he was happy 
to share a working day with me he could only take one passenger in the 
rickshaw, and I soon realized he was losing money because of me. He refused 
to let me pay for the rides, so I invited him for lunch the next day. However, 
in some cases, vendors invited me for coffee and I reciprocated by inviting 
them the next time. While this can be considered getting too close, I kept a 
distance toward the research; but, in order to participate in street business 
culture it was disrespectful to reject someone holding a cup of coffee in their 
hands.  
Another important engagement concerning compensation and the avoidance 
of exploitation in my research occurred during my involvement in the short 
film for the rickshaw association. In this case I helped the association record 
and edit the video. This informal exchange helped me spend more time with 
the people of the association, but it also allowed me to contribute to the 
group’s interests. However, my involvement in this video only occurred 
towards the end of my fieldwork, and the information I was able to collect 
was not dependant on this kind of reciprocation.  
Finally, I believe an important way to give something back to the 
communities I studied is the dissemination of my study among government 
officials in Colombia and the leaders of the associations of street vendors. 
For that reason, I will try to disseminate the results of my research among 
policy makers and social organizations interested in street vendors. 
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4. Legal Culture of Colombia and 
the Regulation of Street Businesses 
Many years later, as he faced the firing squad, Colonel Aureliano Buendia 
was to remember that distant afternoon when his father took him to discover 
ice. (Gabriel García Márquez, 1967, opening line in ‘One Hundred Years of 
Solitude’) 
Colombia is a special place. Its landscapes are of outstanding beauty, but 
drenched in blood. Its people are joyous, yet most families carry an immense 
burden of pain and loss of loved ones in their hearts. Gabriel García Márquez, 
the famous Colombian author and winner of the Nobel Prize in literature, had 
the outstanding talent to capture the lunacy that we often still can observe and 
experience in Colombia until this day. Márquez created Magical Realism, 
revealing the magical of reality and his imaginative town of Macondo, the 
place he uses to recount a family’s entanglements throughout history as a 
symbol of Colombia. In order for the reader to understand where I come from 
and to situate this study of street vendors in Bogotá, I provide in this chapter 
a short description of the historical and socio-economic aspects that have 
both marked and shaped Colombian society throughout the last century, 
based on secondary sources. I also provide an account of the most relevant 
aspects of the legal culture.
12
 Furthermore I enunciate the legal framework of 
street businesses in Bogotá, using doctrinal methodology that describes legal 
regulation and how it is used in judicial reasoning (Dobinson and Johns 
2007). 
                                                     
12 David Nelken defines legal culture as ”one way of describing relatively stable patterns of 
legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes. The identifying elements of legal culture 
range from facts about institutions such as the number and role of lawyers or the ways 
judges are appointed and controlled, to various forms of behaviour such as litigation or 
prison rates, and, at the other extreme, more nebulous aspects of ideas, values, aspirations 
and mentalities” (Nelken 2004, 1). 
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A Country of Contrasts and Beauty 
Colombia is the fourth biggest country in South America, with a land area of 
1,138,000 km
2, 
approximately 2.4 times larger than Sweden. Colombia is 
home to an immense natural and ethnic diversity. Being located on the 
Equator, Colombia is primarily characterized by a tropical climate. However, 
due in part to its topography, it contains a great variety of ecosystems and 
biomes, from tropical rainforests and flat savannah plains to alpine grasslands 
and snowy peaks (CDB 2015). Colombia borders the Pacific Ocean to the 
west and the Caribbean Sea to the north. It shares a border with Panama, 
Venezuela, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador. Many parts of the country are quite 
remote, partly due to the dense and relatively intact forests of the Choco in 
the western parts of the country, and the immense Amazonian rainforest in 
the east (Palacios 2006, 5). 
Colombia ranks number one in the world for bird, amphibian and butterfly 
species (CBD 2015). Roughly 10% of the planet’s species are found amid its 
many ecosystems (CBD 2015). Colombia is also home to more than 90 
different indigenous groups and more than 60 different languages. Despite 
this astonishing array of cultural and biological diversity, Colombia’s 
indigenous people and unique species face great threats. The expansion of 
industrial agriculture, illegal and legal resource extraction, and the increase in 
large-scale extractive industries such as oil, mining, and logging continue to 
degrade and fragment ecosystems and threaten many local and indigenous 
communities (CBD 2015). 
A History of Suppression, Blood and War, with Sunrise on the Horizon 
The Republic of Colombia, its people and political landscape, are marked by 
a tumultuous history of centuries of colonial suppression by the Spanish, and 
the ensuing political and social conflict. Colombia gained independence from 
Spain in 1819 and after decades of political struggle combined with violence 
and reconfiguration of the territory, the Republic of Colombia was declared 
in 1886. War and violence have been part of the Colombian history with 
some periods of extreme chaos and social unrest, such as the time known as 
La Violencia (1948-1953), which resulted in the deaths of more than 200,000 
peasants and political leaders. This particular period of time is of 
transcendental importance in the history of Colombia, not only because it 
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generated a military coup in 1953, but because it led to the creation of a 
limited democracy with alternation of power between the conservative and 
liberal party (1958-74), and it marked the beginning of the guerrilla 
movement (Palacios 2006). 
Violence returned to Colombia in the 1960s when an armed conflict erupted 
between various guerrilla rebel groups and the government of Colombia. An 
estimated 220,000 people have died during the armed conflict, most of them 
civilians. In addition to the loss of life, approximately 6 million people have 
become internally displaced, having to leave their rural homelands and 
villages due to violence and fear (UNHCR 2015). According to the UNHCR 
(2015), widespread security risks and violence involving the forced 
recruitment of children and youth, sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV), threats, disappearances and murders continue to occur, despite the 
Colombian government’s efforts to improve its response to forced 
displacement and to implement the Law on Victims and Land Restitution 
(Ley 1448 of 2011 signed by the Congress of Colombia). Moreover, there has 
been poor response to the economic needs of the families that have moved to 
urban areas as a result of the conflict and often they live under extreme 
poverty conditions (Ibáñez Londoño 2011). 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC) and the National Liberation Army 
(Ejército de Liberación Nacional - ELN) are the two main left-wing guerrilla 
groups fighting against the government. On the opposite side are numerous 
right-wing paramilitary groups who also engage in the armed conflict. The 
reasons for the conflict are multiple, but the unequal distribution of land in 
Colombia has been one of the main motivations for the guerrilla groups to 
take up weapons (Fajardo 2002). Although the armed conflict started as an 
ideological movement, all groups, both left-wing guerrillas and right-wing 
paramilitary groups, engage in the drug trade, extortion and kidnapping 
(Fajardo 2002). Moreover, the suppression of political rights and civil 
liberties is a continuous issue, and while regular democratic elections are 
held, they are only partly free. Threats and violence against political leaders 
are still a major problem. The assassination of political leaders is a recurrent 
fact with a record number of 41 candidates killed during the campaigns in 
2011 (Freedom House 2014). Engaging in politics in Colombia is, arguably a 
dangerous endeavour and a game of fire. 
Tired of decades of war and armed conflict, with hundreds of thousands of 
casualties, the Colombian government under the current president Juan 
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Manuel Santos started negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC since 
2012, which is expected to be signed in 2016 (Beittel 2015). 
Socio-Economics – the Wounds of the Past are the Scars of the Future 
Colombia is classified as an upper middle-income country (World Bank 
2015a). Nevertheless, poverty is widespread and 30.6% of its population (i.e., 
14 million out of 47.49 million inhabitants) lives in poverty. The poverty line 
is established at a monthly income per capita of 206,091 Colombian Pesos, 
equivalent to 67 USD
13
 (DANE 2014b). Poverty levels are higher in rural 
(42.8%) compared to urban areas (26.9%) (DANE 2014b).  
In terms of income inequalities, Colombia is considered the third most 
unequal country in Latin America, with a GINI index
14
 of 53.9, which 
underlines the degree to which the distribution of income or consumption 
deviates among households or individuals in the country (World Bank 
2015a). Based on data from 2013, Colombia ranks at 98
th
 place globally with 
a Human Development Index (HDI)
15
 of 0.711 (UNDP 2014). Furthermore, 
poverty and inequality disproportionately affects women, children, Afro-
Colombian, and indigenous groups and internally displaced persons (UNDP 
2014). 
Corruption is a continuous problem in Colombia and transcends many 
administrative levels and business sectors. According to Transparency 
International which publishes a yearly corruption perception index that ranks 
countries based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be, 
Colombia scores 37, with 100 being very clean and 0 highly corrupt (TI 
2014). 
  
                                                     
13 The conversion rates made through the thesis are all based on the rate of USD from 
December 1, 2014: 1 USD = 2261.011431451 COP, Source: XE Currency converter 
available at http://www.xe.com/ 
14 For the Gini index, a value of 0 represents absolute equality, while a value of 100 represents 
absolute inequality; Sweden with 27.3 has one of the lowest Gini indexes and thus one of 
the highest levels of equality in the world (World Bank, 2015a).  
15 The HDI is defined as the composite index measuring average achievement in three basic 
dimensions of human development - a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent 
standard of living, Norway ranks 1st and Niger ranks in last place (187) (UNDP, 2015). 
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Urbanization and Working Conditions  
More than 34% of Colombia’s population lives in only three major cities. 
The capital of Bogotá has 9.7 million inhabitants, Medellín has 3.9 million 
inhabitants, and Cali has 2.6 million inhabitants (DANE 2015a). The high 
urbanization rate in Colombia (75.1%) is quite typical for South America 
(83.7% of urbanization) (DANE 2015a). However, a high level of 
urbanization, particularly when it is concentrated in a few large cities, has 
many social and environmental implications, for example, socio-economic 
segmentation and increasing levels of pollution (Fay 2005). This socio-
economic segmentation has created large areas of urban poverty, where sub-
standard housing is common, infrastructure is deteriorating and municipal 
services are in short supply. Although there are many initiatives in Colombia 
to address urban poverty, the already existing inequalities and income gaps 
persist (Joumard and Londoño Vélez 2013).  
In terms of the labour market, Colombia has a relatively low unemployment 
rate, estimated at 9% for 2015 (DANE 2015c). However, the low 
unemployment rate hides an inequitable reality. The World Development 
Indicators from 2012 reveal that 48.6% of the labour force is in a situation of 
vulnerable employment, for instance, as unpaid family workers and own-
account workers (World Bank 2015a). And, although youth unemployment in 
Colombia has decreased continuously over the past years and the latest 
unemployment rate for youth (aged 14-28) is 15.7%, almost half of all those 
who work do so in vulnerable conditions, either working on their own 
account, or as domestic workers or day labourers (DANE 2015b).  
The Colombian Welfare State 
According to the National Constitution, Colombia is “Estado Social de 
Derecho” which translates into a “Social Rule of Law”. In practice the 
Colombia welfare system combines elements of the ‘welfare state’ and the 
neo-liberal state. That is the state ensures access to basic health care, 
education and some social protection. The protection of the state is limited 
and private companies as well as the family provide many services under a 
market economy or a mix of private and public funds. Historically the 
welfare state in Colombia, like in other Latin Americas countries, has been 
highly stratified, with wider protections for state employees, while larger 
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groups continue to be excluded from access to basic services (Segura-
Ubiergo 2007). 
One way to illustrate the size and coverage of the Colombian welfare state is 
through the percentage of social expenditure. For instance the social 
expenditure as percentage of the GDP (OECD 2016) is in Sweden (28.1%), 
USA (19.2 %), Spain (26.8 %), Mexico (7.9 %), Chile (10%).
16
 In Colombia 
social expenditure was 13.6% in 2013 (CEPAL 2015). While social 
expenditure has increased in the last years, there is still a gap in the coverage 
with few groups getting benefits while others are left out. However, in order 
to get a glance into the role of the state in the provision of welfare in 
Colombia, it is necessary to look into specific areas.  
Access to Education is a basic right in Colombia and it is provided by public 
and private schools. According to the study of Martha Delgado (2014) the 
coverage in primary (1
st
 to 5
th
 grade) and secondary (6
th
 to 9
th
 grade) school is 
100%. That is basically all children go to school. There is only one year of 
mandatory preschool and the coverage is of 97%. Access to high school (10
th
 
to 11
th
 grade) has coverage of 75%. However, only 48% of the students that 
start high school in rural areas achieve graduation, in comparison with 82% 
in urban areas. Education in public schools is totally free since 2012. 
Nevertheless, the quality of public education is often lower than of private 
schools. Public schools often have shorter school hours and the scores of the 
PISA test in 2012 also indicate better results for private schools (Ibib.). 
Access to university studies is more limited in Colombia. From the 132 
universities that exist in the country only 13 are public, the rest are private 
and collect fees from the students. Only 34% of the people in age of 
advanced education (university and technical) are attending. Moreover the 
difference in access to education between the wealthiest sections of society 
and the poorest groups is the highest in Latin America, in Colombia from the 
poorest quintal only 8.5% can access university studies (Brunner 2011). 
According to the national statistics from 2012, about 91% of the population 
in Colombia is affiliated to a health insurance (Minsalud 2016). There are 
two main types of insurance, one is through work (contributing) where 
workers pay 4% of the salary and employers 8.5%. This insurance covers 
42.8% of the population. The other insurance is the national subsidized 
                                                     
16 Data from the OEDC Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm 
85 
insurance for people without ”formal” work and includes 48.2% of the 
population. Most people outside the health insurance are living in the amazon 
of Colombia. People that are part of the contributing insurance have access to 
more services, treatments and medicines. Thus in practice, there is a great 
deal of inequality in terms of health care. 
Access to pensions is low and estimates indicate that only one in ten 
Colombians can get access to a pension (Mintrabajo 2016). While about 20% 
of the workers are paying to the pension insurance, due to the flexibilisation 
of labour and the years needed to pension, estimates indicate that many of 
them will not qualify to receive a pension. The system is highly unsustainable 
and inequitable because the state subsidy goes to everyone contributing. 
Thus, those getting the highest pensions (about 20%) get 81% of the state 
subsidies (Fedesarrollo 2010), whereas the rest (less than 20 %) goes to other 
groups.  
Public child care is provided to 1.7 million children through ”community 
mothers”, that is, women who take care of 12 to 14 children in their house 
and some community centres. Community mothers were a case of state 
sponsored informality as they were not considered workers and instead 
received a ”scholarship” of less than the minimal wage. However after years 
of protests and a favourable decision in the Constitutional Court, community 
mothers were finally formalized in 2014 and at least now they have a 
minimum wage. However they are still fighting for equal rights since the 
state sub-contracted them through other institutions in order to avoid 
collective contracts and they have a contract of only 8 months instead of one 
year (Pinzón 2015).  
Socio-Economic Characterization of Street Vendors 
As noted earlier, Bogotá is home to more than nine million inhabitants. It has 
a population density of 59,000 people per square kilometre more than double 
the density of London (Sedghi 2015). It is the political and administrative 
centre of the country and concentrates a large economic activity. Bogotá’s 
GDP in 2014 was 24.87% of Colombia’s total, with 94 thousand million 
USD. However, the participation of different activities in the GDP of Bogotá 
reflects a very small industrial activity (9.6 %), commerce (14.9%) and the 
financial; real estate and service sector is the largest (33.3%) (DANE 2014a). 
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The city of Bogotá has made enormous advances in terms of poverty 
reduction in the last ten years, still 17.3% of the city residents live under the 
poverty line and 4% are in extreme poverty. Poverty has decreased at high 
rates, with total poverty level of 53.1% in 2000 going down to 21.3 percent in 
2011.
17
 Still, Bogotá is a city of large social and economic divides, and nearly 
half of the working population is employed in the informal economy. 
Estimates indicate that 43.6% of the workers in Bogotá were informal in 
2015 (DANE 2015a). This means they lack social security protection of 
pension and work related insurances. In addition unemployment oscillates 
between 10 and 8% (8.6% in 2013). Regarding street vendors, estimates 
indicate that there are more than 100,000 persons working in the streets of 
Bogotá .
18
  
Street vendors have existed in Bogotá since colonial times and the legal 
regulation of their economic activities date from 1932 (Simanca 2007). In 
contrast, the phenomenon of rickshaw driving is more recent with the first 
vehicles operating approximately since the 2000s (CID 2013). While the 
activity of rickshaw driving is not allowed under the current legislation 
(2015), street vendors could in theory formalize their work in different 
programs offered by the city.  
The socio-economic characterization made by the city government in 2004 
includes information from a survey of 39,492 vendors. According to this 
survey the average age of a street vendor is 41 years old, four per cent of the 
total number of vendors are younger than 20 years old and 8.6 per cent are 60 
years or older. Most street vendors are women (55%) of whom 26% are 
heads of the household. An interesting fact from this survey was that half of 
the street vendors answered that if they were offered a formal job where they 
would earn the same they earn now they would not leave their work as street 
vendors. The highest education level achieved by most of the vendors (85%) 
is primary school. Only 5 per cent completed basic secondary education or 
                                                     
17 Informe de gestion IPES 2011. Extreme poverty is calculated according to the value of the 
basic food needs of a person established in 2011 for 73,984 pesos (USD). The poverty line 
is instead calculated using the Orshansky Coefficient with a value of 177,562 pesos (USD) 
for urban areas.  
18 These estimates are based on a question that asks people about the place of work. From this 
question 162,198 reported to work in a mobile business, 56,337 work in the streets in a 
fixed place, and 1,788 work in kiosks. Encuesta Nacional de Calidad de Visa 2008. 
www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/condiciones_vida/calidad_vida/anexos/Cuadro42.xl
s 
87 
higher education. Additionally, 42% of the vendors live in the three poorest 
boroughs of the city and 46% has another family member that is also working 
as a street vendor. In average a vendor has been working in the streets for the 
last 11 years and the vendors with the lowest levels of education are the ones 
that have worked in the streets for longer time (Castañeda and Garcia 2007). 
According to the survey collected by the National University of Colombia 
(CID 2013), there are a total of 3,054 rickshaw drivers, while the National 
Federation of rickshaws claims they are more than 8,000 (T-442-13). From 
the first study 51.4 % are present in the borough of Kennedy and 21.3 % 
work in the borough of Bosa.
19
 Most rickshaw drivers are men (93.5 %) and 
between the age of 27 to 59 years old (56%). The second largest age group is 
between the ages of 18 to 26 (28%), between 14 to 17 years old (10%) and 
only few were of 60 years or older (4%). Using the socio-economic 
identification of Colombia based on strata of the residence, 83.4% lived in 
housing of strata 1 or 2. In terms of education, the highest level of education 
for rickshaw drivers is 33.9 % primary school, 37.4 % incomplete secondary 
school, 22.9 % completed secondary school and only 0.6 % completed 
university education. Almost half of the rickshaw drivers are also the owners 
of the vehicles (45.9%) while the rest rented their vehicle. The price of 
renting a rickshaw oscillates between $5,000 and $60,000 Colombian pesos a 
day. However most drivers (85.7%) pay a rent that oscillates between $5,000 
pesos and $20,000 pesos (Ibid.).  
In relation to the welfare of rickshaw drivers, the study indicates that 52.4% 
are registered in the national subsidized health insurance, 26.7% are 
registered in the contributory scheme and 18% do not have any insurance. 
Eighty two per cent of the rickshaw drivers are members of an association 
and 97.1 % of the vehicles are human powered (CID 2013). 
While this is only a brief description and rather a snapshot of the social 
realities of the Colombian population, where poverty, displacement and 
precarious employment are serious issues that affect a large number of 
people, these social realities constitute the context where social control of 
street businesses takes place. The contrast, where geographical and cultural 
beauty meets violence and poverty, as presented above. This connects with 
the reality of the legal system where street businesses are regulated.  
                                                     
19 Boroughs or localidades are an administrative division of the city of Bogotá, the city has 20 
boroughs. 
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The Legal Culture of Colombia  
Anyone aware of the laws prohibiting street businesses in Bogotá will 
characterize these laws as inefficient, considering the great number of small 
economic activities that can be found throughout the city. Indeed, lack of 
enforcement and compliance with the existing laws falls into the general 
characterization of the legal systems in Latin America, which are often 
described as highly inefficient (Garcia-Villegas 2002). Formal legal 
institutions contain a set of written laws, many of them copied from 
European and American legal systems. However, anyone who observes Latin 
American societies will be able to see the wide gap that exists between the 
written laws and the way social order is achieved in everyday live.  
Placing this study of social control of street vendors within the context of 
Colombia requires a more detailed description of its legal culture. Although it 
is a thesis project in itself to present the legal culture of any country, my aim 
is to only briefly describe general patters of the Colombian legal system in 
the following pages. For this purpose I use previous studies (Garcia-Villegas 
2002; Garcia-Villegas 2011; García-Villegas and Uprimny Yepes 2004; 
Santos and García-Villegas 2001; Kalmanovitz 2002; Mockus 1999; 
O’donnell 1998). These scholars describe the main patters of the Colombian 
legal culture as authoritarian, inefficient and pluralistic. In the following 
paragraphs, I describe each of these three main patterns. 
Authoritarian Use (Rule) of Law 
How does one characterize a state where regular elections are held, a 
constitution is in place and a running legislative power exists, but where law 
is often seen as the “will of whoever is in power”? Colombia’s legal system 
is based on civil law, with core principles that are codified. Nevertheless, 
scholars who study the Colombian legal system often characterize it, 
diplomatically expressed, as ”imperfect” (Foweraker and Krznaric 2002), as 
”authoritarian use of law” (Restrepo 2013, Garcia-Villegas 2001), as the 
“(un) rule of law” (O’Donnell 1998), or as ”perverse constitutionalism” 
(Garcia-Villegas 2001).  
While the concept of rule of law is often contested (O’Donnell 2004), it 
describes a system governed by laws made by the appropriate authority, 
publicized and applied also following certain procedures. In addition, a 
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”thicker” meaning of the rule of law also includes democracy and protection 
of basic rights and freedoms (Tamanaha 2004).
20
 On paper, Colombia has 
rule of law (Estado de derecho) since the establishment of the Constitution in 
1886, which means that its people and the government should act within 
previously defined laws instead of according to arbitrary decisions. However, 
in practice the written laws are often in contradiction with the ways laws are 
applied, and also with the ways of everyday life.  
The authoritarian use of law has historical roots in the colonial times of 
Colombia when law was interpreted and applied by the Spanish King with 
great discretion (Garcia-Villegas 2002). Kalmanovitz (2002) describes the 
Spanish legal system as grounded on a Catholic philosophy based on a 
feudal, hierarchical and stratified vision of society (Ibid.). In Colombia’s 
current political system, there are no kings or novelties, but instead, a highly 
centralized presidential system. This legal and political history transcends 
into social relations that are often marked by large social class differences.  
An important example of the authoritarian use of law is the normalization of 
the ”state of siege” Estado de Sitio in Colombia during which military courts 
were given the power to judge civilians for many years (Iturralde 2003). The 
figure of the ”state of siege” or state of exception was incorporated in the 
Colombian legal system in the Constitution of 1886. It was a legal figure 
copied from the French system that allowed the suppression of freedoms and 
rights under exceptional circumstances of public disorder or war. In practice, 
for 32 of the 42 years between 1949 and 1991, the country was governed 
under a ”state of siege” (Garcia-Villegas 2001). During those years, the 
ordinary guarantees of the law were put aside, and instead the executive had 
the power to legislate and to suspend ordinary justice and legal guarantees.  
Various governments used the ”state of siege” to limit the people’s rights of 
free assembly, free movement, and freedom of expression, as well as to arrest 
union leaders and political opponents. Under the ”state of siege” the president 
was not obliged to follow normal rule of law, but instead was able to impose 
military rule (Iturralde 2003). One of the most terrible consequences of the 
”state of siege” for the rule of law was that great power given to military 
courts that could judge civilians and apply criminal law (Uprimny, 
Rodríguez, and Garcia-Villegas 2003). According to Garcia-Villegas (2001), 
the permanent use of the ”state of siege” had a lasting impact on the 
                                                     
20 See the rule of law index at Freedom House and the World Justice Project among others.  
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Colombian legal culture and for ordinary people the authoritarian use of law 
became the rule and no longer the exception.  
Inefficacy and Overproduction of Law 
The Colombian institutional culture can be further characterized by a flexible 
application of law together with a normative overproduction (Restrepo 2013). 
According to Kalmanovitz (2002), this flexible application of law stems from 
colonial times and is represented in the contemporary and common belief that 
”it is legislated but not enforced.” Subsequently, the lack of enforcement is 
seen as a problem of law itself and, therefore, legal norms are changed all the 
time, which in turn generates a normative overproduction.  
The idea that law must be interpreted and adapted to the practical 
circumstances of the moment was also coined during Colonial times, when 
the representatives of the Spanish monarchy would say ”law is obeyed but 
not satisfied” (Garcia-Villegas 2002). According to this position, the officials 
in charge of the application of law interpreted and adapted the content of law 
without openly disregarding the norms. Under the catholic monarchy of 
Spain, to disobey the law was to defy the King, and since it was believed that 
it was God who gave power to the King, no one would openly accept 
disobedience of the law (Melo 1996). Instead, the colonial government 
managed to formally obey the laws without putting them into practice. For 
instance, the Spanish laws prohibited the exploitation of the native 
indigenous population and declared that they should be free. In Colombia, the 
ruling elite kept these laws (las leyes nuevas) in secret from the indigenous 
population and postponed their implementation without major consequences 
from the monarchy in far away Spain (Ibid.). 
This flexible use of law is often perceived as a tool favouring the elites. The 
phrase hecha la ley, hecha la trampa meaning ”the law is always made with a 
loophole” illustrates this belief. Looking for a loophole in law is a common 
practice in Colombia. Many actors, such as businesses, use loopholes in order 
to avoid taxes and the payment of social security obligations for their 
employees (Cardona 2005). This is common practice and together with the 
inefficacy of law creates many social problems, particularly for those who 
belong to the most vulnerable groups, for example the large share of domestic 
workers. Often, they do not even know their rights and the laws that are 
supposed to provide them with more security and protect them from 
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exploitation. Yet, even when they do and are able to bring cases before a 
court, which is rare, often it is not enough to have a favourable legal decision. 
It is often necessary to start another action to enforce a decision of Court 
(Uprimny 2006).  
The peak of the iceberg of the inefficacy of Colombian legal system is 
exemplified by our large impunity rates. According to a study of 59 countries 
in the Wold, Colombia obtained the third last place in level of impunity 
(UDLAP 2015). For instance, more than 370 journalists have been murdered 
in the last 10 years and 90% of these murders are still not resolved or 
punished (CPJ 2015). Freedom of association is another major issue. 
Colombia holds a record of 2,940 assassinations of labour union leaders 
between 1986 and 2012, most of them, victims of paramilitary and state 
mandated violence. Human rights defenders are also the target of violence 
with a record of 78 activists murdered only in 2013 (Freedom House 2014). 
Moreover, there is an increasing preoccupation by the lack of compensation 
and justice for the victims of the armed conflict (Torres and Alonso 2015).  
In addition to the great inefficacy, there is a pattern of normative 
overproduction supported by the idea that if we cannot (or do not want to) 
implement laws, the solution is to change them. While economists often 
argue that stable legal institutions are important for development 
(Kalmanovitz 2002), Colombia holds quite a different tradition, and the 
creation of legal norms leads to a normative overproduction (Restrepo 2013). 
One of the most critical examples of normative overproduction is the number 
of amendments to the Constitutions. For instance, the Constitution of 1886 
was reformed 70 times and the Constitution of 1991 has been reformed 39 
times until 2015. This means that since 1991, we have had an average of one 
reform every seven months. This ”normative overproduction” is often 
considered a sign of weak state capacity, but it also reflects the belief that if 
laws are inefficient it is necessary to change and expand existing ones, 
regardless of whether the new ones can be applied (Restrepo 2013).  
The Culture of Non-compliance to the Law  
The problems of the inefficacy of the legal system are not only linked to 
political and institutional aspects of the law, but are also part of a culture of 
non-compliance that has existed since colonial times (García-Villegas 2011). 
According to Garcia-Villegas, during the centuries that Spain imposed their 
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laws on the colonies in South America, people developed subtle ways to 
avoid and resist them. Indigenous groups, Afro-Americans and even the 
colonizers developed ways to adapt and interpret Spanish law according to 
their own values. In Colombia, many of the beliefs developed during colonial 
times are still present in our culture and can be found in colloquial terms and 
phrases that we use to refer to the legal system.  
One of the legacies of Colonialism is the popular use of malicia indígena 
which translates to “indigenous malice” or “flair” (Ariza 2013; Morales 
1998; García-Villegas 2006). For many people this may be seen as a bad 
characteristic, but in Colombia this term has positive connotations and having 
malicia indígena is seen as an important quality in order to overcome harsh 
conditions. It is often used as a way to describe the ability of the poor and the 
oppressed (indigenous in the context of Colonialism) to get around political 
power (Ariza 2013; Morales 1998). The expression is still used in 
contemporary Colombia to refer to non-conventional and sometimes illegal 
ways to get things done. Thus, non-compliance to law in everyday life is 
common in Colombia, for example cutting the line, disrespecting traffic 
norms, cheating on exams, or, as in the cases presented in this thesis, street 
vendors and rickshaw drivers who do not have a license, but who continue to 
go about their businesses (Garcia-Villegas 2011).  
While there are always many nuisances to any generalization, overall one 
could speak of some features of a Colombian culture. The more 
contemporary description of the cultural values that influence legal culture 
are summarized in the World Value Survey, which presents Colombians as 
traditional, catholic, family oriented, hard workers, but also having low levels 
of trust (WVS 2015). Colombian cultural values are often in contradiction 
with actions. For instance, a majority of Colombians strongly believe in God, 
but do not attend church very regularly. Another example is the value placed 
on family and tradition, yet many women have to raise their children alone 
(Uribe Díaz 2007). In addition, Colombians tend not to trust strangers, but 
nevertheless often help people in need because of the absence of a welfare 
system (Sudarsky 2003). When people talk about and claim their rights, but 
at the same time disobey laws in everyday life, this double-folded mentality 
has a significant imprint on the legal culture.  
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Legal Pluralism  
Colombian law is characterized in terms of legal pluralism because of the 
multiple and often competing normative systems within the country (García-
Villegas 2006). Some examples of legal pluralism are the use of transitional 
justice and military courts, as well as the existence of private systems of 
justice exerted by armed actors who control and claim certain territories. 
Norms that regulate street businesses are another example of the plural 
normative systems that exist in Colombia. 
There are multiple examples of legal pluralism in Colombia. One example is 
the norms created during the aforementioned ”state of siege” under which the 
president creates a parallel criminal system to judge political leaders and 
activists (Restrepo 2013). Another example is the transitional justice 
mechanism created in 2005 to judge crimes committed during the armed 
conflict (Bell 2009). Indigenous communities have been given autonomous 
jurisdiction over their territories and exert a legal pluralism accepted and 
acknowledged by the state (Hoekema 1998). On the other hand, in the 
territories controlled by armed groups, such as the guerrilla, paramilitaries, 
and even drug traffickers, these groups have their own set of principles and 
rules, which are neither accepted nor mandated by the state, but are 
nevertheless enforced by these groups, leading to an illegal legal pluralism.  
In relation to law that prevails in everyday relations, Santos (1987) argues 
that in Latin America the dichotomy legal-illegal is more complicated, and 
therefore, he prefers to talk about ”interlegality”, since state and non-state 
actors have often applied a mixture of norms emanating from different fields. 
A very relevant example here is the large number of street vendors in Bogotá 
who work outside the law, but in practice are ruled by other, informal norms. 
The Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto coined the term ”extra-legality” 
to underline that, despite being outside the law, the activities of the informal 
economy in Latin America should not be defined or marked as illegal (De 
Soto 1989). 
In short, the Colombian system is characterized by a pluralism of norms and 
systems of social control. Multiple forms of social control exist in Colombia. 
Sometimes these norms are based on state law, sometimes they violate or 
stand in direct conflict with law, and other times they are just outside or 
alongside the law. Nonetheless, the Colombian legal system is weak in terms 
of democratic representation and the use of the rule of law.  
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The Colombian Paradox: A Hope that Rests on Legal Institutions  
Despite the frequent authoritarian use of law and its inefficiencies, a 
mentality of non-compliance to rules and the existence of plural and often 
competing social control, the Colombian legal and political system is not 
entirely authoritarian. According to Gutierrez (2000), there exists legalism 
and constitutionalism alongside praxes of illegality and violence. This is a 
paradoxical situation, because despite a precarious rule of law, there are 
elements of modernity in the Colombian legal system (Uprimny, Rodríguez, 
and Garcia-Villegas 2003). According to Serrano and Baier (2015, 53) in 
Bogotá, “despite believing that the law is not for all, is not necessarily just 
and that its institutions cannot be trusted, it is used as a social mechanism to 
create order.” Furthermore, a separation of powers and organs of control have 
managed to hold the state accountable on different occasions, such as the 
trials against public officials by independent judicial bodies, something that 
can be defined as ”law in absence of democracy” (García-Villegas 2014).  
One institution that stands out is the Constitutional Court created in 1991, 
which marks an important point in the history of Colombia because it 
increased the control of the judiciary over the executive and the legislative 
branches of government (Uprimny 2006). While there are other institutions 
that have shown signs of being un-corrupted and that exercise control over 
the government, I will use the example of the Constitutional Court to 
illustrate the hopes that people associate with the legal system.  
In Colombia, the Constitution is not only a formal text, but it also represents 
the foundation of an institution that permeates the country’s entire legal 
culture (Uprimny 2006). The Constitution includes a comprehensive bill of 
fundamental rights that are supposed to guide the entire legal system. This 
bill of rights is supported by two legal actions, first the ”action of 
constitutionality” and, second, the ”acción de tutela.” The action of 
constitutionality is equivalent to the figure of judicial review and allows the 
Constitutional Court to evaluate whether a law made by Congress upholds 
the principles and rights that are contained in the Constitution (García-
Villegas and Uprimny 2004). 
Some examples of legal reviews that have made an impact include the 
recognition of same sex unions and the protection of their rights (see 
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Decisions T-101-98, T-716-11, C-577-11).
21
 Until the Constitutional Court 
had made a decision, the recognition of equal rights for same sex couples had 
been neglected in the Congress, possibly due to the political connotations that 
this debate has in a catholic country like Colombia where more than half of 
the population considers that same sex relations are not justified (WVS 
2015). Other examples of publicly controversial decisions include the 
sentence of unconstitutionality for the criminalization of the possession and 
use of personal doses of narcotic drugs (Decisions C-221-94, C-491-12), and 
the unconstitutionality of the Colombian treaty with the Catholic Church of 
Rome (Decisions C-027-93). While human rights activists have criticized 
some decisions by the Constitutional Court because the court did not always 
follow a progressive trend (Garcia-Villegas 2001), the Constitutional Court is 
in general seen as a non-corrupt institution. 
The second action that has marked the Colombian legal culture in the last 
twenty years is the ”acción de tutela.” The tutela action, a writ for the 
protection of constitutional rights, is a legal suit that can be used by all 
citizens of Colombia when the action or omission of a public actor has 
violated their fundamental rights (Cepeda-Espinosa 2004). It is the equivalent 
of the ”amparo action” that exists in Spain and in other Latin American 
countries. The petition is simple and can be presented in a written or oral 
form to any judge in the country; it is not necessary to have a lawyer or legal 
knowledge to present this action. It is only necessary to explain the facts that 
constitute the violation of a fundamental right to a judge. While the legal 
system in Colombia is quite slow, the tutela action has to be resolved by the 
judge within ten days (Art. 86 of the 1991 Constitution). Additionally, the 
failure of public authorities to follow the judgement can be punished with 
imprisonment for the government officials for a maximum period of six 
months and the payment of a pecuniary sanction (Art. 52 Decree 2591, from 
1991 Constitution).  
Citizens can bring constitutional actions, such as the acción de tutela to the 
court, and regular judges use the principles of the constitution in their 
interpretations of the law, which is constantly evaluated by the court to 
determine abidance to the Constitution (Fajardo-Arturo 2008). Indeed, over 
the last twenty years, the Constitutional Court of Colombia has made 
                                                     
21 The Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Colombia include tutela ”T” decisions and 
constitutionality ”C” decisions. A number follows the letter to identify the decision, and the 
second number corresponds to the years. For instance, Decision T-101-98 is tutela action 
number 101 from 1998.  
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remarkable decisions to protect civil, political, social and economic rights. 
Consequently, the court is becoming one of the central actors in the political 
debate (García-Villegas and Uprimny Yepes 2004). The regulation of street 
businesses has also been discussed in the Constitutional Court, and therefore, 
it is important to understand how this particular court operates within the 
legal system of Colombia, also because it fills a potentially important role in 
determining the legality of street vendors.  
An important example of the practical importance of the tutela action for 
ordinary citizens in Colombia is the increasing use of this action to claim the 
protection of social rights, particularly the right to access health care. There 
has been an increase in the use of tutela actions, from 8,060 in 1992 to 
133,273 in 2010, which illustrates the importance of this action in terms of 
access to justice, but also the continued failure of the state to protect the 
rights of its citizens through ordinary administrative means (García-Villegas 
2014). An empirical study (Saffon and Villegas 2011) of the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court between 1992 and 2006 illustrates that most cases of 
tutela (55%) concern the protection of social rights in contrast with civil and 
political rights (44%). Of the total number of tutela actions regarding the 
protection of social rights the majority (66%) were granted, changing the 
lives of thousands of Colombians that were able to access medical care, state 
subsidies, or social payments (Ibid.). In a country with a very slow and 
ineffective legal system, the tutela action stands out as an important legal 
mechanism for ordinary citizens. In this sense, a representative poll from 
2013 showed that 83.7% of Colombians are aware of tutela action and most 
of them have a favourable perception of this action (CCB, Min Justicia, and 
WB 2013).  
In conclusion, despite the shortcomings of the Colombian legal system in 
terms of democracy and rule of law, there are some reasons to be hopeful 
about the possibility to achieve a more representative and liberal legal 
system. Having made a general description of Colombian legal culture, I will 
now describe the legal regulations that concern street businesses in Bogotá. 
My intention with this description is to build and present a point of reference 
for the subsequent analysis of the differences between formal legal controls, 
as they are prescribed by the law, and social control as it occurs in everyday 
life.  
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Regulation of Street Businesses: Historical 
Perspective 
Street businesses have existed in Bogotá since its foundation in 1538 by 
Spanish conquistador Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada. The main square, Plaza 
de Bolivar, was used for centuries as a place for commercial exchange, where 
people traded different products or services (Carbonell 2013). The Colonial 
plazas and squares of the 16
th
 century were often used at least one day a week 
to sell fruits and vegetables, and many were open for commercial activities 
throughout the week (Carbonell 2013). The city’s many squares were also 
used as nodes of transportation, and people often waited around the plazas to 
carry passengers or merchandise, either using mules or their own human 
backs (Ibid.). The use of public space for commercial exchange was seen as a 
common sense practice and one of the main roles of the city (Ibid.). 
However, following the expansion of Bogotá, the central market of the Plaza 
de Bolivar was re-located to other nearby squares. Since then, different 
regulations have been written with the goal to delimit the use of space for 
commercial exchange in the city of Bogotá (Simanca 2007). 
In this section, I present the political and historical framework of the 
regulation of street vendors and the laws that were applicable at the time of 
my fieldwork (2012-2014). Nevertheless, a short presentation of the history 
of the regulation of street vendors in Bogotá before the time of my fieldwork 
is essential in order to understand the current situation. Since the rickshaws 
represent a more recent phenomenon, most of the historical analysis I present 
is based on previous studies on street vendors. However, the current legal 
framework includes both vendors and rickshaw drivers.  
Licenses and Prohibitions (1932-1988) 
Between 1932 and 1988 street vendors in the city of Bogotá were regulated 
through licenses. While the requirements changed over the years, in general 
vendors were not allowed to sell without a permit from the local government 
and often had to comply with sanitary standards. The first local regulation on 
street vending dates from 1932 when the city council established the 
requirement to have a license and a certificate of hygiene to be allowed to sell 
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goods and services in public spaces (Simanca 2007).
22
 However, the 
regulation of street vending in the city tightened in the 1950s due to the 
period of La Violencia during which thousands of rural citizens moved to 
Bogotá. The unprecedented rise in population led to a shortage of 
employment opportunities, which in turn led to a drastic increase in the 
number of people working as street vendors. In order to manage the situation 
during that period, the mayors of Bogotá saw the need to establish control 
(Simanca 2007).  
In 1950 the mayor signed Decree 76, which required all vendors to renew 
their licenses. However, in order to receive the license, vendors had to be 
members of an association or union, they also had to get a hygienic certificate 
every six months, and they had to pay for an identification card (Simanca 
2007). The later Decree 573 of 1957 was the first to explicitly prohibit street 
vendors in some strategic zones in the city centre. Subsequently, Decree 227 
of 1964 established the differences between: stationary vendors, vendors that 
sell from a permanent structure such as a kiosk, and mobile vendors who 
carry the merchandise with them. According to this regulation, mobile 
vendors could make use of a box 60 cm by 40 cm to carry their products. 
Nevertheless, under no circumstances were they allowed to sell their goods in 
one specific point for a longer period of time, but instead had to move 
continuously (Simanca 2007). Furthermore, it was prohibited to prepare and 
sell fresh food in public spaces, including fried pork and slices of fruit. 
During those years the government of Bogotá built markets and food kiosks 
in different areas of the city and rented them out to vendors. Nonetheless, the 
administration of these vending units was problematic from the onset. There 
were many irregular contracts between the vendors and the government, 
vendors were often late in paying the rental fees and the city government had 
difficulties to collect unpaid fees (Simanca 2007). At the same time, the 
number of irregular vendors in the city was increasing and the enforcement of 
the possession of licenses was out of control (Ibid.).  
The proliferation of street vending in Bogotá and the constant complaints 
about a lack of control pressed the city’s mayors to create a special office for 
vending policies. In 1972, the city council created in Accord 25 the Fondo de 
Ventas Populares (Fund for Popular Sales). The aim of the fund was to lead 
the formalization of informal commerce in the city. This fund was in charge 
                                                     
22 In Accord 37 of August 26, 1932, the city established several measures to regulate street 
vendors and retail sells. 
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of the administration of approximately 770 kiosks and markets, as well as the 
registry of all informal vendors in the city. In order to be registered, vendors 
had to be affiliated to a union or an association of vendors and subsequently 
had to pay twenty pesos (COP$20) for an identification card. The office in 
charge of vending policies was understaffed and had difficulties to tackle the 
workload it was confronted with. It soon became obvious that having a 
registry of licenses for all vendors in the city was nearly impossible. The 
collection of fees and rents from the kiosks and stalls alone consumed most 
of the time. In the early 1980s, there were discussions within the city 
government to close the office since it had not accomplished control over the 
continuous proliferation of street vendors in Bogotá (Simanca 2007). During 
1985, there were many debates about what to do, and the employees of the 
office argued that they operated with a small budget, and that their office 
building was in poor condition, without access to water or electricity. 
Moreover, the office staff argued that exercising control over the city’s street 
vendors would require major investments. The staff also had difficulties to 
enforce the collection of rents from the kiosks and markets. Many vendors 
often argued that they should be exempt from paying due to the poor 
conditions of their stalls and kiosks, some of which were abandoned or had 
broken roofs and doors (Simanca 2007).  
During those years, in particular the 1980s, the city government passed 
different norms to regulate street businesses, which often created confusion 
about the times and procedures for getting a vending license. According to 
Donovan, the permits and licenses were often given to vendors who had 
friends in politics and authorities, or through bribes (2002). Through the 
years, political leaders gave various permits to a few individuals arbitrarily, 
and the city had no control or accurate registry over the number of permits 
issued. According to Nancy Nelson, vendors had to find a “political uncle” or 
a friend of a friend that could help them get the vending permit they needed 
(Nelson 1992). Vendors’ unions often played an important role during city 
council elections, and some of them managed to negotiate special permits and 
licenses for their members (Donovan 2008, 35). However, most of the 
vendors did not have a permit or license; this was a privilege for only a few. 
According to the census in 1985, there were 15,084 vendors in the city and 
only one third (32%) of them had a permit or license for their business 
(Simanca 2007).  
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The War on Street Vendors (1989-2003) 
Urban scholar Michael Donovan (2008) has described the policies on street 
vendors between 1988 and 2003 as a war over space in order to crack down 
on the activities of street vendors in the city, and to recover state control. In 
the 1990s, the policies towards street vendors changed from a model based on 
political connections to a model that prioritized the recovery of public space 
for the citizens of Bogotá. In this new model, all street vendors were 
considered illegal regardless of their licenses or permits. Some of the most 
important changes in street vending policies occurred between 1995 and 
2003, following the elections of two mayors from non-traditional parties. The 
first was Antanas Mockus, the former rector of the National University of 
Colombia, who became mayor with the help of one of the least expensive 
political campaigns in the city’s history, and without connections to the main 
political parties in the country (Montezuma 2003). He was elected twice for 
the periods between 1995-1996 and 2000-2003. One of his main interests was 
to defend public space, which in his opinion was “sacred.”  
Mockus is considered one of the mayors who changed the history of Bogotá 
from chaos and lack of order to a more organized and clean city. However, 
Mockus was not popular among street vendors. During his term, police 
evictions of street vendors were frequent. In a study of the policies 
implemented during these years in Bogotá, Parra criticized Mockus’ ideology 
of “citizenship culture” as a form of dispossession of citizenship for already 
disadvantaged groups of society. By forcing street vendors to become good 
citizens by evicting and prohibiting their economic activities and means of 
gaining their livelihoods, the city government was effectively taking away 
their rights as citizens and imposing unbearable duties on them (Parra 2009).  
However, the most aggressive plan to recover public space was implemented 
by Mayor Peñalosa between 1998 and 2000. In one of the most tragic 
evictions of the time, 3,000 police officers, bulldozers and a helicopter were 
used to expel 400 vendors in the area known as San Victorino in 1999 
(Donovan 2002). Mayor Peñalosa had a dream of transforming Bogotá to 
compete with other European cities. His main efforts were dedicated to the 
improvement of the city infrastructure and the construction of a rapid bus 
transport system called Transmilenio. Furthermore, he also built parks, 
cycling paths, and public libraries. Mayor Peñalosa also created the 
Administrative Department for the Defence of Public Space (DADEP) to 
coordinate the recovery and defence of public space, which remains an 
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important authority in Bogotá to this day. The perception of what is public 
space and who gets to use it is contradictory in many ways. A great 
illustration is the space that is appropriated by private cars, formal businesses 
and construction sites. According to official statistics, street vendors are 
responsible for less than 10% of public space ”invasions”, while the principal 
”invaders” of sidewalks are private vehicles (Hunt 2009). 
Peñalosa’s main policy towards street vending included forced re-locations. 
During his term as mayor of Bogotá, he built different retail sections in the 
city to accommodate a large number of street vendors. His policy of 
relocation was partly the result of more than 1,016 tutela actions started by 
the street vendors that were affected by the policies of recovery of public 
space. Based on these tutela actions, the Constitutional Court of Colombia 
decided in 1999 that Mayor Peñalosa must offer relocation programs prior to 
evictions (SU-360-99). However, according to an audit made by the city’s 
comptroller office, many of the spaces of those relocation programs were 
empty after relocation (Contraloria Distrital 2013). Since there was not 
enough space to relocate all city vendors, the program focused on the 
recovery of strategic areas, and the police forced thousands of vendors away 
from their common areas. However, after police controls were relaxed and 
became less frequent, old and new vendors re-occupied the streets, and most 
relocation programs were rejected by the vendors and unsuccessful because 
the assigned areas lacked customers (Donovan 2008).  
During the second term of Mayor Mockus, he put great effort into passing a 
new Police Code through the city council. The Accord 79 of 2003 was 
intended to further control street vendors. The approval of the police code 
was the catalyst for the largest demonstrations in the history of the vendors’ 
social movement, crowding the city’s main square with about 25,000 vendors 
on the 19th of July 2003. “We ask Mayor Mockus to let us work, we need to 
provide for our children, and we have the right to work”, said Eduardo 
Guzman, one of the leaders, during the demonstration.
23
 At the end of the day 
the Mayor agreed to create a committee to discuss policies for street vendors 
with the participation of their leaders. This is how the ”Committee of Street 
Vendors of Bogotá” was born. While it was during the administration of 
Mockus that vendors agreed on the creation of this committee, the 
                                                     
23 Taken from the Newspaper “El Tiempo” July 19, 2003. 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-972683 
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implementation was only possible a year later, under the newly elected 
Mayor Luis Eduardo Garzón. 
Social Dialogue: The Mayors from the Left (2004 to 2015) 
The process of creating the Committee of Street Vendors of Bogotá took 
some time. Only a year after the demonstration, in May 2004, more than 
12,000 vendors elected their representatives for the committee (Gilbert and 
Garcés 2008, 218).
24
 The transparency of the process created an important 
space for dialogue and participation (Castañeda and Garcia 2007). In 
addition, the committee received one vote on the board of the office in charge 
of street vendors’ policies (i.e., the Fund for Popular Sales).25 
The committee for street vendors is an important representative body that 
gives a voice to street vendors and can influence regulations that affect street 
vendors. While the social movement of street vendors is relatively weak and 
most vendors are not part of an organization, the committee has so far held 
three elections since 2004. Furthermore, the various associations of street 
vendors formed a national association of informal workers called “the 
General Union of Independent and Informal Workers” (in Spanish: La Unión 
General de Trabajadores Independientes e Informales - UGTI). UGTI was 
created in 2009 and has about 25,000 members. It is a member of Streetnet 
international, a member based organization of street vendors from around the 
world (Information based on Interview with the leader of UGTI, 2012).  
The vendors committee was elected during the term of former labour union 
leader Luis Eduardo Garzón, who was elected as Mayor of Bogotá (2004-
2007) under the slogan “Bogotá without indifference.” He was elected with 
the support of many social movements and had promised to focus his efforts 
in poverty reduction and the promotion of social inclusion. Garzón included 
the “formalization of the work of people or organizations in a position of 
vulnerability with emphasis on street vendors”26 in the city development plan 
for 2004-2006. Nonetheless, despite these positive ambitions, the forceful 
eviction of street vendors continued under Garzón. In May 2005, he ordered 
                                                     
24 In 2007, the city again held elections for street vendor representatives; this time more than 
twice the vendors participated. 
25 Decreto Distrital 099 of 2011 
26 City Development Plan, approved by the city council in Acuerdo 119, 3rd of June 2004. In 
Spanish, Plan de Desarrollo de Bogotá 2004-2008.  
103 
1,800 policemen to remove 1,300 vendors from a major vending area in the 
centre of Bogotá (Hunt 2009). 
Under Garzon, Bogotá started a new phase of street vending governance, 
continued by mayors Samuel Moreno (2008-2011) and Gustavo Petro (2012-
2015). Although there continued to be evictions during these years, they were 
less frequent, and the policy assumed a more tolerant stand. However, since 
2005, the mayors of Bogotá recognize the vulnerabilities of street vendors, 
but continue to justify evictions using the battle against organized crime and 
mafia structures, which are assumed to use street vending as a source of 
income .  
The changing views and policies towards street vendors bear resemblance to 
the game of ”hide and seek.” Vendors continuously have to run away when 
the police arrive and return soon after the police have left. In order to control 
all public space from vendors, it would be necessary to have one police 
officer in each corner, which is simply not feasible. Until now, vendors have 
always found ways to move around, adapt to changing circumstances and 
regulations and ultimately survive, not only in Colombia, but in many places 
around the world (Crossa 2009). Control over public space varies also within 
the city and often control is higher in strategic places such as tourist locations 
in contrast with less affluent neighbourhoods (Konzen 2013). 
The Legal Framework of Street Vendors  
The Colombian legal system is based on written law, in contrast to common 
law, and it follows the Napoleonic civil code tradition. Therefore, the main 
source for the judges is written law. Doctrines and legal precedents are used 
as secondary sources of interpretation.
27
 In addition, Colombia is also a 
decentralized state divided into 32 departments and 1,003 municipalities, 
whose governments also have regulatory capacity and the power to make 
laws. However, those regional and local laws must be in accordance with the 
Constitution and other higher ranked norms.  
                                                     
27Article 230 of the Constitution of 1991: “The judges, in their decisions, are subject only to 
the rule of law. Equity, law, general principles of law and doctrine are auxiliary criteria of 
judicial activity.” 
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Following the Constitution, which is the supreme norm, there are national, 
regional and local laws. At the national level, the congress makes laws 
(leyes), the president decrees (Decretos Presidenciales) and the ministries 
make resolutions to interpret and implement the law. At the regional level, 
the assemblies represent the legislative power and the laws they produce are 
called ordenanzas. At the municipal level, the legislative power is the city 
council and the laws they enact are called acuerdos (or accords). In turn, the 
executive powers at the regional and local levels also produce norms called 
decrees. In brief, the Colombian legal system is organized like a pyramid 
where the supreme norm is the Constitution and therefore lower norms 
should not go against higher norms. Similarly, the norms of the legislative 
power have a higher rank than the norms produced by the executive power.  
Although the main laws regulating street businesses in Colombia are of local 
origin, due to the use of tutela actions, the Constitutional Court has made 
important decisions to determine the way in which the government must 
uphold the fundamental rights of the vendors. In the following pages, I 
present these laws in detail.  
Fighting for Rights in the Constitutional Court 
In Colombia, most of the legal norms regulating street vending are of local 
origin. The current situation of the regulation of street vendors is marked by 
restrictions and an unclear legal status of street vendors (Donovan 2002). 
Within regulation at the city level, the decisions of the Constitutional Court 
stand out as an effort to limit the action of city governments to evict and 
confiscate the goods of street businesses. On one hand, there is a lack of 
protection from law, but on the other hand and the courts often decide that the 
municipal governments must provide alternative work or areas for re-location 
prior to evictions of street vendors. In this section, I present the most 
influential decisions of the Constitutional Court and the most important local 
norms regulating the work of street vendors and rickshaw drivers in more 
detail. 
Street vendors in Colombia have used tutela actions to claim their rights 
since the establishment of the Constitution of 1991. On multiple occasions, 
the court has ruled on the conflict of rights between the vendors’ right to 
work and the collective rights to public space and movement. While the 
jurisprudence has changed over the years, the main line of argumentation has 
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attempted to balance the collective right to public space with the right of the 
street vendors to work and earn a livelihood. To harmonize those rights, the 
Constitutional Court has ordered the municipal governments to provide re-
location or alternative work prior to evictions. While the case of rickshaw 
drivers is more recent within the jurisprudence of the court, beginning with 
the first decision from 2013, the court’s decision also considered the need to 
protect the drivers’ right to work. 
From a legal perspective, the main problem of the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court in regard to street vendors is whether the right to public 
space prevails over the right of the street vendors to work. The two articles of 
the Constitution that are frequently analysed by the court when deciding on 
the rights of street vendors are Article 25 on the right to work and Article 82 
concerning public space. These two constitutional articles state the following:  
Art. 25 Work is a right and a social obligation and has, in all its forms, special 
protection from the state. Everyone has the right to decent and fair working 
conditions. 
Art. 82 It is the responsibility of the State to ensure the protection of the 
integrity of public space and its assignment to common use, which prevails 
over individual interest. (National Constitution of 1991) 
The first time the court made a decision in the case of street vendors was in 
1992 when the court examined 172 tutela actions brought forward by street 
vendors in the city of Ibague (approximately 200km south-west of Bogotá) 
against a municipal decree prohibiting street vending in the city centre (T-
225/92). The court made an interpretation of Art. 82 and Art. 25 and ruled 
that in Colombia the collective interest has priority over the interest of 
particular individuals. Therefore, the government in this case was allowed to 
regulate the use of public space against the constitutional rights of street 
vendors to work. However, the Court argued that the right to work is also 
important, and in order to balance the coexistence of these two constitutional 
rights the state needed to provide re-locations for the vendors.  
The court’s decisions have changed over the years. One of the first changes 
in the jurisprudence concerned the conditions that a vendor must meet in 
order to receive re-location prior to eviction. In 1992, only vendors that had 
licenses or permits were provided with re-location alternatives. The reasoning 
of the court was based on the principle of confianza legítima (legitimate 
expectations). In Decision T-225/92, the court argued that when the state has 
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issued permits to vendors to work in public space, they have a legitimate 
expectation to be able to conduct their businesses and therefore the right to be 
re-located prior to evictions.  
Having a license as a condition to be re-located prior to evictions only 
protected the rights of a few vendors, since the majority conducted their 
businesses without any kind of legal permit. In 1996 the court changed this 
criterion in Decision T-438-96 and argued that street vendors that have 
occupied public space for a long time cannot be evicted, but it does not 
specify how many years constitute a long time. The court contended that 
Colombia is a state of rule of law and the omission of the state to act in due 
time has created a de facto right for the vendors to use the public space. The 
court made this decision based on the principle of acting in ”good faith.” 
With this decision by the Constitutional Court, the protection of street 
vendors’ rights was extended to vendors that have occupied a certain place 
for a longer period of time.  
The precedent concerning the need to provide re-locations was subsequently 
developed in other decisions, often with reference to the socio-economic 
situation of mostly poor street vendors and the survival needs of many 
families in Colombia. A relevant example for the city of Bogotá was 
Decision T-772 of 2003, based on a tutela case concerning a vendor who 
experienced the confiscations of his goods and was badly treated by the 
police, and ultimately sent to prison. In this case, the court argued that since 
Colombia was a state with a “social rule of law”, there was a compromise by 
the state to support individuals to enjoy their freedom mainly when it 
concerns the need for a basic income for survival. In the argumentation, the 
court considered the poverty that many people in Bogotá live in, the social 
and political conditions of the country, and the increased number of internally 
displaced people arriving in Bogotá in order to escape the armed conflict in 
the rural areas. In this case the court ruled, 
You cannot pretend that, in a context of poverty that afflicts the capital of 
Colombia … and in the absence of opportunities in the formal sector, 
thousands of people must use the roads, squares and public parks to sell goods 
of various kinds, in order to meet their own basic needs and those of their 
families. (Decision T772-03) 
However, the court maintained that evictions are possible, but insisted that 
the government should have policies to provide alternative means of work for 
the people that depend on this kind of economic activities for their 
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subsistence. This decision is important for the analysis of the cases presented 
in my thesis. The leaders of the vendors often cite this decision (T772-03) 
when talking about their rights, particularly when arguing about the need to 
receive support from the government. For street vendors, another interesting 
development of the precedent is the distinction between mobile vendors, 
semi-stationary vendors and stationary vendors. In this regard, the court 
considered that the vendors who carry the products they sell with them are 
not limiting the collective right to public space. In this regard, the court 
stated: 
… [T]he street vendors carrying on their body the goods they sell, do not 
represent prima faciea restriction on the right of citizens to enjoy wide public 
space. (T-772-03 of 2003) 
From 2003 until 2015 the court has continued to rule in line with the 
protection of the right to re-locations for the vendors. The court also added 
that vendors are in a situation of vulnerability due to the conditions of 
poverty and unemployment in Colombia. Thus, it emphasized the state’s 
responsibility to protect certain groups. In this regard, Decision T-386 of 
2013 maintained the need to protect vulnerable groups, including internally 
displaced people, elderly people, women, ethnic minorities and indigenous 
groups, children and people with disabilities. In the words of the court: 
…[P]eople engaged in informal trade cannot be deprived of their livelihood, 
without the authorities offering them additional mechanisms through which 
they can meet their needs effectively to uphold their fundamental rights such 
as life, dignity, the subsistence minimum, equality, and work, among others. 
(T-386 of 2013) 
One of the most recent decisions on street vendors, T-146 of 2014, concerned 
the eviction of a vendor of lottery tickets who was wheelchair bound. The 
court reiterated the previous decisions that vendors who are mobile and carry 
their products with them do not invade public space and should not be 
evicted. In this case the court stated: 
Since in this case the vendors is in a wheelchair and sells his merchandise 
(lottery and scapulars) without occupying public space, he is not an obstacle 
in himself to the movement of people or vehicles beyond his physical, 
personal presence. (T-146 of 2014) 
In summary, street vendors in Colombia can use the tutela action to protect 
her right to work in times of evictions or confiscations. However, according 
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to the court, the right to work is contrasted with the right to public space, 
which has prevailed in precedents under the consideration that it is a 
collective right. In this regard, the right to work is upheld not by allowing 
vendors to remain in public spaces, but instead by obliging the government to 
provide alternative means of work or re-location alternatives prior to 
evictions. While the right to re-locations was initially reserved to vendors 
with a license, the court later widened this criterion to include vendors that 
have used a certain space for a long time. Moreover, the court added the need 
to protect vulnerable groups. Finally, the court ruled that mobile vendors, 
those who carry the products they sell on their bodies, could not be evicted 
under the argument of public space use, because they do not represent an 
obstacle to other citizens.  
While the jurisprudence concerning street vendors is rather extensive, until 
2015 there had been only one decision by the Constitutional Court on 
rickshaw drivers. In decision T-442 of 2013, the court reviewed a tutela 
claim by different associations of rickshaw drivers against the government of 
the City of Bogotá and the police for violating their right to work. While the 
court rejected the main claim of the tutela action concerning an order to the 
police to cease the confiscations of their vehicles, the court made a ruling 
stating that the city government must regulate the activity of rickshaws. In 
this sense, the court stated that the Ministry of Transportation must decide 
whether rickshaws can be used to transport passengers, and the city 
government must regulate the operation of their businesses.  
In Decision T-442/13, the court also used the principle of ”legitimate 
expectations” and told the city government to consider this principle and the 
needs of rickshaw drivers when deciding on the regulation of this business. 
To this effect, the court stated: 
…the bicitaxismo [rickshaw] is an activity that has been exercised for more 
than ten years in the city, which has generated among its practitioners a sense 
of acting with the consent of the government and, therefore, the state is 
obliged to take measures to mitigate the impact on fundamental rights, 
especially the right to work and the subsistence minimum. (T-442/13 of 2013)  
This decision only requests the government to regulate the economic activity 
of the rickshaws, but does not recognize or assign any specific rights to them. 
According to the court, the tutela action in this case was not based in the 
specific violation and instead was used by the plaintiffs as a way to prevent 
future evictions and confiscations of their vehicles.  
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While the decisions of the Constitutional Court are important in the vendors’ 
and the rickshaw drivers’ struggle for the right to work, the right of citizens 
to public space has continuously been prioritized. In this sense, the court still 
allows evictions, but it has ordered that prior to evictions, vendors and 
rickshaws drivers should be given alternative means of work, or the 
opportunity to re-locate their businesses. However, in practice the concrete 
application of this mandate depends on new tutela actions filed by the street 
vendors and rickshaw drivers claiming their right to work. In this regard, the 
arguments and rulings of the court can be used for new cases. Nevertheless, 
people still need to bring their cases before a judge (Uprimny 2006).  
Evictions and Confiscations 
In this section I describe the more contemporary regulation of street 
commerce and specifically the legal norms that were valid during the years I 
conducted fieldwork in Bogotá (2011-2014). From a legal perspective, cities 
in Colombia can regulate street vending through ”acuerdos” approved by the 
city council, or decrees approved by the city mayor. Acuerdos have a higher 
normative rank and provide a more stable regulation, since the municipal 
legislator approves them. Decrees on the other hand are more volatile, since 
the mayors can easily reform them. In Bogotá, Acuerdo 79 of 2003, which 
established the Police Code of the City, represents the main legal norm that 
regulates street vending. This is a general code regulating different behaviour 
that affects the co-existence of citizens. Street vending is only dealt with in a 
few articles.  
Among the most important, Acuerdo 79 of 2003 prohibits street vending, 
based on the argument that it is a wrongful conduct affecting the preservation 
and use of public space. Article 70 of the Police Code of the City establishes 
that behaviour that is favourable for the preservation of public space requires 
citizens to: 
Not promote, encourage or facilitate directly or through a third party squatting 
of public space by mobile or stationary vendors. (Art. 70 Acuerdo 79 of 2003) 
Subsequently, Article 80 considers that it is a wrongful occupation of public 
space carried out by mobile or stationary vendors, except in cases where there 
is the proper permit issued by the competent authority (Art. 80 of Acuerdo 79 
of 2003) 
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The main sanction for conducting street vending is the removal of the vendor 
and the confiscation of her goods. However, the police also has the power to 
verbally request vendors to remove their businesses from public spaces, and 
in case of refusals to cooperate, the police can send the vendor to a transitory 
detention centre called the Unit of Permanent Justice (UPJ) for up to 24 
hours. In the case of evictions, Article 181 gives the police the capacity to 
recover public space through a process of immediate restitution. However, 
this process must follow Decision T-772 of 2003 by the Constitutional Court 
concerning the need to inform the vendors in advance and to provide them 
with the possibility of re-location. The details of the process of evictions are 
prescribed in Decree 098 of 2004. This decree contains the following legal 
steps when a local mayor wants to recover a specific area in public space: 
The local mayor issues the administrative act declaring the need to recover 
certain public spaces. 
This act must be announced to the vendors within 15 working days through 
leaflets, and the local government must collect the following information from 
the vendors: the location where their activity takes place, the full name of the 
vendor, identity card number and home address. This register must be signed 
by the vendor and is then sent to the Institute for the Social Economy (IPES) 
to determine the kind of re-location or alternatives that can be offered.  
Then, informal vendors covered by these measures have a period of one 
month to select one of the economic programs offered through the IPES. 
After this time, the local mayor will order the police to enforce the recovery of 
public space within 15 days.  
The day of the eviction, the local mayor and a delegate of the Public Ministry 
will write the minutes of the diligence.  
The police can also confiscate the goods of the vendors and, in that case, must 
follow the terms of Acuerdo 79 of 2003 (Decree 098 of 2004). 
Article 178 of Acuerdo 79 of 2003 regulates the confiscations of the vendors’ 
goods in the following terms: 
Perishable legal goods must be returned to their owners or possessors within 
24 hours of retention. 
Durable legal goods must be returned to their owners or holders within10 days 
of retention.  
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The legal regulation of public space in Bogotá varies between ”recovered 
spaces” and common public space. While the procedure presented above is 
followed to evacuate vendors from common areas, once those areas are 
cleared they become ”recovered spaces.” According to Article 12 of Decree 
098 of 2004, the police are allowed to remove the vendors occupying 
recovered places and to confiscate their goods without the previous process 
or any kind of administrative act.  
Transitional Zones 
The Police Code establishes the prohibition of vending unless there is a 
permit. In Bogotá, the city created transitional zones in Decree 419 signed by 
the mayor of Bogotá in 2006 as part of a general plan to regulate the use of 
public space. This Decree defines the ‘transitional zones’ as places where 
vending is allowed until the government can offer economic alternatives to 
street vendors. The Decree establishes in Art 19: 
Transition Zones of Authorized Use: As one phase of the process leading 
towards the recovery or renovation of public spaces affected by the 
proliferation of informal sales, and until we can offer economic alternatives to 
the people developing this type of activities, the Mayor or the competent 
authority can establish transition zones of authorized uses. (Decree 419 of 
2006). 
While the Decree also talked about the need to “conciliate the right to work 
with the right to public space”, the object of the vending zones reflects a great 
interest in the recovery of public space. Moreover, from a social control 
perspective, the vending zones illustrate an interesting way of regulation 
because they were not based on individual licenses but on a permit given to 
an association of vendors. The specific permit for each zone was decided by 
the local mayors of the twenty districts of Bogotá, through a resolution. This 
permit operates like a contract that contains the specific rules in the 
transitional zones including the rights and duties of each party, the time frame 
for the zone, and the specific location. According to Decree 419 the basic 
rules inside the vending zones are the following: 
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1. Vendors cannot place objects outside the tents that can create obstacles for 
pedestrian circulation.  
2. The vendors must exhibit their products only inside the tents.  
3. Minors are not allowed to work in the vending zones.  
4. Vendors should no dump solid waste in the areas around the vending zones  
5. Vendors should take care of the public space that is temporarily assigned. 
6. The time limit of the vending zones is one year, but that can be extended to 
one more year.  
 
The Decree did not specify anything about the payment of taxes or the 
registration in the chamber of commerce for the individual businesses. In 
practice neither the government nor the vendors talked about taxes, they only 
referred to the regulation of public space. Thus formalization in Bogotá was 
mainly understood as a way to enforce public space laws, not the entire legal 
system controlling businesses, which includes among others tax law, civil 
law and labour law.  
Rickshaws: Waiting for Legal Regulation  
While there was not a specific norm regulating rickshaws in Colombia or in 
Bogotá until 2014, the evictions and confiscations of rickshaws were based 
on the regulation of the transportation of passengers, which does not include 
the possibility to use rickshaws. Law 769 of 2002 regulates the transportation 
of passengers, and according to this norm rickshaws are not defined as 
vehicles that can be used for this purpose. In Art. 2, this law defines public 
service vehicles as “approved motor vehicles designed to carry passengers, 
cargo or both by charging a fee, postage, freight or passage.” This was the 
main norm and it was used by the police to confiscate the rickshaws.
28
 
The sanctions for driving non-motorized or animal-pulled vehicles are 
contained in law 1383 of 2010, specifically Art. 134. According to this norm, 
the drivers of unauthorized vehicles will be sanctioned with a fine of four 
                                                     
28Following Decision T-442 of 2013 by the Constitutional Court, the Minister of 
Transportation initiated a process to draft a norm regulating rickshaws. By the end of 2015, 
this norm had not yet been approved, but the ministry approved of a technical norm that 
specifies the requirements of the design of rickshaws to be safe.28 This norm is called 
Norma Tecnica de Calidad ICONTEC 5286 from 2015. The approval of this norm was the 
first step in the process of regulation, but the ministry has to generate a resolution 
accepting the use of rickshaw, and thereafter, the City of Bogotá must regulate the licenses. 
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minimal wages, and additionally, the vehicle will be immobilized for a 
certain period of time.
29
 However, in Decision C-981 of 2010, the 
Constitutional Court solved a lawsuit of unconstitutionality against this norm 
and ordered the City of Bogotá to regulate the transportation of passengers in 
this kind of vehicle. The court argued that to regulate the use of different 
vehicles of transportation in detail does not lie in the competence of the 
national legislator, and that instead, this is something that should be decided 
at the local level.  
In the case of Bogotá, since 2011 the city council has discussed five potential 
acuerdos (local laws or accords), but none of them have so far been 
approved.
30
 According to the local government, the regulation of public 
transportation of passengers is an issue that must be solved first by the 
ministry of transportation, and until then, the main action continues to be 
evictions and confiscations (T-442-13).  
Contradictions in the Regulation of Street Business  
I started this chapter showing the contrasts and paradoxes of the Colombian 
legal and political system and the weaknesses of Colombian rule of law. This 
paradox includes the cases of the regulation of street businesses and the 
multiple contradictions of rights, laws, and practices. On the one hand, street 
vendors have a constitutional right to work, although they must comply with 
public space regulations. They are exposed to local laws that allow evictions, 
while at the same time they can use tutela actions to protect their right to 
work. There are strict regulations concerning the use of evictions, but in 
practice it is uncertain to what extent these legal norms are followed in the 
normal course of police work.  
Tutela actions only protect individual rights, and therefore, governments only 
protect the rights of people that use this judicial action. This creates a 
paradox, because while according to the precedent the court would decide in 
favour of some protection for people engaged in street businesses, in practice 
local mayors can wait until they receive the judge’s order. This creates a 
                                                     
29According to Law 1383 de 2010, the vehicle will be immobilized for the first time for a 
period of five days, for the second time twenty days and forty days for the third time.  
30The City Council of Bogotá has discussed until 2015 the following acuerdos: 260 of 2012, 
24 of 2013, 122 of 2013, 180 of 2013, and 261 of 2013.  
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situation in which one must show a tutela action in order to receive 
protection of one’s rights. 
Looking at legal norms that regulate street vending and rickshaw drivers, it is 
possible to see how legal control ”ought to” be exercised by the police. 
However, it is necessary to contrast these written laws with the everyday 
practices of the police and the local government. Therefore, this description 
of the legal framework will be a point of reference for the analysis of the 
ways in which law was experienced by the vendors and rickshaw drivers in 
their everyday work, as well as, my observations in the field.  
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5. The Norm of Acreditar 
Most street vendors in Bogotá work in violation of the local law that 
prohibits the use of public space by mobile or stationary vendors.
31
 However, 
they do not operate without regulation; rather, different practices of social 
control influence the way they work. In this section, I explore one kind of 
social control, i.e., informal control, based on the norm
32
 of “acreditar”, 
which can be translated to English as: to get an informal right to use a space 
spot in the streets. The norm of acreditar is enforced through informal 
control, as the decentralized and spontaneous ways in which a social group 
enforces a norm.
33
 This means that informal control is often working without 
a hierarchical organization steering it or imposing it.  
Street vendors in Bogotá often explained that in order to get a good spot on 
the street where they can work, they have to go through the process of getting 
the spot accredited. They often use the word “acreditar” to refer to an 
informal process of allocating the different locations on the streets. To 
become “accredited”, vendors have to repeatedly return and use a spot for a 
period of time until the people around recognize them. This process provides 
them with the legitimacy to be able to claim the spot. Acreditar can therefore 
be defined as a social norm that secures access to space among street 
vendors.  
According to Ellickson, “Norms [meaning social norms] are harder to verify 
because their enforcement is highly decentralized and no particular 
individuals have special authority to proclaim norms” (1991, 130). 
Nevertheless, it is possible to argue about certain norms and what they mean 
                                                     
31 The prohibition of street vending is found in Art. 80 of Acuerdo 79 of 2003. For more 
details, see the legal framework of street vending presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
32 Unlike legal norms, which are adopted by the political system, social norms are built upon 
social interaction in a more spontaneous way (Hydén and Svensson 2008). 
33 Ellickson defines informal social control as “the system of social control that arises out of 
the operation of decentralized social forces” (1991, 131). Other definitions of informal 
control were introduced in the theoretical chapter of this thesis. 
116 
through the observation of patterns of social control. The fact that many of 
the street vendors I interviewed explained that they were obliged to respect 
the spots used by accredited vendors is an indication of a norm. However, the 
most observable way to identify this norm is that street vendors regularly 
punish newcomers who infringe on or even occupy their spots with 
spontaneous reprimands, verbal aggression, gossip, and the threat of violence.  
In this chapter, I present excerpts from my field notes that illustrate how the 
process of acreditar works and the way informal practices of social control 
shape this process.  
Accrediting a Spot 
The process of acreditar starts when a new vendor begins selling on the 
streets. Vendors told me that in order to start work as a street vendor, they 
have to go out there and just start selling wherever they can or are allowed to 
by other vendors. However, finding a spot where you can sell takes time and 
effort and is not easy. Another aspect you need to consider is the kind of 
products or services you want to sell, because vending, like mots businesses, 
requires you to sell something that is demanded by your customers. The first 
thing vendors do is to try out different places until they find a good spot 
where they are allowed to stay and where they find many costumers. Then 
they have to return to the same place every day to get the spot accredited in 
order for others to recognize them. The story of Cali in Santa Librada, 
illustrates a common way to get accredited for a business spot, or, in his 
words, “acreditar el puesto.” Cali sold cholados, an iced drink which main 
ingredient is lulo, a typical fruit native to the Andes that is also known as 
naranjilla, or little orange. This drink is made out of crushed ice and small 
pieces of lulo and other exotic fruits. Cali, the cholado vendor, worked in a 
street intersection near the vending zone in Santa Librada. The following 
excerpt is taken from the field notes I took the day I met Cali. It illustrates 
how he had managed to set up his business and got accredited on this spot.  
Today, I spoke to the man selling cholados. He is often busy with costumers 
and he seems to have a good vending site, very close to the vending zone. 
Next to the cholados vendor, there is a man selling pirate copies of music 
CDs, a man selling chaza and a woman selling socks. The name of the 
cholado seller is Cali. I have seen him selling before, always on the same 
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corner. Today, I spoke to him about his work. I asked him how he had started 
his business there. Cali explained that when he arrived there two years ago, he 
had talked to the man selling CDs as well as the chaza seller. He had asked 
them if he could stay there and they had replied, ”Mijo vaya y acredite su 
puesto”, meaning, “Go ahead and get your spot accredited.” Since that spot 
was vacant, they told him that if he came every day he could get accredited 
for that spot. Cali explained that one has to come every day to get 
“accredited” for a spot. Cali explained that now people in the area, including 
the police, had started to recognize him. (field note based on a short interview 
from August 20
th
 2012). 
The previous excerpt illustrates different aspects of the acreditar process. 
First, it shows that in order to get accredited for a spot, vendors ideally must 
look for places that are “not taken” by other vendors who sell the same 
product or service. There is an unspoken rule about the need to respect the 
spots of other vendors already working in the streets. This practice is similar 
to the informal norm of “first come first serve” and shows that people tend to 
respect the spots where regular vendors have displayed acts of use based on 
informal usufructuary rights for a period of time.  
Avoiding Competition 
Street vendors often try to set up their businesses in busy places such as bus 
stops, close to shopping centers, supermarkets, schools, churches, 
government offices, in public parks, and on public squares. However, it is 
very likely that there will be vendors already located on these lucrative spots, 
and one will have to negotiate access with accredited vendors in order to be 
allowed in these spots. Different strategies can be used to start up a business 
in a good spot. You can set up a business by parking your pushcart, setting up 
a table or spreading out a blanket on the floor and start selling. Sometimes, 
people around you will not bother about your presence, and you can conduct 
your business in peace. However, if you pose a source of competition, it is 
very likely that other vendors will ask you to move and that you will need to 
walk around until you find a free spot. One example of a business in which 
there is a lot of competition for good spots is the chaza business. A chaza is a 
wooden structure that looks like a box on four wheels from which a person 
sells candies and cigarettes. Vendors using this structure are often called, 
vendedor de chaza. The chaza is easy to move around, and the products they 
sell are usually in high demand. However, one must be in the right spot and 
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not have too much competition in order to succeed. The following excerpt 
from an interview with Raul, one of the chaza vendors near the Santa Fé 
mall, illustrates how chaza owners find good spots.  
I asked Raul about his business and when he had started to work in the 
vicinity of the Santa Fé mall. He explained that he had first moved around 
until he found a good spot. “I started to walk around near Portal del Norte, but 
there were already fewe chaza man there, so I couldn’t stay there”, he said. I 
asked why he had not parked his chaza next to them. He replied, “It’s obvious 
that you can’t park your cart next to another chaza, because that person is 
going to be upset. I mean, there’s no point in causing that kind of 
competition.” Raul had continued to move around for a while. He tried 
different places until he found this corner. He was the only chaza vendor 
there. (Interview from December 17
th
 2013).  
Many vendors explained that in order to start selling you simply have to go to 
the streets and start selling. “There is money to be earned in the streets, and 
you have to go out there”, Raul told me. He said that it was important to try 
out different places and see whether a place was good in terms of customers, 
and if the police and other vendors would let them work in peace. The 
following excerpt is from a visit to the Santa Fé mall and illustrates how a 
new vendor (Pilar) had set up her business next to an already established 
vendor (Raul). 
Today I visited Raul, and I saw that there were other two vendors on that 
corner, a woman selling popsicles from the Bon Ice Company and a woman 
selling gloves and scarves. The name of the woman selling popsicles was 
Pilar. I asked Pilar how she had managed to set up her business there. She 
explained that when she first arrived, the only vendor on this corner was Raul. 
She said: “I just parked my cart a bit away from him and started to sell.” I 
asked whether she had received Raul’s approval. Pilar said, “I didn’t ask him 
of it was ok, and he didn’t say anything. This was a vacant spot. Plus, I sell ice 
cream and he sells chaza, so he can’t say anything. I mean, as long as I don’t 
park my pushcart in his spot, he doesn’t have the right to come and say 
anything” (field note based on observations and a short interview from 
January 11
th
 2014).  
According to Pilar, when looking for a business spot you have to respect 
already established vendors’ spots, park yourself some distance away and not 
pose competition by selling the same products. Indeed, many street vendors 
claimed that no one owns the streets and that anyone in need should be able 
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to start up a small business.
34
 However, I found that this is not how the reality 
works and the excerpts and stories I present show that avoiding competition 
is a way to avoid problems and conflicts with already established vendors. 
Thus, the norm of acreditar worked to control newcomers from setting up 
their businesses where someone was already selling a similar product. 
Enforcement of the Acreditar Norm  
While people’s stories of acreditar show that this is a common way of 
working in the streets, according to Ellickson (1991, 130) the best way to 
illustrate the existence of a norm is to show patterns of regular enforcement. 
Thus, the question is, what are the consequences of taking a spot that 
someone else has used on a regular basis. 
Vendors reacted in different ways to violations of the acreditar norm. Often 
vendors approached newcomers and told them that they had to leave, through 
a warning. If the new vendor agreed to leave the place, then the problem was 
solved and compliance with the norm was achieved. If the new vendor 
refused to leave, accredited vendors could use verbal abuse (bad-mouthing) 
to punish them. Vendors also used gossip to spread rumors about new 
vendors who disrespected the acreditar norm, giving them a bad reputation. 
Vendors who refused to leave were subjected to a bad working environment. 
Finally, this social control could also escalate into the threat of physical 
violence and the actual use of violence. In this section, I consider some of the 
practices of the sanctions and in general practices of social control that 
emerged during my fieldwork. 
Warnings 
During my conversations with street vendors, they often explained that when 
they had first started to work in the streets, they had to move around from 
place to place until they had found a good spot that was not taken by 
someone else. I also observed how many vendors moved from one place to 
                                                     
34The survey I conducted among formalized street vendors also illustrates this point. The 
survey asked vendors working in the vendor zones about their opinion on non-formalized 
vendors. The majority (88%) answered that everyone had the right to work in the streets.  
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another. I saw some vendors walking in the same neighborhoods day after 
day, others I only saw once. The following story is based on the 
conversations I had with Marta, a woman selling empanadas at the rickshaw 
stop in Quintas. Her story illustrates how other vendors exert control so that 
newcomers do not take their spots through simply calling attention to the 
existing norm. I used my notes and excerpts from informal conversations to 
reconstruct her story. 
It was the end of October when Marta decided she needed to find something 
to do to earn some money before Christmas. She had been a housewife since 
she got married, but her husband had lost his job a year earlier, and the family 
was in serious need of money. They were already three months behind on the 
rent. While her husband had managed to get some pick-up jobs, it was never 
enough to pay for all the bills at home. Marta’s sister had lent her money to 
pay for the electricity bill twice, but this time they were going to cut all the 
other utilities unless they could come up with the money on time.  
Marta had seen many people selling coffee and empanadas in the streets and 
she thought she could do the same. Preparing the coffee and the empanadas 
was not so difficult. But selling was going to be a bigger challenge. Marta was 
a quiet woman and she had never sold anything before. She thought she could 
sell them in the neighborhood center where a lot of people constantly pass by. 
Marta’s husband was a bit worried about her, because he had heard in the 
news that street vendors were not allowed. But she had seen vendors 
everywhere, and they seemed to be doing ok. She knew she could get in 
trouble with the police, but she had to take the risk. Perhaps, if she explained 
her needs to the police, they would feel compassion, she thought. 
Marta filled up some thermoses with coffee. She filled a basket with 
empanadas and got a chair to sit on. She was feeling sick to her stomach about 
working on the streets and was afraid she would not sell anything, but she felt 
she had to try. On her first day, Marta sat with her basket outside a 
supermarket called Carrefour, near Portal de las Americas. She opened the 
basket of empanadas to attract her customers with the smell. However, no 
more than ten minutes had passed when another woman came up to her and 
told her to move from her spot. She was selling empanadas and she told Marta 
that this was her spot. The supermarket security guard confirmed this to 
Marta, and she had no other choice but to move. The woman told her, “Look, 
there isn’t room for the two of us here. You have to go somewhere else and 
find your own spot.”  
Frustrated, Marta moved to the end of the street. But five other vendors were 
already selling various types of food there. They also told Marta that this was 
their spot and that she had to leave. She moved to the other side of the street 
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to a corner that was free. She was alone there, and not many people passed by. 
The best spot was near the entrance of the supermarket, but the woman there 
would not let her come near. It was already getting dark, and Marta had sold 
only a few empanadas. She began to worry that she would have to return 
home with her food, so she started to walk around offering her empanadas to 
people working in the stores. That night Marta came home at eight in the 
evening after she sold everything. 
The next day Marta went to a school and tried to sell there as the students 
were leaving the school premises. But at the school entrance, there was 
another woman selling empanadas, and she had told Marta that there was no 
point in both of them selling in the same spot. Marta agreed and realized that 
she had to move. She recommended Marta go to another school ten blocks 
away where there were not many vendors. Marta left with her basket, but by 
the time she arrived at the other school, the students had already left. Much 
like the previous day, she started walking around offering her empanadas to 
people working in stores. 
Marta started to sell her empanadas moving from one place to another. It was 
a tough job, but she was able to sell more when she walked around, and she 
was also left in peace by other vendors. After some days moving from place to 
place, Marta decided to set up her chair and sell her empanadas outside the 
school the other women had recommended when the school day was over and 
children were leaving to go home. She also started to sell to the rickshaw 
drivers in the neighborhood of Quintas, early in the mornings. Drivers started 
to buy empanadas from Marta, and now she had established her spot in 
Quintas outside the school. (Story based on observations and informal 
conversations with Marta at the rickshaw stop at Quintas, conducted on June 
11, 15 and 17 of 2013). 
Marta’s story illustrates how vendors enforce the acreditar norm, often 
through simply warning. Marta accepted the warning of other vendors and 
moved away until she found an empty spot. Street vendors often move 
around until they find a place where they themselves can become accredited. 
Another interesting point that can be extracted from this story is the role of 
third party enforcers, in this case the security guard at the supermarket. His 
approval of the first vendor was an act of social recognition of the acreditar 
norm and reinforced the vendor’s request for Marta to leave. 
A “warning” can be a first step in the process of social control. However, if 
Marta had refused to leave, the reactions could have escalated to harsher and 
even violent forms of punishment.  
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In this case, a warning was a conciliatory type of social control. It offers the 
opportunity of a peaceful solution in complying with the existing norm. In 
addition, the warning is a less severe form of control, in contrast with verbal 
abuse. The social control of the acreditar norm often started with conciliatory 
forms and depending on the response, the person acting as controller could 
opt for more punitive forms of social control, such as gossip or physical 
violence. Informal controls to enforce the acreditar norm illustrate what 
Ellickson calls “escalating steps” (1991, 214) - that is, forms of control that 
increase depending on the results they generate. 
Verbal Abuse: Se Agarran a Boca 
Many vendors reported having verbal confrontations with others due to envy 
and competition. Often they use the phrase “se agarran a boca”, meaning they 
fight with their mouths, to refer to verbal confrontations. Accredited vendors 
often told newcomers to move on, and verbal abuse would occur when a new 
vendor refused to leave. Thus, verbal abuse was often a second step in this 
process of informal control. The following excerpt illustrates how Gaby (the 
new vendor) relocated after Pilar (the accredited vendor) had shouted at her 
that this was her place. 
I have seen Gaby and Pilar before but I didn’t know they had had a fight. 
Today, I talked to Gaby and spent some time with her during the afternoon. 
She complained that she had to move to the middle strip of the road because 
the other vendor didn’t like that she was selling more and had started insulting 
her. “She started to shout at me and I had no other choice but to leave. I don’t 
like to fight with other vendors”, said Gaby. (Field note based on observations 
and a short interview from January 11
th
 2014). 
In the middle strip of the road, the new vendor (Gaby) was more exposed to 
traffic accidents and pollution, because cars passed on both sides. However, 
she had been forced to park her ice cream cart in that dangerous spot in order 
to remain within some distance from the accredited vendor and avoid a 
conflict. Vendors often talked about being insulted by others due to envy and 
competition. Many preferred to move on while others fought back. Verbal 
abuse (bad-mouthing) is a common form of social control among street 
vendors trying to defend their spots. The group of vendors that had arrived 
first in the spot often insulted vendors that refused to move away. Verbal 
confrontations created a poor working environment and affected the well-
being of many street vendors who experienced mistreatment from other 
vendors.  
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The Use of Gossip 
I had often heard rumors from both new and accredited vendors about unfair 
competition, envy and poor co-existence. New vendors often argued that they 
were mistreated by already established vendors who abused their right of 
acreditar. While many new vendors acknowledged the acreditar norm, they 
complained that there was enough space for everyone and that the established 
vendors were envious. The case of Gabo, one of the vendors near the Santa 
Fé mall illustrates how gossip affected coexistence among ice cream vendors 
in this area.  
I have heard on different occasions that Gabo was upset with another ice 
cream vendor. However, I haven’t seen this woman until today when Gabo 
exploded furiously and said he was tired of telling this woman that there was 
not enough space for more ice cream vendors. While Gabo’s spot was next to 
the stairs of the pedestrian bridge, the old lady he was referring to was in the 
street intersection a few meters away from the other vendors. He referred to 
this woman as la viejita peleona, meaning “The feisty old lady.” I had heard 
how Gabo talked to some other vendors about this woman, so I decided to ask 
him about her.  
“Hi, how is business today?”, I asked. Gabo answered that it was bad as usual. 
“How come?”, I asked. Gabo replied, “You know, the problem with this job is 
the competition, there are too many ice cream vendors everywhere.” Gabo 
said that people did not like him because he would not let others take his spot. 
He said he did not like to get in fights with other vendors, but that the old lady 
selling ice cream from the Rico Ice Cream Company was frustrating him. 
Gabo continued complaining about another other ice cream vendor. I asked 
him what the problem with this particular woman was. He answered that he 
had told her that there were too many vendors in this area and that she had to 
go and sell somewhere else, but she had started shouting as if he was hurting 
her. “As harmless as she seems, she’s a feisty old lady. Fighting against that 
kind of people is difficult”, said Gabo. (field note based on observations and a 
short interview from December 18
th
 2013). 
Gossip is common among street vendors. During my fieldwork I heard gossip 
about corrupt leaders, vendors that took other vendors’ spots, and the 
vendors’ personal lives. Gossip created a poor working environment for 
many, and I often heard complaints about the difficulties of working in the 
streets because of bad co-existence (mala convivencia). However, one thing 
about gossip is that there are often different sides to the story. Therefore, I 
talked to Soledad, the woman that Gabo had tried tell that she had to leave 
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and look for another place to sell her ice cream. She was 67 years old. The 
following excerpt illustrates Soledad’s side of the story.  
I’ve seen that the woman Gabo complains about works mostly in the 
mornings, but she does not come every day. Today, she came around nine in 
the morning and left at two in the afternoon. I decided I had to talk to her and 
hear her story. Her name was Soledad. She started to talk about Rico (the 
company she worked for) and said that their ice cream was both of better 
quality and cheaper than Crem Helado’s ice cream. I bought an ice cream 
from her. I told her about my research and we started to talk about her job. 
Then she started to talk about the problems she was having with the man 
(Gabo) selling Crem Helado ice cream. She complained that some people 
thought they owned the streets, but she insisted that nobody owns the streets. 
“The truth is that when the police come we all have to leave. No one is 
allowed to stay”, she said. Then she explained that one of the Crem Helado 
vendors had told her she had to move away, because that was his spot.  
Soledad talked about her spot, su puesto. She said that unlike the man from 
Crem Helado (Gabo) who was an envious and bad person, she was nice and 
had allowed another Rico vendor to take her spot in the afternoons when she 
was not there. And yes, I indeed have seen another woman from the same 
company selling there in the afternoons. (field note based on observations and 
a short interview from January 7
th
, 2014).  
The story of Soledad’s refusal to leave illustrates that the acreditar norm is 
not always respected. Many people reported difficulties in preventing other 
vendors from setting up their businesses next to them. In a sense, Soledad 
interpreted the acreditar norm as “having a place to sell things”, and since 
she was a few meters away from the other vendor she believed she was not 
violating any norm. However, because of her refusal to leave, vendors talked 
badly about her, and she felt that she was not welcome in the area. However, 
her main concern was selling and earning a living. The gossip among the 
vendors did not affect her reputation among customers who cared mostly 
about the quality of her ice cream. Scholars studying gossip have considered 
the consequences that negative talk can have on a person’s well-being. 
According to Merry, “The impact of gossip and scandal is greater in more 
bounded social systems” (1984, 296). While gossip generates a bad working 
environment, vendors often needed to provide food for their families, and the 
bad working environment caused by negative gossip was not as bad as not 
being able to put bread on the table. In addition, the social systems of their 
customers were different to the quite loose social system of the street 
vendors, so it was possible to balance out the negative outcomes of gossip. 
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As one of the vendors told me, “I don’t care about the others here. I only care 
about selling.” 
The Threat of Violence  
Verbal warnings could come with a threat of a more severe response in case 
of failures to redress the violation of a norm. Ellickson explains that a 
“warning to the deviant” often points out that a future violation may trigger a 
harsher response (1991, 212). Continuing with the example of Soledad, the 
ice cream vendor, she experienced anxiety and fear due to threats from the 
aggrieved vendor. The following excerpt from my field notes illustrates this 
point:  
Soledad explained that when she had refused to leave, Gabo had threatened 
her. “He shouted at me and told me I better leave or he would take care of 
me”, said Soledad. She asked me what I thought he meant by, “Take care of… 
Can take care of mean kill me?”, she wondered. (Interview from January 7th, 
2014).  
Much like Soledad, other vendors complained of the fear of being hurt by 
other street vendors. In some places, such as the Santa Fé mall, I could feel a 
tension among many vendors, and people talked about having to watch their 
backs and being afraid of other vendors. 
Another example occurred on the other side of the highway, in front of the 
Santa Fé mall. The following excerpt is from a conversation with Adriana 
who was accompanying her husband while he sold ice cream:  
I have heard rumors about conflicts among the vendors selling at this bus stop, 
but talking to them was always hard due to them jumping on and off of the 
buses where they offered their products. Today, as I was sitting at this bus 
stop, I started to talk to a women pushing an ice cream cart. I asked if she was 
a vendor and she replied that she was only helping her husband. She was 
sitting on a corner a short distance from the bus stop while her husband 
jumped on buses to sell ice cream. Her name was Adriana. We started to talk, 
and Adriana explained that the peanut vendor had been at the bus stop the 
longest and that he had been very upset when her husband had started to sell 
on the buses. “He told my husband he had to leave, but the owner of the ice 
cream agency sent him to this spot, so he can’t leave”, Adriana explained. 
However, she was worried that someone could hurt her husband or steal his 
ice cream while he was boarding buses, and for that reason she had started to 
accompany him to work in the late afternoons. She said, “I feel bad about my 
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husband’s situation and that he has to work so hard. Look at him, he could get 
run over by a bus anytime, people around here are mean to him and he’s 
always worried that he could get hurt.” Adriana complained that on the 
streets, people do not really help each other and are on their own. She felt you 
could not trust anyone in the streets, because people only care about 
themselves and about selling more than you. She said, “You can only trust 
your family, and that’s why I’m here helping my husband.”  
We continued talking about life. Adriana asked me about my life in Sweden 
and whether life was better here. I told them that I thought in Sweden the 
government takes better care of people, but that it was not perfect. We talked 
about our dreams. Adriana said her dream was to open a store one day. She 
wants to find a place where she can sell things without being insulted by 
others, without exposing her life, without being afraid of someone hurting her. 
Working in the streets is tough, and she felt that people should try to put 
themselves in the shoes of others, because everyone needs to work. (field note 
based on observations and a short interview from January 25
th
 2014). 
The threat of physical violence in the future was often used to intimidate 
newcomers. The excerpts from the interviews with Adriana and Soledad 
illustrate that many vendors live in fear of being hurt by their colleagues. 
While no one knows whether a threat will turn into actual violence, it creates 
stress and anxiety among street vendors. In this case, both Soledad and 
Adriana’s husband defied the threat of violence and stayed in their spots. 
Soledad moved a few meters away, while Adriana’s husband asked his wife 
to provide company and watch over the ice cream cart while he is jumping on 
different buses in order to sell more. Not all cases were like this. In many 
places there was also solidarity among many vendors and drivers. 
Nevertheless, conflicts over the use of space and competition for customers 
were at the heart of their everyday work.  
Physical Violence  
Sometimes the fights over business spots included physical violence. The 
type of violence that affects people in street businesses on an everyday basis 
is not always police or crime related, but can also be initiated by other 
vendors. The vendors I talked to reported that sometimes there were fights 
over busy spots. While I did not observe a physical fight, there was much 
gossip and talk about recent fights. In this section I illustrate the way in 
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which physical violence is used to punish intrusions and disrespect of the 
acreditar norm. 
Nico’s case illustrates how the relationship between formalized and non-
formalized vendors is not always a harmonious one, and sometimes there 
were fights among them.  
Nico sold a package of juice and cookies, which he called refrigerios, 
meaning school snack. He would set up his table near the vending zone of 
Santa Librada around four in the afternoon and leave at seven in the evening. 
Today I talked to him and asked him about his work. He explained that he 
sold his refrigerios in different spots; in the mornings he would sell near a 
government office, at noon outside a school, and in the afternoon he worked 
in the neighborhood of Santa Librada, near the formalized vending zone. The 
vending zone was located in front of a supermarket and near one of the main 
bus stops in the neighborhood, so it was a good spot for any business. He had 
not known about the vending zones, so he had simply set up his table where 
he thought it seemed to be a good spot. He said that when he had started to 
work there, the vendor from the tent in front of him had approached him and 
told him he had to leave because that was a vending zone. The man that 
approached Nico was the leader of the association of vendors. Nico explained 
that the man had told him to leave and that he had answered that he was not 
doing anything wrong. Then they had started to argue and the man had kicked 
Nico’s table over and knocked his goods onto the ground. He had to defend 
himself, so he fought back, and in the end the man left him in peace. He 
threatened to send the police, but Nico said he was not afraid of the police, 
because if the police come they have to move all the vendors around there 
away. Nico said, “They think they’re better than me because they have tents 
[referring to the vendors in the vending zone], but nobody owns the right to 
the streets.” (field note based on observations and a short interview from 
January 12, 2014). 
The story of Nico shows that vendors can refuse other vendors’ claims to 
certain spaces in the city. In this case, the vendors in the vending zone had 
their rights protected by the “legal permit” given by the government. 
However, according to vendors like Nico, they also had the right to the space 
and they contested the rights of formalized vendors.  
Street vendors sometimes use violent self-help to defend their spots. 
However, when using violence, there is always a risk of meeting someone 
that could have a knife or that could fight back and hurt you. Many preferred 
to avoid conflicts. Yet, violence was an option for those that felt strong 
enough to fight. Only people that had the physical power or the weapons to 
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hurt others could in practice use violent self-help. Many women used verbal 
abuse instead, while knife fights were common mostly among men. Thus, not 
everyone had the same opportunities and power to exercise social control in 
the streets.  
Hybrid Forms of Social Control 
One of the reasons that some vendors and rickshaw drivers preferred to avoid 
street fights was that it could raise the attention of the police. Police 
intervention in a street conflict was bad for everyone, because once the police 
had arrived, all the vendors had to leave. The following excerpt is from an 
anecdote of one occasion when the police had come because two women 
were arguing. The anecdote was told by Cali, the man selling cholado drinks 
in Santa Librada. 
Cali has told me that when he first arrived his spot was vacant, and he 
accredited it by coming every day. So, today I asked him, “What would 
happen if you come tomorrow and someone else is selling on this corner?” 
Cali answered, “Well, I would have to tell him, ‘Hi. You have to move 
somewhere else, because this is my spot.’” I asked him what would happen if 
the person did not want to move. He said that in that case he would have to 
resort to force. “That’s never happened to me, because people usually move 
on. I mean, I care about my spot, but there are lots of free spots here.” 
However, he remembered a case of a woman selling ice cream who had got 
into a fight with another woman who had arrived with an ice cart and parked 
next to her. So, the first woman had started to cause problems for the second 
woman. First she had asked the second woman to leave and told her this was 
“her zone.” Then the second woman had reported this to the police who had 
asked the first woman, ”So, you want this women to leave this spot?” ”Yes”, 
she replied. The police then told her that she would have to leave too, because 
nobody owns the street. 
“So what happened?”, I asked. Cali answered that the first woman had been 
forced to stop causing problems and stayed quiet. The second woman had 
stayed there too. “Did you interfere or try to help in that conflict?”, I asked. 
Cali said, “No, you can’t become a sapo [a frog, Colombian slang for a person 
that interferes with other people’s business]. You have to mind your own 
business.” I also asked Cali if he would have done things differently had he 
been in the first woman’s position. Cali was clear that he would not have 
called the police because that was bad for everyone. He explained that all this 
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had happened because of envy, because people worry about not selling 
anything. But he believed that if you had a good product you would not have 
to worry about other people. (field notes based on observations and interview 
from August 21
th
 2012). 
The perception that police officers could come and remove everyone in the 
case of street fights discouraged many vendors from the use of physical 
violence as a means of social control. Thus, this example illustrates how 
informal and formal controls interact with each other.  
Resistance 
The following excerpt is from the notes I took after talking to Edwin, a 
vendor near Portal del Norte. It illustrates a form of resistance.  
Edwin sells cell phone accessories such as chargers, headphones, and phone 
covers for all kinds of brands. He works in the vending zone near Portal del 
Norte. Edwin gets the goods he sells at a wholesale store that buys large 
containers of products from China and distributes them to retailers in the city, 
including street vendors such as Edwin. According to Edwin, the goods he 
sells are not pirate merchandise; instead, they were generic brands and 
therefore cheaper than known brands. Edwin is a small but strong man of 
about 34 years old. He was not the most welcoming person in the area, but at 
the end of my visit we talked for some time. Edwin told me that he had sold 
books in the city center for about five years, but following a large police raid, 
he was sent to prison accused of selling pirate goods. After that he had 
stopped working with pirate goods. At the same place where he used to buy 
books, a man had told him about cell phone accessories and claimed it was a 
legal business. 
I asked Edwin how he had started to sell here in Portal del Norte. He 
explained that he simply arrived with his goods and started to sell. At first no 
one had said anything, but after a few days, a man selling from a chaza had 
told him he had to leave, telling Edwin that there were too many vendors 
there. Edwin replied that he could move a little bit, but he insisted that Edwin 
had to leave. “I don’t like people with that attitude telling others what to do, 
so I showed him my knife and he stopped bothering me”, said Edwin.  
He explained that in the streets you have to be ready to defend yourself and 
defend your spot, because people can always come and start a fight. “I don’t 
think anyone can come and tell others they have to move”, said Edwin. He felt 
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that no one owns the streets, and that people did not realize the needs one 
might have at home. “If you’re in the streets fighting to make a living, there’s 
a reason for it”, he said. 
Later, we talked about new vendors arriving in the area and how he felt about 
them. Edwin said that as long as they did not take his spot he did not care. 
However, he would not appreciate another vendor selling phone accessories, 
and in that case he would tell the person to move to another street. Edwin is a 
tough man and he always carries a knife with him, because he thinks the 
streets are a hard place to survive. “In the streets, you never know what kind 
of people you’re dealing with, they might think you make good money, and 
they could rob you once you’re alone”, said Edwin. He felt he needed to carry 
a weapon for self-defense, and he knew that he had to be alert at all times. 
(Interview from August 20
th
 2012). 
Edwin’s story highlights that competition for a good spot is one of the main 
and daily struggles for the vendors. There are often tensions between people 
selling similar products or providing the same service. It shows that 
individuals that have the capacity, both physically and mentally, as well as 
the confidence to fight back are able to resist social control. While Edwin 
was able to resist because he was a “tough man” and dared to use a knife, 
people talked badly about him and he was not the most appreciated person in 
this place. Thus, a person could respond to social control with violence, but 
then also has to accept to live in a bad working environment nonetheless, 
because other vendors will mistrust this person. 
Resistance Through Quiet Encroachment  
While direct confrontation is not always possible, vendors can resist social 
control through quiet encroachment. Many vendors that are told to leave 
move a few meters away and then wait until social control relaxes enough for 
them to slowly return to and occupy the spot. The same happens when the 
police arrive and tell all the vendors to leave: they simply move to another 
street and then slowly return. New vendors ought to stay some distance away 
from accredited vendors, but there is enough space on the street to 
accommodate many of them. Often, people in street businesses do not have 
the time and resources to go around kicking others out, and therefore, 
vendors can accredit a spot next to others. The following excerpt from an 
encounter with Chucho illustrates how quiet encroachment works.  
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Chucho sells a traditional drink called forcha next to one of the tents in the 
vending zone of Kennedy. Forcha is a kind of punch that is sold on the streets 
of Colombia. It is stored in oak barrels used to ferment the drink. My first 
question to Chucho when I met him was how he had managed to work next to 
the tents without being a formalized vendor. Chucho explained that he had 
started selling forcha to the people working in the tents. He used to park his 
pushcart a few meters away from the vending zone until he met Perla, the 
owner of one of the tents. They would often talk a bit and he would park his 
forcha cart next to her tent while they chatted. In the end, Perla told Chucho 
that he could stay there if he wanted. Other vendors in the zone did not 
complain about Chucho, because he maintained good relations with them all. 
He said he did not like getting in fights, and he was on good terms with the 
other vendors. He was the only one selling forcha, so he was not a threat to 
the vendors in the tents. He also gave free gifts of his drink to the vendors in 
the zone and even offered me a free glass. (Interview from August 8
th
 2012). 
 
Figure 3 Non-formalized vendor in the Transitional Zone  
Source: Photograph from author’s fieldwork 2012. 
I often observed how new vendors started a few meters away from more 
established vendors and slowly moved towards them after some days or 
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weeks had passed. It was a process of “having a feel for it” in the sense that 
you would feel out the atmosphere and decide whether it was ok to move 
towards busy spots. Many vendors reported that they had received an 
informal permit from another, previous vendor. Nevertheless, accredited 
vendors could decide if there were too many vendors, and new vendors were 
not allowed.  
Chucho’s case illustrates how street vendors would set up their businesses 
further down the street and slowly move to the busiest spots. Because the 
streets are open, with patience and by coming everyday, one could gain 
access to a spot next to another vendor, through the same process of 
acreditar. Thus quiet encroachment, as explained by Bayat (1997), was also 
possible in order to challenge the acreditar norm.  
Social Capital Allows you to Avoid Control  
Other vendors had a friend or family member that had helped them get a 
good spot. The following excerpt is from an interview with one of the 
vendors near Portal del Norte. She was around 30 years old and had two kids. 
Thanks to her cousin who was also a vendor near Portal del Norte, she was 
able to get a good spot.  
Today, I talked to different vendors near Portal del Norte. Vendors near the 
Santa Fé mall have told me that Portal is more difficult because there are too 
many vendors there. I spend today walking around Portal del Norte and 
observing the interactions of the vendors. Finally, I talked to Nancy, a vendor 
of hats and caps. I asked her about the first time she started to work at Portal 
del Norte. She said, that she had not had to ask anyone for permission, neither 
was she kicked out. Her cousin, who vended next to her, had helped Nancy to 
set up her business.  
Nancy explained that in the beginning she was a bit nervous, because her 
cousin had explained that they had to be ready to run away if the police came. 
But with the company and help of her cousin she had felt safe. She told me 
that when her husband died, her cousin had told her, “Nancy, you can’t stay 
here in your room crying all day, you have to go out to the streets and find a 
way to bring home food for your kids.” He lent her the money to buy hats in 
the city center in a large store where he also buys the sun glasses he sells. 
“People here don’t say anything about me, because I’m here with my cousin, 
and he already had this spot”, said Nancy. (field note based on observations 
and a short interview from January 15
th
 2014). 
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Having a friend or a family member that was already established as a street 
vendor was an advantage for a new vendor in the streets. These people act 
like gate openers or mentors, and can help you find a place with good 
customers, where the police were not harsh, and where other vendors would 
let you settle in peace. Apart from that, teaming us has also a range of 
practical reasons, such as toilet breaks during which they could watch the 
pushcart. This example shows that social capital and not only social control is 
present in the streets. While some vendors are working close to friends or 
family members, in some cases this can lead to the appropriation of a certain 
area by one group of vendors who then exert control charging fees to new 
vendors to sell there and using the threat of violence to exercise control. 
Acreditar and Well-being 
Many street vendors in Bogotá cooperate to access and distribute the use of 
spots in the city, through the acreditar norm. Whether this is due to a fear of 
getting into fights with others or because they feel it is fair (according to their 
beliefs), most of the vendors that I met respect this norm. It seems as if there 
is a common belief that when a person has already claimed a spot, new 
vendors selling the same goods have to move somewhere else. Sometimes, 
newcomers would refuse to leave and argue that acreditar means moving 
away “just a bit”, and they often use quiet encroachment to gradually move 
towards busy spots.  
From the perspective of individual well-being, the acreditar norm provides a 
sense of security and belonging. Having some kind of expectations for their 
informal right to a spot allows many vendors to work under better conditions. 
However, some vendors started selling their spots or would charge 
newcomers to sell near them. This form of cooperation can enable well-being 
when it allows people to work with less security, but it has created more fear 
and tough working conditions for newcomers. In-depth knowledge about the 
way informal control operates is therefore useful to understand the working 
lives of street vendors. 
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6. Organizational Control: The 
Study of Rickshaws 
The standard rickshaw (bicitaxi) used in Bogotá is a human powered, three-
wheeled vehicle, that is powered by a driver that sits in the front. While 
rickshaws are commonly found in many cities in the world, they are a 
relatively new phenomenon in Bogotá. Estimates indicate that the 
proliferation of rickshaws began after the year 2000 when Transmilenio, the 
city’s new rapid bus system, started operations (CID 2013). Before 
Transmilenio a system of privately run buses and minibuses provided 
transportation in the city. However, when the new public transportation 
system, started operations the main routes did not cover many 
neighborhoods. 
Much like street vendors, rickshaws operate outside the law and therefore 
experience police harassment and confiscations. However, most rickshaw 
drivers in Bogotá operate through associations that coordinate and control 
their work.
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 These associations illustrate a form of organizational control. 
Organizations can be defined as “collectivities oriented to the pursuit of 
relatively specific goals and exhibit relatively highly formalized social 
structures” (Scott 2003, 27). They often include individuals issuing orders 
and being obeyed (Eldridge and Crombie 1974, 27). Thus, it is possible to 
say that they often rely on formal controls to influence their members. 
Organizational control is often based in the power to sanction is attached to 
positions within the organization (Scott 2003, 311). However, organizations 
also rely on informal control. 
In this chapter I will explore organizational control through the study of two 
rickshaw associations. A study of social control within these associations 
illustrates the existence of a hybrid-system of control that includes 
                                                     
35 An estimated 82 per cent of rickshaw drivers are members of associations that controlled 
their places of work (CID 2013). 
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hierarchical control, given to the coordinators, contracts between the owner 
and the driver and informal control, spread among the drivers.  
Rickshaw Stops and Routes 
The word Portal stands for the main stations of the Transmilenio rapid bus 
system. In Bogotá, Portales are often located on the outskirts of the city and 
operate as bus route terminals. Since two of the vending zones in the borough 
of Kennedy were located near Portal de las Americas, I had visited this 
station and used the rickshaws in my previous fieldwork in 2012. However, 
in 2013, I visited Portal de las Americas with an interest to explore the work 
of rickshaw drivers. One of the first things I realized during my visits to 
Portal was that rickshaws operated on different routes and had designated 
stops. Two associations control the route at Portal de las Americas, to make 
their names anonymous; I will call them the “first association” and “second 
association”. The following excerpts illustrate how this route operates.  
Today was my first day at Portal de las Americas. I arrived around 10 a.m., 
after I had spent two hours on buses from my residence in the north of the 
city. As at all the Transmilenio portals here, there were also smaller green 
feeder buses (alimentadores). These feeder buses bring passengers from 
distant neighborhoods to the first stop of the Transmilenio lines. However, if 
you need a ride to the surrounding areas or the areas that the feeder buses do 
not pass, the fastest and even more affordable option is to take one of the 
rickshaws that are parked just outside the station. 
As I exited the station, a rickshaw driver greeted me and asked me if I needed 
a ride. I told him I was a university student interested in the working 
conditions of rickshaw drivers and I asked him if I could have a short 
interview with him. He replied that he had to work and did not have time for 
an interview, but instead he could let me ride in his rickshaw during the slow 
hours of the day so we could talk while he was working. He told me to get on 
while we wait for another passenger. No more than a minute had passed when 
another woman arrived and asked the driver for a ride to the neighborhood of 
Quintas. He told her to get on and started pedaling towards the south of the 
station. The name of my driver was Luis and he was 21 years old. 
I asked Luis about his job as a rickshaw driver. The first thing he said was, 
“There isn’t any other job where I can make the money I make here”, and he 
explained that he makes more than minimum wage. He said that if he works 
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all day, from the early mornings to the late evenings, maybe a total of 14 
hours a day, he could make about 70,000 pesos a day (31 USD). But most of 
the time he made around 45,000 (20 USD). From that, he has to pay 13,000 
pesos (5.7 USD) in rent for the rickshaw, and can keep the rest of the money. 
He usually makes 700,000 pesos a month (310 USD), which is more than 
minimum wage (260 USD in 2013). Also, this job has the advantage of having 
flexible working hours; you are your own boss, and you can combine your job 
with other obligations. It is hard work because you have to pedal all day, and 
you need to be in good shape. But this job is ok for now, said Luis, and he 
mentioned that one day he would like to become a bus driver, like his father. 
(field notes based on informal interviews and participant observations from 
June 7
th
 2013). 
Like Luis, most rickshaw drivers at Portal de las Americas reported that they 
earned more than minimum wage. In a sense it is a profitable business for 
both the owners that receive the rental fee for the rickshaw as well as for the 
drivers that have the chance to earn more than in other jobs. I continued 
riding the rickshaw, and I also talked with Luis’ customers. The following 
excerpt illustrates how the customers perceived the rickshaws and how the 
routes work.  
I introduced myself to the woman next to me and told her about my research. 
She seemed not to mind my presence and said it was ok for me to be there. I 
asked her whether she uses bicitaxis frequently. She said, “It’s the easiest way 
to get around in this barrio.” She commented that the buses were often 
crowded and you had to wait for them, while the rickshaws were always 
available. The ride from Portal to her destination in the neighborhood of 
Quintas took about five minutes. We dropped our passenger off at her 
destination and continued towards the rickshaw stop in that neighborhood.  
This time, a woman in her 50s climbed aboard. I asked her what she thought 
about the rickshaws. The first thing she said was that they provided “door to 
door” transportation.  
Every time we arrived at Portal de las Americas, we dropped our passenger 
off at the entrance of the bus station and then travelled to a pedestrian bridge 
to park behind other drivers. The same happened in the neighborhood of 
Quintas, the main destination for our passengers. Once there, we dropped off 
the passengers wherever they wanted, and then we continued towards a corner 
stop where other drivers were waiting. There we parked our vehicle behind 
the last rickshaw in the line and waited for our turn. (field notes based on 
informal interviews and participant observations from June 7
th
 2013). 
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There are many rickshaw routes in the city of Bogotá. The name of the 
associations controlling the routes is often placed on the drivers’ vests or in 
the back of the rickshaw. As I became aware of the existence of this route, I 
suddenly started to see routes all over the city. Through my visits to Portal I 
realized that routes existed in the sense that only of the associations of 
rickshaws could pick up passengers at the designated stops. 
In order to illustrate how the route operates in more detail, I use the following 
two drawings. They depict the location of the rickshaw routes at Portal de las 
Americas. The first figure is a drawing I made during my fieldwork, based on 
my observations. It shows the places where rickshaw drivers park their 
vehicles to wait for passengers. It also shows the route they take towards the 
neighborhood of Quintas, located on the west side of the station. The second 
figure is a map I drew using Google maps to more accurately illustrate the 
geographical location of Portal de las Americas, and the location of the two 
stops in the neighborhood of Quintas. In this map is also possible to see two 
other rickshaw routes, one located on the east side of Portal and the other 
located near a supermarket called Carrefour. The map also shows the location 
of one of the vending zones denoted by the acronym VZ.  
 
Figure 1 Drawing of the rickshaw stop at Portal de las Americas 
Source: Author’s field work diary 2013. 
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Figure 2 Map of the Portal de las Americas bus station and the neighborhood of Quintas. 
Source: Adapted from Google maps made by the author based on previous drawings. 
Acreditar la Ruta 
Rickshaw drivers also use the word acreditar to explain the process of 
earning the informal privilege to use a certain route. Miguel, the leader of the 
association of rickshaw drivers at Portal las Americas told me once: “Esta 
ruta esta acreditada”, meaning, “this route is accredited”. It goes so far that 
even the people living in the neighborhood recognize the drivers and that 
pirate rickshaws (those outside the association) are not allowed to pick up 
passengers at the stops of the accredited association. When I asked rickshaw 
drivers why they had to pay the cupos (a form of membership fee in the 
association), many answered that this was like a payment to the drivers who 
originally started the route. Luis, one of the drivers, explained ”Los que 
acreditan la ruta merecen un reconocimeinto”, meaning that those who got 
the route accredited deserve some recognition. According to Miguel, the cupo 
is a normal payment, because the first drivers had to work for a long time to 
create a route and to get accredited in the community.  
During my time at Portal de las Americas, drivers explained that they 
belonged to two different associations. I could recognize who worked for 
each association from their initials on the blue vests they wore and the 
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registration plate on the back of their rickshaw. The following excerpt from 
an interview with Miguel, the leader of the first association, illustrates how 
they started this route. 
“So Miguel, how does the route work?” I asked. Miguel explained that in the 
beginning there were only three drivers. They saw the opportunity to provide 
transportation to people in the neighborhood of Quintas, and they started to 
pick up passengers every day in the same spots. In time, Miguel and his 
colleagues had consolidated the route and people started to use their services 
on a regular basis. Miguel said, “Esta ruta esta acreditada y por eso tenemos 
muchos pasajeros”, meaning, “This route is accredited and this is why we 
have so many passengers” (interview from June 24th 2013).  
The route of Portal de las Americas was established for a period of about 
seven years when I interviewed Miguel in 2013. It had started with a few 
drivers that got together and decided to work in the same spots. People in the 
neighborhood now recognize them and trust their services.  
Another example comes from a route that was only three months old and was 
in the process of becoming accredited. I became aware of this route because 
their main stop was only a few meters away from the bus stop of Portal de las 
Americas, but they covered a different neighborhood than the association 
Miguel works for. The route was smaller and there were only five drivers on 
it. The following field note excerpt illustrates how drivers were in the process 
of accrediting this route.  
I have seen that there is another association that controls the pickup spot on 
the northern side of Portal de las Americas. Over there, drivers wear different 
vests and they don’t go to the Portal entrance to pick up their customers. This 
route is smaller and has only a few drivers. They take passengers traveling to 
a different neighborhood, and their spot is located at the far end of the station. 
Today, I talked to one of the drivers and asked him about this route. His name 
is Jaime and he is one of the founders of the route. He explained that they got 
tired of fighting with people from the associations in the area and had decided 
to start a new route. He had spoken to two other rickshaw drivers, and 
together they had started their own route starting at the Portal de las Americas. 
He said, “Estamos acreditando la ruta”, meaning, “We are getting the route 
accredited.” However, this was a small association, and during busy hours all 
the drivers had passengers, and the rickshaw stop remained empty only a few 
times. According to Jaime, they were still having problems with pirate drivers 
that took advantage when they were absent from the stop transporting 
passengers. (field note based on observations and a short interview from June 
27
th
 2013). 
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The establishment of accredited routes became a necessity for the drivers in 
order to coordinate their work and to improve their collective well-being. 
Accredited routes have the advantage of creating a costumer base that starts 
to trust their services, and thereby reduces unnecessary time and effort of 
driving around in search of costumers. Thus, for drivers it means more 
income and less energy spent, which is a substantial benefit for them. 
Association Roles and Responsabilities 
Organizations are composed of individuals that make contributions to the 
organization and perform different roles (W. R. Scott 2003, 21).
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 The 
rickshaw associations at Portal de las Americas spoke about at least three 
different roles: the drivers, the owners, and the coordinators. Drivers rent the 
vehicle from members of the association, but they have no vote in the 
association’s decisions. Instead, the owners elect the board of the associations 
and the coordinator of the route. Norms of expected behavior, as well as 
social control practices, varied among the members of the associations. In 
this section I will present the relationship between owners and drivers. I will 
explain the role of the coordinator in a separate section.  
Owners of Rickshaws and the Rental Agreement  
The rickshaw association at Portal is composed of various individuals who 
own a vehicle and a share in the association. The shares in the associations 
are called “cupos.” A survey conducted in the city of Bogotá in 2003 
indicated that almost half of the drivers owned their vehicle, while 46 % 
rented their rickshaw from another person. At Portal de las Americas I met 
both owners and drivers that rented their vehicle from a member of one of the 
associations. At first, it is difficult to identify whether a driver rents the 
vehicle or owns it. They all wear the same vests and perform the same public 
transportation service. However, after talking to the drivers and spending 
some time in the field, it was possible to observe the relationship between 
owners and drivers and their different roles.  
                                                     
36 The roles of participants in an organization generate expectations of behaviour (W. R. Scott 
2003, 19). 
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One of the owners I met was Julian. He was thirty-two years old and owned 
one of the rickshaws in the first association . The following excerpt illustrates 
how he became a member of the association.  
Today Julian let me share a ride in his rickshaw. He explained that he had 
bought his vehicle from a local manufacturer. It cost 1.5 million pesos (485 
USD). Then he had to buy the cupo from the association. “That was more 
expensive than the rickshaw”, Julian explained. He paid 1.7 million pesos 
(880 USD) for one cupo in the first association . Before he had become an 
owner, he had rented the vehicle from a man who belonged to the association, 
but he was tired of paying “la cuota” [the daily rental fee] and therefore he 
had saved enough money to buy his own rickshaw.  
Later, Julian took me to the factory where he had bought the rickshaw. This 
place was a garage in the borough of Bosa. Julian introduced me to the owner. 
When he had first started his business, he had only built and repaired bicycles, 
but he started to manufacture rickshaws after they had become popular in the 
neighborhood. During our visit, he was building a rickshaw for a street 
vendor. He said he builds four rickshaws a month since there was high 
demand. We left after he gave me his business card. (field notes based on 
informal interviews and participant observations from June 11
th
 2013). 
There are drivers who own their vehicle, like Julian. There are also owners of 
one or more vehicles that rent them out. There are also associations where 
one person owns all the vehicles and controls the drivers. In this kind of 
association, drivers pay a rental fee and get to keep the rest of the money. In 
other associations the owner gets all the money and pays the drivers a small 
salary.  
According to Miguel, they do not run a monopoly of rickshaws, and one 
owner can have a maximum of three rickshaws. But he knows of other routes 
where one person controls everything. José owned three vehicles in this 
association. He rented them to drivers such as Luis. The following excerpt 
illustrates one way of entering the rickshaw business.  
Finally, we arrived at the association’s improvised office, which was a simple 
desk in José’s house. José owns three of the rickshaws. Unlike Miguel, José 
doesn’t drive a rickshaw, but works as a tailor. José explained that he learnt 
about the rickshaw business from one of his neighbors who had founded the 
Portal route. He offered to buy him a rickshaw and that is how he entered the 
business. While we were talking, a young boy arrived with his CV to give to 
Don José and asked when he could start working. José explained to me about 
a woman who owned one of the rickshaws and was looking to hire a driver. 
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José usually helps the owners to find “good” drivers, basically young men that 
are known in the neighborhood and have good references. José administers 
other rickshaws and collects the daily fees from the drivers. He did not say if 
he gets a commission from the owners. (field notes based on interviews and 
participant observations from June 21
st
 2013).  
Gregorio is a 43 year old rickshaw driver who works for one of the 
associations. He has been working here for one year, and he also owns his 
rickshaw. He had paid 3 million pesos to Ms. Patricia which included the 
“cupo” (share of the association) and the rickshaw itself. Patricia was one of 
the vendors in the area. Gregorio had to pay 20,000 pesos (9 USD) every 
month to Patricia, the president of the association. “Her brother is the 
treasurer and they appointed me as secretary. But then, these people kicked 
me out. They don’t really work like an association, they only care about us 
paying the 20,000 a month, that’s all.” From that, she gets half of the money, 
and the other half goes to the salary of the coordinator. He said, “I don’t agree 
with the way this association works. This is not an association, they’re only 
here for the money, they don’t care about us.” He has to pay the first week of 
each month. He said, “The coordinator provides security, and he also helps to 
keep the area clear of thieves and pirate rickshaws.” I asked him what would 
happen if he did not pay the association fee (20,000 pesos a month). He 
answered simply, “They wouldn’t let me work”, referring to the coordinator 
and his family. (field notes based on interview from June 24, 2013). 
In the context of the associations, owners are “shareholders” and the “cupos” 
represent the shares. Owners have the responsibility to attend the 
association’s meetings and pay the monthly association fee. If the owner does 
not pay, the coordinator could use violent self-help to prevent the driver from 
using the route, similarly to how he would deal with pirate drivers. If the 
police confiscate the vehicle, it is the owner’s responsibility to pay the fine.  
Rickshaw Drivers 
You can own a rickshaw and drive it, or you can rent the vehicle. My 
informants use the word “drivers” to designate those that rent the vehicle.37 
                                                     
37 Estimates from a survey conducted at the city level indicate that there are between 3,000 and 
8,000 rickshawdrivers that transport passengers mostly between bus stations and residential 
neighborhoods (CID 2013).37 The great majority of the drivers are men (93.5 %). More 
than half (56 %) of the drivers are between 27 and 59 years old.37 The education level of 
the rickshaw drivers is relatively higher than the average street vendors, but only 26.8 % 
have finished high school. Most rickshaw drivers work on the outskirts of the city, the great 
majority in the low-income boroughs of Kennedy (51.4 %) and Bosa (21.3 %) (Ibid.). 
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At Portal de las Americas there were 70 owners and drivers, of whom only 
two were women who rented their vehicle. When I asked Miguel, the 
coordinator of the first association, about the exact number of drivers and 
owners, he avoided answering the question. In my field notes I recorded 
meeting 20 drivers and 10 owners.  
Drivers and owners often use a verbal agreement for the rental of the vehicle. 
The following excerpt illustrates how rental agreements work.  
Luis rents his rickshaw from a man that has a “cupo” in one of the 
associations. He explained that he pays 13,000 pesos per day (7 USD) for the 
“cuota” (the rent). The rest of the money he makes goes to him. He has to pay 
this cuota from Monday to Saturday; Sundays are free, so he can decide if he 
wants to work or rest. If he works on Sundays, the money he makes is his. In 
the same way, if he falls sick or cannot work on one of the weekdays, he still 
has to pay the daily quota. Luis said it was a good deal, because he did not 
have to worry about reparations or police confiscations. If the police take his 
rickshaw, it is the owner’s loss, not his. Luis explained that he has to return 
the rickshaw every night at the owner’s house. In this way, the owner makes 
sure that he pays the quota and takes care of the vehicle. I asked Luis if he 
knew of any drivers that had stolen the vehicle. He said stealing a rickshaw 
was not very common, because owners only trust drivers that they know. 
However, he remembered one man who was a drug abuser and had 
disappeared with the rickshaw. The owner tried to recover it, but the man had 
disappeared and his family did not know where he was. In this case, the owner 
lost out. “That’s why they only trust drivers that they know”, said Luis. (Field 
notes based on participant observation and informal conversations from June 
7
th
 2013). 
Miguel, the leader, told me I had to take a bus to Bosa Libertad and, once 
there, I should ask a rickshaw driver to take me to the community center room 
in the neighborhood of Potreritos. At the same stop where the bus had 
dropped me off, there was a line of rickshaws on the side road waiting to pick 
up passengers. I told my rickshaw driver I was going to Potreritos. After 
driving along an unpaved road for about 10 minutes we entered the 
neighborhood of Potreritos, which in Spanish means small pastures, and in 
this case is a place where rurality meets urbanity. Here, you find small farms 
with chickens and cows, shacks made out of green tarpaulin and other 
improvised housing for the urban poor. I left my rickshaw after paying only 
700 pesos (22 cents USD) for a ride that would have cost double near Portal 
de las Americas, and almost triple in the north of Bogotá. My rickshaw driver 
explained, “People earn less in this area, so rickshaw rides are cheaper.” 
Probably the rent of the rickshaw and the quota were also cheaper, I thought. 
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(field notes based on interviews and participant observations from June 21st 
2013).  
The rental agreement is a contract between drivers and owners. However, the 
drivers’ organization regulates some details in the agreement. To rent a 
vehicle, the owner must inform the coordinator of the association. Drivers 
must bring their CV and a copy of their criminal record to the coordinator. 
While owners and drivers agreed on the rental agreement, the value of the 
daily “quota” [rent] was informally decided among the owners, and they all 
charged the same. Rentals varied from association to association. 
To enforce the rental agreement and make sure that drivers did not steal the 
rickshaw, many owners required the drivers to return the vehicle every 
evening. In this way they could make sure that the drivers paid the rent every 
day. However, trust was necessary because a driver could run away with the 
rickshaw at any time. Moreover, drivers that had gained the owners’ trust 
could park the vehicles at their own residence. Thus, informal control plays a 
big role in the enforcement of the rental agreement. However, owners could 
also get the help from the coordinator to recover a vehicle or to sanction a 
driver for not paying the daily quota. 
The Good and the Bad Association  
Not all the associations work collectively for the benefit of their members, as 
they argued, and some are only interested in earning money from the 
rickshaw business. This made me wonder to what extent the Ministry of 
Transportation’s accusations about mafias controlling rickshaws were true. 
The president of one of the first associations, José, said that they were the 
“good guys” and that the second association was a group of vandals. The 
following excerpt illustrates this point.  
José knows there are rumors about mafias controlling the rickshaw business 
and he brings this subject into the conversation. He said, “They’re organized 
in associations to make the work easier, but they’re not mafias, like the 
government thinks.” He showed me the legal documents of the associations 
that are registered at the Chamber of Commerce as non-profit organizations. 
He told me that the association was founded six years ago because 
transportation in this area was inadequate, and most of the residential 
neighborhoods are located about 2 kilometers from the bus station. He 
explained, “We provide a good service to the community, we pick them up at 
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their doorstep and leave them at the bus station, and the price is very 
convenient.” People can sit and relax, unlike on the crowded buses. He added 
that they were also good for the city because they do not generate pollution 
like the buses or the taxis. (field notes based on interviews and participant 
observations from June 21
st
 2013). 
Through Miguel, I came in contact with Eduardo, one of the officials drafting 
a norm to regulate rickshaws at the national level. He explained that the 
Ministry had created a working group for rickshaw regulation after more than 
1,000 rickshaw drivers had blocked the entrance to the Ministry during a 
demonstration in 2013. Although there were demonstrations in 2009 and 
2012, in 2013 the Constitutional Court ordered the Ministry to regulate this 
issue.  
Eduardo said that there isn’t a place in the city where drivers can pick up 
passengers in their rickshaw without having to pay the people controlling the 
different routes. They say they’re rickshaw associations, pretending to be 
good guys representing the poor drivers, but according to Eduardo only a few 
people control the business and get most of the profits. “Some of these people 
own up to 800 vehicles and control entire neighborhoods” said Eduardo. He 
explained that the associations are not interested in the formalization of 
rickshaw services, but in keeping their monopolies. Although they call 
themselves associations, they’re just there to defend the interests of a few 
owners, while the majority of the drivers are unprotected. “This has become a 
business for the police officers in the districts of Kennedy and Bosa” said 
Eduardo. (Phone interview From February 7, 2014) 
For a passenger like me, it seemed that the two rickshaw associations share 
this route and work in harmony. They charge the same fares, wear similar 
uniforms, and have a joint queue system to pick up passengers from the bus 
station. There are no open fights between the rickshaw drivers of either 
association, they drink coffee together and have short conversations while 
they wait for their turn to pick up passengers. However, Miguel and José’s 
stories show that there is great tension between the leaders of these 
organizations, and some of the street vendors around the area explained that 
both the street vending and rickshaw businesses are controlled by one family. 
Whether a group of rickshaw owners gets together to operate a route and 
coordinate their behavior, or whether they use violence to collect money, can 
define the difference between an association and a mafia organization.  
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Informal Control and Control by the Coordinator 
As I have explained above, one way to study norms is to show regular forms 
of sanctioning non-compliance. In this section I will consider some of the 
practices of social control used among rickshaw drivers, specifically informal 
control among drivers and specialized control from the route coordinator.  
Cupos: Semi-formal Licenses for Rickshaws 
Drivers use the word “cupo” to refer to shares in the association. It is a 
membership fee that new owners must pay in order to gain access to an 
accredited route. I use the term semi-formal, because although they are not 
legal, they are not entirely informal in the sense that they are regulated by the 
associations of rickshaw owners. The drivers explained that cupos are paid to 
the people that originally established a route. The following excerpt 
illustrates how cupos work.  
Today I am riding in Miguel’s rickshaw, the coordinator of one of the 
associations. He took me in his rickshaw to the association’s office via an 
unpaved road. On the way, Miguel showed me his house in the distance, 
where he lives with his wife and three kids. Miguel’s wife takes care of the 
kids, especially her youngest son who is only ten months old. During the ride, 
I asked Miguel about the cupos. Miguel said that in the beginning, there were 
only six rickshaw owners that started the association. They worked in the 
neighborhood of Quintas bringing passengers to Portal de las Americas. 
According to him, it took a long time for them to get the route accredited in 
the community. It took a lot of work to defend the route from pirate drivers 
that wanted to steal their customers. However, in time, the route had become 
accredited and drivers in the neighborhood began to respect their stops. 
Gradually, they started to sell cupos to people that wanted to own a rickshaw 
on this route. 
We are now at the office of the association. Here I met José, the vice-
president. He owns three rickshaws. José said that the rickshaw business is 
like the taxi business, where some people own the taxis and lend them to other 
drivers on commission. He mentioned that his brother is a taxi driver, and they 
wanted to operate like a taxi company. (field notes based on informal 
interviews and participant observations from June 21
st
 2013).  
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According to the drivers I met, the price of the cupos varies from route to 
route, and they were relatively expensive at Portal de las Americas since that 
was a good route. For instance, the price of the cupo at Portal was 1.7 million 
(880 USD), while the route located on the side road was only 700,000 pesos 
(226 USD). In the excerpt, José, the vice-president of the association, 
mentioned that they wanted to operate like a taxi company. Taxis in Bogotá 
also use cupos, which are based on licenses provided by the government. 
However, taxis are legal while rickshaws are not. While rickshaw drivers 
generally have to either pay or establish a route elsewhere, in some cases they 
fought against the associations. In fact, the second association, had been 
formed by a group of drivers that had rebelled against Miguel’s association, 
and had used violence to invade the route with their own vehicles. However, 
drivers explained that resisting an association was not easy and that the case 
of the second association was unique. Nevertheless, both associations agreed 
on a maximum number of 35 cupos for each of them, because the drivers 
complained about not earning enough.  
For Eduardo at the Ministry of Transportation, the creation of cupos was 
abusive, and the government needed to create a system that was fair.  
Eduardo said, “We have to stop all the mafias controlling the rickshaws in 
Bogotá. Those people exploit the drivers” (Telephone interview from 
February 7, 2014).  
In Bogotá, the government and the rickshaw owners have very different 
opinions about the role of the associations. From the government’s 
perspective, the rental fees (quota) and cupos charged by the associations 
were exploitative. To be part of an association, it is necessary to buy a cupo, 
which is the equivalent of a company share. Buying the cupo guarantees 
access to the stops controlled by that association. Additionally, members of 
the association have to pay a monthly fee, attend the meetings of the 
association and follow certain rules. But how does the association enforce the 
cupos?  
Coordinators as “Control Specialists” 
The rickshaw associations at Portal de las Americas have two coordinators. 
One works in Quintas during the rush hours in the morning, and the other 
works in Portal during the evenings. The members of the associations elect 
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the coordinator. The person elected to the job of coordinator receives a salary 
from the association. Smaller routes can operate without a coordinator by 
using other forms of control. However, a route that is controlled by a 
coordinator can establish more formal control to prevent pirate drivers from 
picking up passengers at their stop. The following excerpt illustrates how 
coordinators work. 
Today, I arrived at six in the morning at the rickshaw stop in Quintas. I must 
confess that I have postponed this visit for a while, because I have to leave my 
residence at four in the morning in order to be here at six. Miguel, the 
associations’ coordinator, told me that if I wanted to see how the route works I 
had to come early. I am sitting on the sidewalk at one of the stops in Quintas. 
There is not enough time to talk to the drivers or the customers because they 
are busy. People here seem to be energized. While it is early, the sun is 
already in the sky, children are on their way to school, the local bakery is open 
and I can hear the sound of the city in the background. I am glad to see doña 
Marta selling tinto and empanadas to keep me company and get something to 
eat. Life starts early for most people in the city.  
Miguel, the coordinator is here. He said, “So you managed to get here early.” 
He does not ride his rickshaw, he only greets the customers and sends the 
drivers off. His vest is blue like the other drivers, but “Coordinator” is printed 
on the back. The drivers that I can see wear their vests and helmet. I hear him 
shout, “Hey man, we need more drivers here, tell the guys at the other stop to 
move faster.” Many customers do not say anything, they just jump onto the 
rickshaw and the drivers start pedaling towards Portal. Most people here 
seemed to know how the route works. 
While I observed Miguel, the coordinator of the route, I did not see any pirate 
drivers using the route. His job consisted mostly of making sure that the 
traffic on the route flowed well. However, Miguel said, “La ruta no se puede 
dejar sin coordinador porque se vienen otros a piratear”, meaning that it was 
not possible to leave the route without a coordinator because other pirate 
drivers would arrive and invade it. He explained that prior to having 
associations, there were constant fights, and some drivers had been injured. 
Since the establishment of the associations, everyone now worked in peace. 
Later that day, Miguel showed me a metallic stick he carries. In case of 
problems with pirate drivers, he said he would slash the tires. (field notes 
based on observations from June 25
st
 2013).  
The previous excerpt illustrates the role of the coordinator in preventing 
pirate drivers from picking up passengers at the stops belonging to the 
association. From my observations and the conversations with Miguel, I 
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could see that his role implied a kind of preventive control. He carried a vest 
bearing the coordinator sign, and he monitored operations during the rush 
hours. This could prevent pirate drivers from visiting this stop. However, he 
also carried a weapon to defend the route and the punishment for pirate 
drivers was to cut their tires. 
Conflict Resolution  
Coordinators of the rickshaw route often act as mediators in case of conflicts 
among drivers, as well as in conflicts between the owner and the drivers.  
According to Miguel, he always tries to solve conflicts among drivers by 
talking to them. He believed it was necessary to work together and to have a 
good co-existence. While minor problems were solved through Miguel’s 
mediation, in the case of major problems the ultimate sanction was to expel 
the driver from the association. Miguel said, “It all starts when they insult 
each other, then they start fighting and then knives appear.” Miguel said he 
always tried to mediate to prevent violence. He tried to explain the fighting 
among the drivers. In the case of drivers fighting among themselves, the 
owner would have to rent the vehicle to a different driver. In the case of an 
owner involved in a fight, they could only expel him in extreme cases, but 
Miguel reported that until now they had not had any such cases. On various 
occasions, I heard Miguel telling the drivers to wear their helmet or clean their 
vehicle. They said that since the associations had been established, things had 
become easier because they knew they had a place on the route (field notes 
based on observations from June 25
st
 2013).  
Drivers at Portal de las Americas talked about a conflict between the two 
associations. They described it as a conflict among a group of drivers that did 
not want to pay the cupos and had decided to bring their own rickshaws to 
the route by force. The following excerpt illustrates the conflict and what 
happened afterwards.  
José owns three rickshaws in one of the associations. Today, while we were 
talking, he explained why there are two associations on one route. He said that 
was because some drivers had seen that this was a good business. They had 
then decided to enter the route by force. They had threatened to use violence 
against the members of the first association if they did not let them work. He 
had not wanted to use the same kind of violence, so he had called the police. 
He said his brother was a police officer and he had put him in contact with the 
police officers in that zone. The police came and tried to help them to kick 
them out, but in the end, those drivers had managed to remain there. They had 
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the help of the family of street vendors in Portal and they were difficult to 
fight. They control the street vending business in the area and had noticed that 
rickshaws were good business, so they had moved their vehicles there (field 
notes based on interviews and participant observations from June 21
st
 2013).  
The family of vendors claiming the monopoly of Portal acted as owners of the route, 
they did not seem to work like a member based association; instead the President and 
coordinator were from the same family. While José complained about this family, he 
owned three rickshaws and he did not drive himself. 
Contract Between the Drivers and the Owners 
There is often an informal verbal contract between the drivers and the 
owners. Drivers often said that they had to pay the rental fee every day 
because owners knew that if they fell behind on the quota (the rent), it would 
be difficult for them to stay debt free and clean. Vehicle reparations or fines 
in case of confiscation are the owners’ responsibility. The drivers said that if 
they did not pay the rent, the coordinator would take them off the route, and 
the owner would take back the rickshaw by force. But what happens when a 
driver steals a rickshaw? The following story illustrates how owners try to 
recover their vehicles, through self-help. 
Gregorio owns three rickshaws in one of the associations. He rents 
them to drivers such as Luis. He remembers that one of his drivers had 
stolen a rickshaw. He was the son of one of his neighbors. He had 
talked to Gregorio and asked him for a job. However, the young man 
had only worked half the day before leaving. Gregorio went to his 
house and talked to the young man’s mother, but no one had given him 
any information about him. He took a bicycle and started to look for 
him. “I know people buy second hand rickshaws all the time in Bosa, 
so I checked different routes until I found the rickshaw. I called the 
police to report the crime. They came, but the man that had stolen the 
rickshaw had bought fake papers from a rickshaw factory, so the police 
could not do anything (field notes based on interview from June 24, 2013).  
Julian said that if he did not pay, the owner would get a new driver. He 
would ask the coordinator to take the vehicle and the driver would not 
be allowed on the route again (field notes based on interview from June 27, 
2013).  
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The papers Gregorio was referring to were the receipt of the sale. Gregorio 
said he could not do anything more to recover his rickshaw, but that if he saw 
the man who had stolen it, he would probably hit him. Since then, Gregorio 
only rents to people he trusts, but there is always a risk involved. However, 
the fact that the police came to mediate in this conflict also shows how 
formal and informal controls are interrelated.  
Informal Control to Exclude Pirate Drivers 
At Portal de las Americas, drivers of other routes, or “pirate drivers”, often 
arrived to drop off their passengers. However, according to my informants, 
pirate drivers were not allowed to pick up passengers at Portal, and they had 
to leave with an empty rickshaw. The following excerpt from my field notes 
during a ride with Luis illustrates how drivers respected other routes. 
We took a passenger to a neighborhood on the east side of Portal de las 
Americas. As we drove back to the rickshaw stop, we passed a supermarket 
called Carrefour. A person waved at Luis, but he just continued pedaling. He 
told me that he was not allowed to pick up passengers near this supermarket 
because it belonged to a different route. I saw that they wore different vests 
and belonged to other associations.  
Luis only picked up passengers in the neighborhood of Quintas or at Portal. 
Sometimes customers needed to go to another place and Luis would take them 
there. However, Luis always returned to the stops at Portal and Quintas (field 
notes based on informal interviews and participant observations from June 7
th
 
2013). 
Most drivers at Portal de las Americas said they did not like to piratear, (to 
work as pirates). They said that they had their own route, and if they picked 
up passengers on other routes they could get in trouble.  
Slashing the tires as a form of control 
Rickshaw drivers had agreed to the practice of slashing the tires of “pirate” 
drivers who picked up passengers from the stops of a route that was 
established. This form of control was common and it was often exercised by 
a group of drivers that witness the violation. However, before arriving at this 
form of self-help, drivers had used less severe forms of control. First they 
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would “give a warning” and tell the pirate driver that he was not allowed to 
pick up customers at an accredited stop. If the driver returned to the same 
stop, other drivers would block his way and ask the passengers to leave. 
Then, if the pirate driver were a repeating offender, they would slash his tires 
with a knife. The following excerpts correspond to various field notes 
concerning piratear. 
Today, it is very slow at Portal. Since hearing about pirate drivers, I have been 
looking to find them, but I haven’t been able to see how they work. I asked a 
group of drivers that were waiting in line at Portal about pirate drivers. They 
smiled and one of them said, “Pirates don’t come here because they know that 
they will get in trouble.” (field note based on informal conversations from 
June 12, 2013).  
Gregorio pointed out one driver who was dropping off passengers at Portal. 
He said, “Look at that guy over there, he’s a pirate.” I can see that they did not 
have problems with pirate drivers that drop passengers off there, but that they 
may not leave with new passengers, otherwise they would block their way and 
get their passengers to get off. According to him, the associations are a good 
thing, because they help drivers defend their territory from pirate rickshaws 
(field note based on observations and one informal interview from June 12
th
 
2013). 
Today, I also talked with Julian about the cupos [shares in the association] and 
the monthly fee. Julian explained that the cupo is expensive, but he preferred 
to pay it than to work as a pirate driver. He chose this over the constant 
driving around on the search for customers. He also believed that it is better to 
pay the cupo, because that way he did not have to fear the drivers from the 
different associations, who might slash his tires if they see him picking up 
passengers on their routs. Then Julian explained that prior to the creation of 
the associations, they had often fought over passengers, and sometimes hit 
each other so that many drivers even got injured. He said, “No faltaba el que 
le sacaba a uno el cuchillo”, meaning there was always someone that could 
pull a knife on you. (field note based on participant observations and 
conversation from June 10
th
 2013). 
I asked Luis, “So, what would you do if a driver from another association 
comes here and picks up customers?” Luis responded, “We’ll block his way 
and get the passengers to leave.” Luis explained that before the associations 
there had been a lot of fights over customers. He said that most drivers carried 
a knife for self-defense and that they used it to slash the tires of pirate 
rickshaws. Later the same day, Luis mentioned that they are all pirates before 
the police (field note based on informal interviews and participant 
observations from June 7
th
, 2013). 
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Rickshaw drivers organize their businesses through associations. They 
collectively enforce a rule that excludes non-members of the organizations 
(called pirates) from using their stops. Julian preferred to work within the 
associations. That way he avoided conflicts with other drivers. However, as 
Luis mentioned, they are all “pirate” in the sense that they do not have a 
license from the government.  
The Queuing System 
Rickshaw drivers have different queuing systems. The first queuing system is 
at Portal de las Americas. When drivers arrive at Portal, they drop the 
passengers off at the entrance of the station, but are not allowed to pick up 
passengers, and instead have to go to the back of the line under the pedestrian 
bridge. The following excerpt from my field notes indicates how the queuing 
system works.  
Luis drove along the sidewalk in front of the bus station and continued 
pedaling until he entered the side street. There was not much traffic there. He 
drove along this desolated road for two blocks until he entered the residential 
neighborhood of Quintas. This neighborhood is composed of some gated 
communities and a few stores. The neighborhood is very quiet during the day 
since most of the residents are at work, but there are some people walking 
around. We dropped our first passenger off at her house, and Luis continued 
pedaling until he reached the pick-up stop at the end of the road. There, we 
had to wait for our turn to drive back to the bus station.  
Luis continued driving people around, and he returned to the bus station at 
Portal de las Americas each time. He parked his rickshaw in the queue under 
the pedestrian bridge that connects the station with the street called Avenue 
Cali. He had to wait some distance away for his turn to pick up passengers at 
the entrance of the bus station to avoid congestion. “We don’t fight over 
customers”, said Luis, while talking proudly about the rickshaw associations. 
We did not have to wait more than ten minutes in line before it was our turn 
again (field note based on informal interviews and participant observations 
from June 7
th
, 2013). 
In a conversation with Miguel about the queuing system at Portal, he 
explained that the police had told them they had to avoid congestion at the 
bus station entrance if they wanted to be there. The following excerpt from a 
conversation with Miguel illustrates this point.  
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Miguel said, “We used to park all the rickshaws outside the entrance, but the 
manager of Portal got upset. He called the police lots of times.” So, Miguel 
had talked to the manager who had told him that they could park the 
rickshaws under the pedestrian bridge. Miguel also said, “The police don’t 
bother, because we are careful to stick to the designated spots”. He meant that 
since they had started parking their vehicles under the bridge, the police had 
stopped harassing them. However, Miguel was referring to the regular police 
and not the road patrol, which was the one picking up rickshaw vehicles. 
(field notes based on observations and interviews from June 24, 2013) 
The following photograph shows how rickshaw drivers line up next to the 
pedestrian bridge, avoiding congestion at Portal de las Americas. In this 
photograph it is also possible to see the driver’s vest and helmet he carries 
under his seat.  
 
Figure 6 Rickshaw Stop at Portal de las Americas 
Source: Photograph taken by the author in 2013 
The queuing system was enforced with the help of the coordinator, but was 
also self-enforced by the drivers. I often heard drivers asking who was last in 
the line and they would line up behind them without issue. However, if a 
driver failed to comply with the queuing system, other drivers could simply 
give notice about their error or complain to the coordinator.  
Established Fares, Uniforms and Working Hours 
Rickshaw drivers at Portal de las Americas have standard fares, uniforms and 
working hours. The associations have agreed on the fares. They print a list of 
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the fares to different neighborhoods and place it in the back of each rickshaw. 
Customers know what they have to pay, because they can see the list. In 
practice, most customers simply pay the fee and leave. The following excerpt 
from my fieldwork illustrates this point. 
Drivers at Portal de las Americas wear a blue best with the name of the 
association on the back. Some of them wear a helmet, but not all [see 
photograph above]. Some have radios playing music. They said they do not 
have a fixed schedule, but working hours are between 4:30 a.m. and 11:00 
pm. However, not all drivers arrive at 4:30 and not all stay until 11. Many 
take a lunch break around noon. Some only work in the mornings, others 
prefer the evenings. But the more hours you work, the more you earn (field 
notes based on observations from June 2013). 
The normal fee for a ride between Portal and Quintas is 1,000 pesos (30 cents 
USD). However, they can negotiate a ride to other neighborhoods between 
two to three kilometers away. While the rickshaw has room for two 
passengers, drivers sometimes take three or four, should a family want to 
share a ride together. (field notes based on observations and interviews from 
June 2013). 
This time our client needed to get to the neighborhood of Alondra. Luis said 
that was not a problem and took a different route to the one I was used to. 
This was a longer ride, so the tariff was higher, but the passenger paid without 
problem. We dropped our passenger off there, and Luis drove back to Portal 
de las Americas (field notes based on participant observations from June 7
th
 
2013).  
The previous excerpts illustrate the regulation of fares, uniforms and working 
hours. For instance, the standard fares were commonly enforced and I often 
saw customers paying without even asking. The use of a price list placed at 
the back of the rickshaw allowed customers to exercise informal control over 
the drivers. In this sense, the associations use the price list as a way to signal 
a norm, but the enforcement is decentralized to the customers, who can apply 
informal control. Similar hybrid-systems of control have been explored in the 
literature on self-regulation where the law provides a focal point (the list of 
prices), although the enforcement is decentralized (McAdams 2000).  
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Resistance  
As a pirate driver it was possible to fight back and to defy control. The 
following excerpt from the conversations I had with Yeison illustrates this 
point. 
Today I met Yeison at Portal de las Americas. He is about 25 years old. I have 
seen him working at the Portal before, but we have never talked. Today, 
Yeison approached me and said, “Well, you should talk to me, because I am 
one of the founders of the second association.” This was the other association, 
and I had previously tried to talk to their coordinator, but had been denied. I 
asked Yeison to tell me about how the association had started. He explained 
that he used to work in the first association (Miguel’s association) as a driver, 
and had wanted to buy his own rickshaw. He knew of a rickshaw factory in 
the neighborhood and had saved enough money to buy his own rickshaw, 
which only cost 1.5 million pesos (750 USD). Then he had spoken to the 
leaders of the association, but they had told him that he also had to buy a cupo 
for another 1.5 million pesos (750 USD). He felt that was too much money 
and did not want to pay. So he had spoken to the son of the street vendors’ 
family in Portal, and they had decided to bring their own rickshaws and get 
onto the route.  
I have heard about this family of street vendors that don’t let any other 
vendors come near the entrance of Portal. However, now Yeison told me this 
family was also involved in the rickshaw business. Yeison knew the people 
from the vending family, and he thought they could fight against the other 
drivers. “People here don’t mess with that family because they know how to 
fight”, said Yeison. With the support of this family, the people from the first 
association could not do much. In the beginning, the drivers from the other 
association started slashing their tires and pulling off their passengers. There 
was a lot of fighting, but the family in Portal helped them. In the end, they 
made an agreement to work in peace, because the constant fights were 
attracting the attention of the police. (Interview from June 22, 2013).  
Although Yeison had fought back against the association that controlled the 
route since he did not want to pay the cupo, he had himself started to sell 
cupos to new drivers, because he saw a chance to earn some money. Drivers 
that had bought the cupo from Yeison said they cost the same as the cupos of 
the other association. However, most drivers at the Portal Americas accepted 
the cupos, since the risk of getting the tires slashed as pirates was too high. 
Additionally, many preferred to work on routes, because that helped them to 
create a stable customer base and thereby they avoid unnecessary pedaling 
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and wasting time. Still, some owners in the second association complained 
about Yeison and the family of vendors and said they were only interested in 
the money. 
Formal Within the Informal 
There is a blurred line between formality and informality. While rickshaws 
are informal in the sense that they lack a license from the government, they 
are registered at the Chamber of Commerce, have written rules, and many 
pay an accident insurance.
38
  
While my focus is on how social control operates in the drivers’ everyday 
lives, in this section I will present some of the association’s formal rules. 
These formal rules are contained in a document called Acta de Compromiso 
01, which translates to “Act of Commitment 01.” According to this 
document, the standard sanction is to lose one day on the route. It is an 
economic sanction in the sense that a driver is not allowed to work on the 
route and therefore suffers from a decrease in income. The hardest 
punishment is reserved for drug consumption, and the ensuing sanction 
entails expulsion of the driver from the route. A less severe punishment is 
used for drivers who cut ahead of the line and consists of sending the driver 
five places back in the queue. I got a copy of this act from one of the drivers. 
The following table summarizes some of these rules and sanctions.  
  
                                                     
38 Some of the owners at Portal de las Americas showed me the sticker of a liability insurance 
they had bought form an insurance company.  
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Table 1 Written Rules of the Associations  
Source: Author’s translation and summary of the original document of the association 
 
This list of rules illustrates a set of formal norms, in the sense that they are 
written and enacted by the relevant authority. However, with regards to social 
control, what is interesting is to observe how organizations enforce these 
norms.  
In the previous sections in this chapter, I mentioned the rules that I was able 
to identify from my observations and interviews. As explained by Ellickson, 
when studying social control, “What people do should be taken as more 
significant than what they say” (1991, 129). Many of these written norms 
were regularly followed. For instance, the norms of using the vests, not 
urinating in public, customer service, alcohol, clothing, queuing, and 
pirateria were followed by most of the drivers.  
In practice, I saw Miguel telling drivers to lower the volume of the music, or 
about the need to keep the rickshaw clean. However, I never saw a driver 
receive any of these formal sanctions. In this sense, organizational control 
also varies from what is written and what is enforced in practice.  
 
Norm Description  Sanction 
Vests It is mandatory to use the association’s vest  2 days off the route 
Helmet It is mandatory to use a helmet 1 day off the route 
Customer 
Service 
Drivers must provide good customer service 2 days off the route 
Urinating Urinating in public is banned 1 day off the route 
Traffic Norms It is mandatory to respect traffic norms (stop lights, 
not driving against the traffic)  
1 day off the route 
Alcohol Prohibited to consume alcohol at work 3 days off the route 
Drugs It is prohibited to use drugs Expulsion from the 
route 
Clothing The clothing code does not allow the use of shorts 
and sleeveless shirts 
1 day off the route 
Slander Slander about the other drivers and coordinators is 
prohibited 
2 days off the route 
Pirateria It is prohibited to pick up passengers at stops on other 
routes, Pirateria. Attention to complaints from 
coordinators of routes nearby. 
2 days off the route 
Queue It is prohibited to jump the queue. The violator will be sent 
five places back in the 
queue 
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Are Organized Street Businesses Mafias? 
There were often discussions among government officials about mafias 
controlling public space. Lina, the official working at the Office of 
Formalization (IPES) reported that there were spots controlled by criminal 
groups that collected money from the street vendors. Similarly, at the 
Ministry of Transportation, there were rumors about mafias controlling the 
rickshaw routes and collecting unlawful fees. Let us take the case of cupos on 
the rickshaw routes. A cupo is a license that new rickshaw owners have to 
pay to the original drivers that had first accredited the route. While some 
drivers considered this a fair compensation for the work of the first drivers, 
others believed cupos were too expensive and considered them to be an 
abusive fee. According to Eduardo at the Ministry of Transportation, cupos 
exploit the drivers but also represent an unlawful appropriation of public 
space. For him, unscrupulous individuals were using the threat of violence 
against other drivers to benefit themselves.  
So, to what extent can we draw a line between the self-regulation of the 
rickshaw associations and mafia systems of control? According to Peña, the 
government in Mexico City has accused street vendor organizations of being 
mafias (2000). However, in most cases these organizations help vendors to 
reduce risk and uncertainties in a normless market and provide an important 
service for the vendors (Peña 2000). In the cases of the rickshaw drivers I had 
observed, the associations allowed drivers to coordinate their work and to 
earn an income that was higher than minimum wage. However, the 
associations of rickshaws start charging high fees, monopolizing routes, 
imposing excessive costs on the drivers and using violence to enforce their 
rules, and in this sense their case becomes more similar to that of the mafia 
systems.  
Organizations and the Well-Being of Drivers 
Rickshaw drivers realized that slashing the tires of pirate drivers was a costly 
and violent solution and, instead, had created associations that allowed them 
to administer a better enforcement of accredited routes. Their organizations 
show another form of social control. The creation of routes had helped 
drivers to work more efficiently. Instead of pedaling around to pick up 
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passengers, rickshaw drivers followed the norms of the associations and used 
designated stops where they picked up their passenger. Working without 
belonging to an association was not worth it, partly due to the violence this 
would incur from other drivers, but also because it required more physical 
effort. Therefore, associations (organizational control) enabled drivers to 
improve their personal safety, their physical well-being and their income. 
Other associations were based in the threat of violence to monopolize certain 
routes and they collected high fees from the drivers.  
Note on the Formalization of Rickshaw Drivers 
By the end of 2015, the law to formalize rickshaws had still not been enacted. 
The ministry had approved standards for rickshaw security and design, in a 
norm published on the 19th of December 2014. As had been feared by some 
of the rickshaw leaders, the safety standards had been raised and their 
vehicles would need major reparations in order to comply with the norm. The 
drivers expected the government to establish a formalization process to give 
the current owners time to meet the new requirements. However, the next 
step was the regulation of the rickshaw routes and services by the city of 
Bogotá. By the end of 2015, the city had not enacted this regulation. 
Rickshaws continued to operate under the associations, and the road patrol 
continued to confiscate their vehicles. 
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7. Big Brands and Small Vendors 
 
Businesses with commercial premises outside on the streets (off-street stores) 
often complain about street vendors taking their customers and competing 
unfairly, since they do not pay taxes or rental fees. Nevertheless, when you 
visit the streets of Bogotá, you can find a great number of vendors selling 
products and wearing uniforms from well-established companies. Big 
companies distribute newspapers, ice cream, lottery tickets, cell phone cards, 
and energy drinks via street vendors. The distribution of products through 
street vendors in Bogotá often includes three parties, the big company that 
provides the products, a middle-man (the agency or franchise owner) who 
distributes the products to street vendors, and the vendors. In the case of ice 
cream vendors, there is no contract between them and the main company; 
instead, vendors frequently sign a consignment sales agreement with the 
intermediary agency. Under this contract, the agency is the main owner of the 
product, and the vendors only have to pay for a proportion of the sales. 
However, payment is only made when and if the items are sold.  
Street vendors selling products for big companies are considered own-
account workers and therefore do not have any employment based social 
security insurance. In many cases, the big company determines the areas 
where vendors are allowed to work, provides them with uniforms, and sets 
the prices that vendors may charge. During my fieldwork, I met ice cream 
vendors all over the city. I repeatedly watched how they moved from place to 
place with their ice cream carts. When analyzing my field notes, the case 
theme of ice cream companies became relevant as another form of 
organizational control. In this chapter, I present the field notes recorded near 
a shopping mall in the north of Bogotá, called Santa Fé. I met ten ice cream 
vendors from different companies in the vicinity of this mall, and I watched 
them during their working hours and had short conversations with them while 
they were working. Here, I want to illustrate the role of the large companies 
that control vendors through a third party, the agency or franchise owners.  
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Control by Big Companies 
The ice cream vendors in theory were free to conduct their sales the way they 
wanted, however in practice they were subject to the surveillance and control 
of company agents. Ice cream companies in Bogotá provide uniforms and ice 
cream carts. The companies set the prices of the ice cream, and vendors are 
only allowed to sell their products. Yet, Article 70 of the Police Code 
(Acuerdo 079 of 2003) establishes that in order to protect public space, it is 
necessary to “Not promote, encourage or facilitate directly or through a third 
party squatting of public space by mobile or stationary vendors.” Still, many 
street vendors felt that police control was mainly directed at them and not 
toward the companies. 
Among the street vendors near the Santa Fé mall, there is a group that stands 
out due to the bright colors and logotypes on their uniforms. They sell ice 
cream from different companies. Selling ice cream is probably one of the 
most common street businesses in Colombia, and you can find vendors 
everywhere, even in small municipalities. For a person in need of work, the 
ice cream business is attractive, because starting up does not require any 
capital, and vendors can make a profit from the very first day. The downside 
is that profits are low and they need to sell a large amount of ice cream in 
order to reach a survival income. The profit margin varies between 10 and 30 
per cent, depending on company. The business operates through three groups: 
the main company that manufactures the ice cream, small delivery agencies 
or franchises in charge of distribution, and street vendors that sell the 
products outdoors. The delivery agencies and the street vendors must follow 
the main company’s instructions with regards to quality, service and price. 
The company provides the delivery agencies with tilin tilin carts and 
uniforms for the vendors, and gives them training in how to manage the 
business. In turn, the delivery agencies recruit and control the street vendors. 
Tilin tilin is what people and businesses call the carts used by the ice cream 
vendors in Bogotá. These carts have small bells that announce when an ice 
cream vendor is coming and make the sound ti-lin, ti-lin, ti-lin. 
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Working as an Ice Cream Vendor 
One of the advantages of selling products for big companies is that vendors 
do not need much capital to start up their businesses. They contact one of the 
agencies that distribute ice cream in the city, sign an agreement and can start 
selling the next day. However, ice cream vendors often complain about the 
low profits in this kind of business and the stiff competition. The following 
excerpt illustrates a typical day at work for an ice cream vendor. 
Rosa arrives every day before nine in the morning at her vending spot by the 
pedestrian bridge near the Santa Fé mall. I can see she is an ice cream vendor 
by her uniform and the ice cream cart she pushes, which belongs to an 
international corporation called Crem Helado. Rosa greets me and offers me 
an ice cream. “Good morning Madam, would you like to refresh your day 
with a delicious cone? I have all flavors, strawberry, chocolate and vanilla.” 
We start to talk about her work as an ice cream vendor. She explained that 
getting a job as an ice cream vendor was relatively easy. You bring your CV, 
a copy of your criminal record, a copy of your identity card and two 
references from someone who can verify you are a good person. She 
explained that El patron [meaning the boss] at the Crem Helado agency pays 
you a home visit to make sure that you live at the address you have provided 
in your CV. Then, if everything is ok, you get an ice cream cart and can start 
selling the next day. “That’s the good thing about ice cream, you can start 
receiving money from your very first day”, she explained. She gets about 18 
per cent of the sales from the Cream Helado company, and makes an average 
of 20,000 pesos a day (9 USD) (field notes based on observations and 
informal conversations from December 17, 2013). 
Yanira sells popsicles from a company called Bon Ice. She prefers to sell 
popsicles because they can melt and refreeze without the product being 
ruined. When selling ice cream, the products would sometimes melt and she 
would have to pay for them. The downside of selling popsicles is that they are 
very cheap and the profits are marginal. She said she earned about 20% of the 
sales. One popsicle costs between 200 and 300 pesos (8 to 13 cents USD). She 
said she often made 15,000 pesos a day (6.6 USD). However, on a rainy day 
she can go home with less than 5,000 pesos (2.2 USD). For that reason, she 
was often behind on paying her bills (field notes based on observations and 
informal conversations from December 19, 2013).  
To earn 15,000 pesos a day, Yanira has to sell about 250 popsicles. While she 
was frequently busy, this was a large sum for her, and she had to work hard 
to make a basic income. Still, if she worked six days a week, she would make 
about 360,000 pesos (160 USD) in a month. This was less than minimum 
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wage, equivalent to 260 USD in 2013. In this context, it is not surprising that 
ice cream vendors often complained about the low profits in their business. 
They made less than half of the rickshaw drivers at Portal de las Americas. 
Many were elderly people that did not have a pension or people that could 
not get any other job.  
The documents that an ice cream vendor has to provide the agency with in 
order to be entrusted with an ice cream cart are similar to those the drivers 
must provide to be entrusted with a rickshaw. In both cases, the agency or the 
association has to obtain information about the vendor’s or drivers’ residence 
in case the person went missing with the cart. Both vendors and ice cream 
vendors explained that if they failed to return the cart, the owner would come 
to their house and try to get it back. This illustrates a form of self-help in 
social control. 
Independent Workers 
Some of the ice cream vendors I met complained about their work conditions 
and explained that they could not get any social security protection, since the 
companies made it clear that they had nothing to do with them. Formally, 
they signed a contract of “consignment sales” which prevented vendors from 
trying to make the companies responsible, for instance, in cases of work 
related accidents. Perla’s daily routine, a vendor working for another 
company called Rico, illustrates her relationship with the local agency.  
Perla goes to the Rico agency to pick up the ice cream around eight in the 
morning, but she works flexible hours, so she can pick it up between eight and 
ten. The boss at the agency counts the cones and popsicles she gets and makes 
her sign a form. She loads the ice cream onto the tilin cart and heads to the 
streets to start her working day. Perla wears Rico’s company uniform, and she 
is not allowed to take it off. She represents the company’s image and needs to 
wear a clean uniform every day. She works until five, and then returns to the 
agency. The boss at the agency counts the remaining ice cream and calculates 
the difference between the remaining goods and the amount that Perla had 
received in the morning. Then, Perla pays for what she has sold. Perla’s 
commission is between 20 to 30 % of the sales. Perla says she makes between 
20,000 to 30,000 pesos a day (9 to 13 USD) (field notes based on observations 
and informal conversations from December 16, 2013). 
Perla and I talked about what being an independent worker entails. She 
explained that being independent means that if she does not sell anything 
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then she “can’t bring home the potatoes.” Perla used a reference to being able 
to bring “la papita a la casa”, which in English means, “bring the potatoes 
home”, to show her dependence on her sales to be able to buy food.  
El Patron at the Agency 
Santiago works at one of the ice cream agencies near the Santa Fé mall. I 
visited Santiago and told him about my research. He has a contract with the 
main company to distribute ice cream through 30 street vendors. The 
company gives him the uniforms and the ice cream carts for the vendors. 
Much like the vendors, Santiago is also an independent worker. He receives a 
percentage of the sales from the vendors. The following excerpt is from an 
interview with him.  
I asked Santiago to tell me about his business. He said, the company provides 
the ice cream on consignment, and he pays depending on the sales. It also 
provides the ice cream carts for the vendors as a free loan. He explained 
proudly that the company had agencies all over the country. His agency had 
the north zone in the borough of Suba, which covers all the neighborhoods on 
the west side of the north highway. However, when I asked about the vendors’ 
social security, he was reluctant to talk. He said, “Vendors should be glad that 
they have a job.” He explained that he employed single mothers, men without 
any education, basically people that could not get a job anywhere else. He 
exclaimed “If you’re good at selling, you can make more than minimum 
[wage]. At that moment he had three carts parked in his office, because the 
vendors that had been using them had resigned. The problem is that the 
vendors don’t get compromised; they worked one day and the next day 
Santiago had to call and ask if they were going to come to work or not (field 
notes based on observations and one interview from January 24, 2014). 
Part of Santiago’s job is to make sure that his street vendors come to pick up 
the ice cream every day. The following excerpt illustrates how agencies 
ensure that vendors would not steal the ice cream cart.  
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I asked Perla what would happen if she decided one day to sell all the ice 
cream and run away with the cart. She said that there had been a woman that 
took the ice cream and worked for only a few days and then left. In that case, 
it was a big loss for the boss at the agency, explained Perla. He had to pay the 
company for the cart and the ice cream. For that reason, when Perla began 
working for him, the boss would only give her a small amount of ice cream, 
and gradually, as she gained his trust, he gave her more. She also said that if 
you run away with a cart, they put you on a black list. Perla was often 
interrupted by customers. She is well skilled in her sales. Later, during a 
conversation, a man came up and asked Perla where the Rico Helado agency 
was. He was looking for a job. Perla had a card from her agency and gave it to 
the man, and she also asked him to mention her name so that she could get a 
small commission. She explained that the Rico company was expanding and 
that she gets a commission for every new vendor that she recommends (field 
notes based on observations and informal conversations from January 23, 
2014). 
Various companies in Colombia use agencies to distribute their products. 
Their profits are based on the vendors’ sales, and therefore it is in their 
interest to have many vendors. However, the low profits and benefits vendors 
receive make this job unattractive. Many ice cream vendors explained that 
this was the only choice they had, but that they were looking for other jobs.  
The Main Company 
From reading newspaper articles and the information on the companies’ 
websites, one can see the role street vendors have in their business models. At 
the website of the Bon Ice company, formally known as Quala, one can see 
how they present their distribution strategy of indirect employees. The 
website states they are “One of the top 25 job creating companies in 
Colombia. We create 3,800 direct jobs and 14,000 indirect jobs” (Quala 
2016). The 14,000 jobs they refer to are likely to be represented by street 
vendors. The company reported annual sales for more than 15,000 million 
pesos (6,6 million USD), from which they paid taxes to the state (El Tiempo 
2002). Similarly, other ice cream companies talk proudly in the media about 
their job creating role in Colombia. The president of Rico Helado, a company 
that began business in Colombia in 2012, says they have created more than 
7,000 indirect jobs in one year (El Tiempo 2014).  
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Figure 3 Distribution line of Crem Helado called “carritos tilines” 
Source: Photograph take by the author 2013 
Despite the open use of street vendors, the Police Code of Bogotá prohibits 
the distribution of products on the streets via street vendors. Although the big 
companies do not engage directly with the vendors, it is possible to argue that 
they are part of their business model. After all, ice cream companies are the 
owners of the carts used by the vendors in their daily work. 
Street Vendors Needed 
“Street vendors needed. Men and women of all ages with some sales 
experience, preferably street vending, that want to camellar [meaning work 
like camels], should send their CVs to the following address.”  
Alexandra, who works at the Office of Formalization (IPES) showed me this 
advertisement while complaining about the gravity of the situation 
concerning big companies that benefit from exploiting street work. 
I met Alexandra on one of my visits to the Office of Formalization (IPES). 
She showed me the above add on an Internet site. She explained that she had 
got the link from one of the vendors in her programs. The vendor worked in 
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one of the kiosks and complained about a man who hired women to sell 
freshly pressed orange juice near his kiosk. Apparently, the man brought the 
pushcarts with the oranges every morning, and the women received a 
percentage of the sales. When I checked the Internet I could find plenty of 
adverts for street vendors to distribute and sell products in the streets of 
Bogotá. According to Alexandra, that was why they needed to control public 
space. It was one thing that many people needed work, and another when 
small and big companies started using street vendors. (field notes based on 
observations and informal conversations from January 22, 2014) 
It is very smart for a new company to use street vendors, because they get to 
place their products on busy corners and get all the publicity for free. It is a 
cheap marketing. But it is nothing new. Large businesses have used street 
vendors and public space for many years such as newspapers, lotteries, or 
phone companies. 
The Legal Regulation of Ice cream Vendors 
Article 70 of the Police Code establishes that in order to protect public space 
it is necessary to “Not promote, encourage or facilitate directly or through a 
third party squatting of public space by mobile or stationary vendors.” 
Accordingly, businesses such as Rosa’s ice cream businesses are not allowed. 
However, on my last visit to Santa Fe mall in 2014, all the ice cream vendors 
were still working in their spots. According to the vendors, they continued to 
face police harassment and confiscations. When I asked the government 
officials of the city working with the regulation of street vendors, they often 
criticized large companies for using street vendors as part of their business 
model. The following excerpt from an interview with Carlos from the Office 
of Public Space illustrates some of the issues of regulating public space in 
relation to big companies.  
Carlos considered the issue of ice cream sellers to be complicated. He believes 
that there are big companies behind these vendors, and that there existed a 
labor exploitation relationship. However, the city doesn’t have a special 
policy in this regard, but in his opinion there should be a labor policy. He felt 
that the government looked away when big companies fail to comply with the 
law. (Interview from January 20, 2014)  
The use of street vendors as a business model has expanded exponentially in 
Colombia. For instance, in 1978, Bromley exposed how a local ice cream 
company in the city of Cali used 60 vendors to sell their products in the 
171 
streets (1978, 1166). While there are no reliable statistics showing an increase 
in street vendors distributing products for big companies, the numbers the 
companies reported concerning indirect employees could indicate that these 
businesses are expanding.  
The use of street vendors by large companies to distribute their products is a 
global phenomenon. Cross argues that all over the world, large corporations 
have deliberately used street vendors to distribute their products to compete 
in the market and avoid large overheads and labor costs (2000, 39–40). In 
Cross’ model of entrepreneurship vs. exploitation, he defines people that 
have a single supplier and a single client as disguised workers. He gives the 
example of the garment industry where the materials are supplied by the 
same agent that later buys the final product. Ice cream vendors are defined in 
this model as semi-dependent workers that depend on a single supplier and 
multiple clients (Cross 1997, 42–43).  
Managers of these companies often pride themselves on creating jobs for 
vulnerable groups such as single women, elderly people and people with 
disabilities. However, most of these jobs are informal and therefore without 
basic social protection. In India, the government has a long history of using 
welfare boards to force companies to contribute a basic percentage to welfare 
schemes for so called independent workers, such as home based workers. For 
instance, Agarwala explained that in the tobacco rolling industry, the main 
tobacco companies and the cigarette (bidi) rollers have to contribute to state 
funded welfare boards (2006). These boards help workers get access to 
welfare benefits. However, these welfare boards place workers below the 
minimal benefits of formally employed people. While it is possible to argue 
that the state needs to enforce a labor contract, looking into alternative ways 
of providing welfare for this group of workers could be a possibility.  
Control from Security Guards of Private Malls  
Big companies not only exploit the use of public space directly, through 
street vendors, but can also establish free vending areas when they have the 
means to place guards outside their premises. The case of the Santa Fé mall 
illustrates this point.  
Santa Fé is a major commercial mall in the city of Bogotá. It is an impressive 
building with more than 500 shops, 2,300 parking spaces, a large cinema, and 
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a sizeable food court. Surrounding the mall are many apartment buildings, 
some houses in gated communities and some light industries. However, there 
are no street vendors around the Santa Fé mall. Indeed, the mall 
administration has placed guards outside, making sure that neither vendors, 
homeless people, or any other unwanted persons can get close. These guards 
have intimidating dogs that make sure you feel there is no space for disorder 
around the stunning mall. However, just after the street crossing you find a 
pedestrian bridge that spans the north highway of Bogotá and connects to the 
Transmilenio bus station. Down by the bridge, street vendors are welcoming 
and friendly, and ready to sell their products to the numerous by-passers.  
There I met Perla. She sells ice cream one block from the Mall. She explains 
that when she first came here, she thought it would be a good idea to walk by 
the mall and try to sell to the people on their way there. First she parked her 
ice cream cart near the northern entrance of the mall, but after a minute a 
guard came and told me her that she had to move away. He said vendors were 
not allowed around the mall and asked her to move. She moved to the other 
side of the street. (field notes based on observations and informal 
conversations from December 16, 2013). 
The control over the use of space is often a battlefield between street vendors 
and the owner of larger supermarkets, or malls, among others. The case of the 
Santa fé mall is particular since it is a relatively new mall and the guards have 
managed to keep it free from vendors. Many other malls and commercial 
areas are often crowded with vendors, but the tension between them and the 
bigger businesses is often present. Still sometimes vendors developed good 
relations with the owners of the off-street businesses and they can give them 
an informal permit to work in front of their stores.  
Gated Communities 
While some businesses place security guards outside their premises to ensure 
free vending zones, in other places there are not enough security guards to 
control them, and these zones become occupied by many vendors. In the case 
of gated communities, vendors often explained that the managers of these 
residential areas call the police to complain, while some of the residents 
would buy their products. The case of the gated community that Perla 
mentioned was unique, because the manager of the neighborhood was able to 
get the city mayor to sign a decree declaring that the area outside the gated 
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community was a vendor free zone. The following except from Perla story 
illustrates this point.  
After Perla was asked to move away from the mall, she moved to the other 
side of the road. She had been selling there for about ten minutes, and this 
time the guard from the gated community there came over and showed her a 
sign that said ”Vendors Not Allowed.” He said she had to move away. She 
moved down the street to a bus intersection. She saw some vendors in that 
spot, so she thought she could work there too. But as soon as she started to 
sell near them she could see in their faces that they didn’t want her to be there. 
That was her first day, and she spent almost all that day looking for a place to 
set up her cart. She ended up walking up and down the street. (field notes 
based on observations and informal conversations from December 16, 2013). 
Across the pedestrian bridge on the other side of the Santa Fé mall, there is a 
big sign that says “Special Security Zone, Street Vendors Prohibited.” 
Although some vendors walk around this area, most of them stay a few 
meters beyond the pedestrian bridge to avoid harassment from the security 
guards from the gated community of Marantá. This sign bears the city 
government logo, and according to some of the street vendors in the area, the 
manager of this gated community has done everything he could to kick out 
the street vendors from this area.  
Lalo works in the bus stop few meters away from the gated community of 
Marantá. He explained that they were in a battlefield when they worked in 
front of Marantá. That’s where the buses that go to the municipalities in the 
north of Bogotá stop, and many vendors used to work there. The people from 
the gated community complained all the time and sent their guards to move 
them away. There were lots of vendors, and together they could ignore the 
guards. The manager of this gated community also often sent the police 
whenever they could. Finally, they got that decree that said that this is a 
vendor free zone. Lalo explained that there are rumours about the manager of 
the gated community having friends in politics and that is how they got this 
sign. Many people left because they were tired of dealing with those private 
guards, as well as with the police. Now they’re re-establishing at this bus stop, 
but there isn’t any proper sidewalk for passengers to stand on and wait, here. 
(field notes based on observations and informal conversations from December 
16, 2013). 
This improvised bus stop is the work place for about ten vendors who sell to 
the people waiting to catch the bus to the surrounding municipalities of Chia, 
Cajica, Zipaquira, and Tunja, among other destinations. These buses come 
from Portal del Norte, which is one of the main bus stations of Transmilenio.  
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There are often three or four buses waiting to pick up the last passengers 
before leaving Bogotá. Buses only stop for a couple of minutes before they 
continue on their way since this is not a proper bus stop, and if they stay too 
long they could create major traffic congestion. Vendors at the bus stop sell 
mostly to the passengers waiting for the buses, and when the buses are not 
full the vendors get on and sell their goods while the bus is waiting. There are 
also two men working as voceadores whose job is to shout out the bus route. 
You hear them crying loudly, “Chia! Chia! Chia!”, the name of one of the 
municipalities along the bus route. Voceadores help the passengers enter the 
bus, and the bus drivers often give them voluntary tips.  
According to Bhowmik (2010) inspired by neoliberal ideologies, many public 
spaces have been privatized and, therefore, control has been placed in the 
hands of private guards. Big businesses complain about nuisance, congestion, 
and the unfair competition caused by street vendors, since they do not pay 
taxes, registration fees or off-street premises.  
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8. Daily Relations with the Police 
Police encounters are common when working as a street vendor outside the 
law. Even though one may think that the police are not really doing much 
about street vending since such activities are so widely spread, most of the 
people I met in my fieldwork have experienced confiscations or police 
harassment.
39
 In this sense, the police, as an agent of control, is not toothless, 
and impacts the lives of many vendors. However, as I will present in this 
chapter, police controls vary greatly from what the written laws prescribe. 
This chapter provides insights into how street vendors experience police 
controls on a daily basis.  
Fear of the police is widely spread among people working as street vendors. 
However, police evictions and confiscations of goods are, according to some 
of the vendors, a matter of being “street smart” and following certain 
precautions. They often manage to escape, but if they are unlucky, they might 
be apprehended by the police. The police do not always use strong arm 
tactics. Often, police control varies between widespread tolerance, pushing 
around, “levantamiento” (meaning to lift up and confiscate their goods) and 
jail. Control also varies greatly between “conflict zones” such as the business 
district or the city center, and the city outskirts. Hence, through the lens of 
social control, I explore street vendors’ experiences of police control.40 
  
                                                     
39According to the survey I conducted in the transitional zones of vending, 56 % of the 
vendors experienced confiscation of their goods by the police before they entering the 
formalization program. 
40 Bromley states that “conflict-zones” are the central business district, various neighborhood 
and suburban commercial centers, the transportation terminals, the major sports and 
entertainment centers, and all major tourist attractions.” (Bromley 2000, 16)  
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Punitive and Territorial Control 
During my fieldwork, I observed the daily relationship between the police 
and the street vendors and rickshaw drivers. Vendors and drivers often talked 
about their fear of being “lifted away” (la police nos levanta). I saw the 
police telling the vendors to move on, and I saw vendors running away 
because they thought the police were coming to lift them away. During the 
conversations I had with street vendors and rickshaw drivers, many of them 
related stories about police confiscations. The following text illustrates the 
story of a vendor, Pedro, who was evicted. I have written his story based on 
the jottings I took during conversations with him. While the details of his 
story are personal, they resemble the stories of other vendors that have shared 
similar experiences of evictions and confiscations. 
The Drama of Police Confiscations 
Pedro still remembers when he was sent to one of the detention centers 
(commonly known as UPJ), because he refused to let the police destroy his 
goods. He used to sell avocados from a wooden structure near the Rosary 
Square in the historical center of Bogotá. Surrounded by government offices, 
two universities, and other small businesses, Rosary Square is crowded 
during business hours. Moreover, the Transmilenio bus stop that serves the 
city center is located on the south side of the Square, and the high level of 
pedestrian traffic makes this a great location for any business. However, 
police officers often make their rounds in this area and force vendors away 
from the square. Still, at different times during the day, it is possible to find 
vendors transporting their products in pushcarts, in small wooden structures 
they hang from their chest, or in blankets that they can gather up from the 
floor in case the police come.  
On the morning that Pedro’s avocados were confiscated a great turmoil had 
broken out. Some people were watching, others were arguing with the police, 
a man shouted from a distance “Let him work, he isn’t a criminal”, and others 
started recording the scene with their mobile phones. The police had thrown 
the avocados on the ground after Pedro had refused to let the officers lift his 
pushcart onto a police truck. However, things had become more agitated 
when one of the police officers had grabbed Pedro by the neck and forced 
him into the police truck. What had started as a police confiscation ended up 
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in a confrontation between a group of police officers and Pedro. Initially, 
Pedro had begged the police to let him leave with his avocados, but the 
sergeant had told Pedro that they were tired of telling him to leave. Other 
police officers started to throw the avocados onto the truck while Pedro 
began to get desperate at the sight of his plante (investment) going to loss. At 
that point, one of the police officers kicked the pushcart over and knocked all 
the avocados onto the ground. In an act of desperation, Pedro had grabbed 
onto his pushcart firmly. Pedro shouted, “Stop hitting me, I’m not doing 
anything wrong, why won’t you let me work?” People watching the scene 
shouted, “Leave him alone!”, but many kept their distance for fear of getting 
in trouble with the police. The sergeant ordered the other constables to take 
Pedro into the police truck and they all left soon after. For Pedro, resisting the 
police eviction was a lesson he would never forget, because he had to spend 
24 hours in the UPJ (detention center). Today, Pedro sells avocados in the 
neighborhood of Santa Librada. Pedro complained that police officers think 
they are better than vendors because they wear uniforms, but they are just 
like them. “I don’t understand why the police won’t let people work”, said 
Pedro. (Story based on jottings from December 16, 2013)  
It took six or seven police officers to evict Pedro and confiscate his goods. 
According to his description, there were other vendors in the square, but that 
day they managed to escape. I met Pedro during one of my visits to the 
vending zone in Santa Librada. He often parked his avocado cart near the bus 
stop, so we started to talk during one of my visits. When I asked him about 
his relationship with the police he told me this story. I met Pedro on many 
occasions and he seemed to be able to work in peace. He pushed his cart 
around and had not experienced any further confiscations. As for the other 
vendors near Rosary Square, new and old vendors continue to experience 
police harassment. However, Pedro feels it is not worth taking the risk, and 
he prefers to sell less in Santa Librada, but be able to work in peace.  
The neighborhood of Santa Librada is located in the south east of the city. 
According to many vendors that previously worked in the city center, they 
have to sell at lower prices in this neighborhood, since people there have 
lower incomes than people who live in the north or work in the city center. 
People who had previously worked in the city center could compare their 
experiences of police control, and many agreed that police raids were less 
severe on the city outskirts. This illustrates how the severity of police control 
can vary in relation to space, something that has been pointed out by Konzen 
in a study of the regulation of tourist cities (2013, 273–275).  
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The Territoriality of Police Control 
A recovered area is a section of public space, a sidewalk or a park, where the 
government has executed an administrative process of recovery.
41
 The Office 
of Public Space has an inventory of recovered areas and has the obligation to 
defend them from future invasion from vendors. Vendors that occupied 
recovered areas in Bogotá have to be more alert, because the police could 
come at any time and evict them without the need of an “Administrative 
Act.” The following excerpt illustrates how control operates in a recovered 
area. 
Vendors outside the bus station at Portal del Norte were not part of the 
vending zone [a formalization program] and instead worked on their own. The 
atmosphere here was more stressful than in other places and they said that 
police crackdowns occurred regularly. Some of the vendors told me this was a 
“recovered” zone which is why the police often visited there. People watched 
their backs, and all of them used pushcarts or tricycles. One of the vendors 
explained that it is easier to escape or to move around on these tricycles. 
However, when the government also offered the vendors from Portal to 
become formalized in the vending zones, most of them refused to move to the 
zone and argued that the location was a bad business spot. (field notes based 
on observation and informal interviews from December 2013).  
Observing and talking to vendors in “recovered areas”, I could see how 
police control varied from place to place. While in Pedro’s story, it was 
possible to see variations in control between the city center and the city 
outskirts, in this case the variation was in relation to a specific area. 
However, this variation in control was based on a City Decree that gives 
police officers the authority to evict and confiscate the goods of vendors in 
recovered areas without the expressed authorization of the government.
42
 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that the law, as such authorizes the police to 
use “strategic control.” This Decree better reflects how the police operate on 
an everyday basis, i.e., how they control problematic areas or places of 
interest more strictly than others. Similarly to the findings in this research, 
                                                     
41 Article 12 of Decree 98 of 2004 signed by the Mayor of Bogotá defines recovered areas as 
public spaces which have been recovered as a result of administrative and judicial 
proceedings. 
42 In the chapter of the legal framework of police evictions I describe how Decree 098 of 2004, 
allowed the police to remove the vendors occupying recovered places and to confiscate 
their goods without any kind of administrative act. 
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the literature on the geography of social control has shown variations in 
police control in relation to geographical spaces (Fyfe 1991). In his argument, 
Fyfe states that policing is a territorial activity which often varies according 
to zones (Fyfe 1991, 262, 265).  
Pushing the Vendors Around: Giving Notice  
While police confiscations still occur, most of the time the relationship with 
the police is not punitive, and other kinds of interactions occur. The 
following excerpts illustrate how police control through “pushing around” 
still remains a way for them to control public spaces, but it is less punitive 
than confiscations or evictions.  
The day I met Diego, he was selling ice cream in front of the bus station at 
Portal de las Americas. There were some police officers talking to other 
vendors near Diego when I heard one of the officers say that vendors were not 
allowed to be there, and that they had to move on. I was worried that Diego 
could get into trouble with the police and asked him whether we should 
continue talking in another place. Diego said that it was ok and that once he 
was finished with the customer he was currently selling an ice cream to, we 
could move to another street.  
Diego’s customer looked uncomfortable after a policeman had begun shouting 
at another vendor to leave the place, so she paid the ice cream quickly and 
left. But Diego seemed less anxious. Diego and I started to walk away slowly, 
but I could still hear the policeman’s voice. I wondered whether we should 
hurry up.  
Diego told me I should not worry because those police officers only ask them 
to move on, and are not going to confiscate their goods. He said that they had 
got kicked out fifteen minutes ago and the police were somewhat irritated at 
them returning. “It seems like the police aren’t going to let us work today”, he 
complained. He explained that the only time they have to run away is when 
the police boss arrives. According to him, that sergeant was a very angry 
person, and the other day he had said that the next time he comes he would 
bring the truck.  
We had not walked more than three meters when another customer asked for 
an ice cream. Diego opened the tilin tilin cart and showed her customer 
various options. The customer took her time deciding and finally chose one of 
the cones. While she was looking for her wallet, the police officer put his 
hand on Diego’s shoulder and said: “I told you to leave a long time ago, what 
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are you still doing here?” Diego apologized, and once the woman had paid 
him for the ice cream, we walked away at a brisker pace.  
I asked Diego why the vendors who sold chaza (snacks) near the entrance of 
the Portal were allowed to remain on the sidewalk without any problems. He 
explained that a woman there had once filed a tutela action after the police 
had destroyed her pushcart and goods, and since then, the police had left her 
alone. Now she works there and had brought her husband and son with her to 
work as street vendors. They monopolize the chaza and cell phone calls 
business there. We continued walking down the street, and Diego said he was 
going to work near the wholesale market called Corabastos. Diego explained 
that the police do not bother them much at Corabastos. The police officers 
near the market have real problems to take care of because that’s a hot zone, 
explained Diego. (field notes based on observations and one informal 
interview from 27 June 2013).  
The previous excerpts illustrate different aspects of how vendors experience 
police control. First, it shows that police control varies from simply giving 
notice to a more serious threat of eviction (bringing the truck). It also shows 
that vendors resist police control when they can by moving slowly to other 
neighborhoods only to return soon after the police have left. This is an 
example of subtle resistance, one of the weapons of the weak, as explained by 
James Scott (1985). Finally, there is also a difference between vendors that 
have won tutela actions in court and ordinary vendors. While the intention of 
tutela is to protect fundamental rights, in practice it has created better 
treatment for those that know how to use the law and have won their cases, 
and those who do not bring their claims to court (Uprimny 2006).  
The Use of Mobility to Avoid Police Control  
I met Diego the next day at the same sidewalk where the police had 
previously kicked out the vendors. This time Diego had only a cooling box 
with him instead of the ice cream cart. The following excerpt from this 
encounter illustrates how vendors use mobility as a way to avoid 
confiscations.  
Diego said, “Hi Ana, how is the research going? You still looking for 
information on the vendors?” I saw Diego now had a cooling box hanging 
from his chest and he was not using the tilin tilin cart. So I asked him, where 
his tilin tilin cart was today. Diego explained that yesterday, after I had left, 
the police sergeant had returned. Diego had come back to sell the rest of the 
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ice cream and had seen the sergeant talking to the vendors. So he had 
approached him to talk to him. The sergeant had said that the ice cream carts 
themselves were the actual problem and that the vendors were invading the 
public space. He told the vendors that if they used smaller boxes they 
wouldn’t have any problems. They had these cooling boxes at the agency, so 
today Diego was working from one of them. They were not ideal, because ice 
cream melts faster in them than in the carts, but at least he was allowed to 
remain there and sell his goods. He was considering to use the ice cream cart 
again tomorrow. (field notes based on observations and one informal 
interview from the 28 of June 2013).  
Diego carried less ice cream in the cooling box, so he had to return two times 
to the agency to refill. He was bothered by the ten blocks he had to walk each 
time he ran out of ice cream, and carrying the box hurt his back, but at least 
he could keep his spot on the sidewalk near Portal de las Americas. Other 
vendors were using tricycles, similar to the rickshaws, to move around during 
their work. Mobility is a common strategy among street vendors to avoid 
police controls, which has been shown in previous studies (Meneses-Reyes 
2013).  
Establishing Order in the Streets 
Sometimes, the police would ask vendors to keep behind a line to avoid 
congestions in certain spots. They did not tell the vendors to leave, just to 
move to another area in the same street. The following excerpts from my 
field notes illustrate this point.  
Today is Saturday and I arrived at 11 in the morning at the vending zone in 
Santa Librada. I greeted Cali, and he said, “See? I told you about all the 
vendors on the weekends.” Later in the afternoon I saw a police officer. I was 
sitting next to Cali and I heard the sergeant telling Cali, “All good, man.” Cali 
showed me that they were all stationed behind a line. He said that some 
weekends ago the police had come and told the vendors to move and make 
space on the sidewalk. Cali was already standing behind the line. Cali said 
that the other vendors had complained and asked the police, “But why don’t 
you move the cholados guy?”, to which the police had replied, “Because he’s 
behind the line, and he knows his place.” The police said, “Everyone behind 
the line, or nobody works.” Then everyone moved. (field note based on 
observations and one informal interview from August 25
th
 2012). 
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The previous excerpts illustrate how police control can also be informal. The 
actions of the police officers organizing the vendors can be interpreted as a 
way of manifesting their presence by exercising some kind of authority. Yet, 
this was not exactly a legal procedure, but rather an informal way to establish 
some kind of order in the streets. It illustrates how the police also exercise 
informal control, another example of hybrid-systems of social control 
(Ellickson 1991, 254).  
My informal interviews with Garcia, one of the police officers working near 
Portal de las Americas, illustrate another way in which informal police 
control operates. Garcia works at one of the police stations in the borough of 
Kennedy. Most of the time, he patrols the neighborhood on a motorcycle 
accompanied by another officer. With one of the highest crime rates in the 
city, the police station in Kennedy is constantly busy. I met Garcia twice at 
the police station, and we talked about his work in relation to street vendors. I 
also saw Garcia passing by Portal de las Americas on his motorcycle. The 
following excerpt is from the notes I took the first time I met Garcia at the 
police station. It illustrates how police control does not always involve 
punishment and can instead be informal.  
Today I visited a police station located about 10 blocks away from Portal de 
las Americas. There, I met Garcia
43
, a police officer. He said he was not 
authorized to give a formal interview but that he could talk to me informally 
and I could take notes. I told him I would not disclose his name.  
Garcia explained that vendors are the last thing on his mind, except when the 
people working at the local Mayor’s office call and ask for help to clear a 
sidewalk. He seemed annoyed by the vendors. He mentioned that the other 
day, the local mayor’s office had called and asked for help to count the 
vendors in Portal Americas. The local government wanted to count the 
vendors in order to start a formalization process. They counted 17 vendors at 
the bus station at Portal Americas. The government had told those vendors 
that they were going to offer them a formalization program, but Garcia 
complained that since then they had not heard anything from the government. 
“I mean our job is to help the Mayor, but if they don’t do anything, there isn’t 
much we can do”, he said. Then he told me that the week before, he had 
passed by Portal and checked on the vendors. He had counted 23 vendors in 
total and had told the new vendors they had to leave, but they had complained 
                                                     
43 The name Garcia does not correspond to the police officer I met. Like in the case of all the 
informants I met through my fieldwork I have changed the name to protect their identity.  
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and replied that in that case all the vendors should have to leave, because it 
was unfair that some should have the right to stay while others did not.  
Garcia was interrupted many times while we talked, and the phone at the 
station rang constantly, so I waited while he carried out his work, and then we 
continued talking. Garcia explained that they limit their work to the Mayor’s 
Orders: “If the Mayor wants us to apprehend the vendors, they have to give us 
the order, and then we just follow their instructions.” He explained that when 
people call and complain about street vendors, they merely tell the vendors to 
move on, because they cannot confiscate their goods without a Mayor’s 
Order. Later in our conversation, Garcia reflected that, “Counting the vendors 
is a waste of our time. There are always new vendors arriving on the streets.” I 
thanked Garcia and left the police station. (field note based on an informal 
interview from January 23, 2014). 
For Garcia, his work with the street vendors was mostly limited to moving 
the vendors away when he received complaints from more established 
businesses in the neighborhood, or to lift them away when the local mayor 
gave the order. The police officers in Bogotá meet with people engaged in 
street vending in a variety of settings, and their relation often lies beyond the 
duties of evictions and confiscations. While helping the government to count 
the vendors is part of the police’s duties, checking on them is an informal act. 
It is also informal to establish a difference between older vendors and new 
vendors.  
Cooperating with the Police 
Interactions between people engaged in street businesses and the police are 
sometimes related to security and the general crime situation in the streets. 
The following excerpt illustrates how the coordinator of the rickshaws at 
Portal de las Americas works together with the police to control that drivers 
do not carry weapons.  
Today I talked to Miguel, the leader of one of the rickshaw associations. 
There were seven other rickshaw drivers waiting for their turn to take 
passengers to Portal. It was the slow hours of the day, so the drivers were 
chatting with each other. While I was talking with Miguel, a police officer on 
a motorcycle arrived, greeted Miguel and said that he was checking on the 
drivers. Miguel told the police officer to go ahead with his job and told me 
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that they work together with the police to keep the neighborhood safe. The 
police patted down all the drivers except Miguel.  
Miguel explained that they like to work together with the police, because they 
want to keep their customers safe. “This neighborhood is generally safe, but at 
night people from other places come here, and we’ve had cases of drivers and 
their customers being robbed”, he said. This was not good for business and 
Miguel said that he was part of the neighborhood watch, and he cooperated 
with the police to keep the area safe. “The police come here to search the 
drivers and make sure they don’t have any drugs or weapons”, Miguel 
explained.  
Later Miguel showed me a steel rod he keeps hidden in the rickshaw for self-
defense. 
Miguel said, “In our organization, we want to cooperate with the police.” He 
explained that the police had followed them during the Virgen del Carmen 
parade. Miguel showed me the photographs of the parade during which 
rickshaw drivers decorated the rickshaws and the priest blessed their 
rickshaws.  
Drivers in Colombia often pray to Virgen del Carmen, a Catholic saint that 
represents the Virgin Mary. Devotion to this saint is an old Colombian 
tradition, and drivers often celebrate her day of honor in July. Miguel was 
pleased they could organize the parade, and he praised the police for their help 
and cooperation. While the police officers that Miguel mentioned were the 
ones that deal with common crime and security, the road patrol was the 
branch that confiscates rickshaw vehicles. (field note based on observations 
and one informal interview from June 25, 2013). 
The previous excerpt illustrates how organizational control (by the rickshaw 
associations) and police control cooperate in a peculiar manner. The residents 
in the neighborhood were aware of this peculiar cooperation between the 
police and the illegal rickshaw drivers. This could be seen as a pragmatic way 
to operate, but it can also give the image of the police operating outside the 
law.  
Everyday Tolerance 
When you walk through the city of Bogotá, you can see police officers in 
many different places. However, when you ask vendors about their relation 
with the police, they explain that not all police officers are “to be feared.” 
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Indeed, there is wide tolerance among police officers for street vendors and 
rickshaws, and they often seemed to ignore them.  
 
Figure 8 Transmilenio bus station at Portal del Norte 
Source: Photographed by the author, 2014 
Some vendors reported that the police were friendly to them. The following 
excerpt illustrates the kind of solidarity that sometimes develops between the 
police and the vendors.  
Perla tells me that she has no problems with the police. She explained that the 
other day, a policeman had told her that if it was up to him, he would not 
move them off the streets, but that this was his job. Perla says the policeman 
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told her “Go away for a while, and then you can come back after I leave.” 
(Field notes based on informal conversation from December 16, 2013).  
Rickshaw drivers also reported not being bothered by the police, and were 
only disturbed by the road patrol. While regular police officers sometimes 
come and check that drivers do not carry weapons, it is the road patrol that 
can “lift away” their vehicles. The following excerpt from field notes taken at 
Portal de las Americas illustrates the daily relations between rickshaw drivers 
and the police. 
We arrived at the Portal Americas station. I saw a few police officers, but 
Luis, my rickshaw driver, did not seem to worry about them. We started 
talking about the legal status of rickshaw drivers in Bogotá and their 
relationship with the police. Luis said, “The tombos [policemen] aren’t the 
problem; the problems are with the road patrol.” He explained that when they 
arrive, drivers quickly spread the word ”Police!”, so that most of them can 
hide. You have to be very unlucky to get caught, because it takes a while for 
the road patrol to lift up and move rickshaws, and while this is happening the 
rest have time to escape. (Field notes based observations and informal 
conversations from June 7
th
 2013).  
There seemed to be a difference between the local police and the more 
specialized force that controls the traffic. While the local police seem to be 
friendly and “cooperate” with the vendors and the rickshaw drivers, other 
police units are harsher. The fact that local police had developed close 
relations with the “accredited” vendors and rickshaw associations can also be 
interpreted as favoring certain groups in the streets, and not necessarily the 
ones that seemed more vulnerable, such as the pirates or mobile vendors.  
I took the following photograph at the vending zone located near Portal del 
Norte. The vendor with the blue umbrella is not part of the vending zones and 
does not have a license. When I asked about the police presence, he explained 
that this particular police officer was only concerned with the bus station at 
Transmilenio and does not have anything to do with the vendors.  
Police Control and Well-Being 
Police tolerance for street vendors can be interpreted as a pragmatic way to 
deal with this phenomenon, considering that the police are busy trying to 
control other crime. It can also be seen as acceptance of this survival activity. 
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However, the unusual cooperative agreements between the police and the 
more organized groups of vendors and rickshaws are beyond the duty of the 
law and can signal different problems. Studies of street vendors in other cities 
show that police officers are also part of the problem, and that many vendors 
have to pay bribes to the local police and government authorities (Bromley 
2000, 9; Saha 2011). 
Corruption scandals within the police force are often reported in the news in 
Colombia (Goldsmith 2000). The statistics from Transparency International 
show that 27 per cent of the respondents in Colombia had paid a bribe to the 
police in the last 12 months (TI 2013). Police corruption must be considered 
when studying this kind of control. When compared to other countries in 
Latin America, Colombia appears to be better than other cases. For instance, 
paying a bribe to the police was reported to amount to 61 per cent in Mexico, 
and 44 per cent in Peru. On the other hand, in countries such as Uruguay, 
only 4 per cent of the citizens reported paying bribes to the police (Ibid.).  
While the analysis of corruption is important, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that police harassment and evictions affect many vendors. In the words of the 
leader of the street vendors
44, the main priority with regards to ”decent work 
conditions” was ending police harassment. This illustrates the need to have a 
legal regulation that protects the rights of the vendors. Not a regulation that 
opens the doors for bribery and corruption.  
  
                                                     
44 Interview from January 23, 2014.  
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9. Formalization in the Transitional 
Zones  
Governments can regulate street vending that occurs within zones. A vending 
zone is a delimited space where vendors can conduct their small businesses. 
Vending zones are common in countries like India, where local governments 
have made an urban divide between “vending zones” and “no vending 
zones”, based on the national policy on street vendors (Srivastava et al. 
2012). Although formalization can be understood in different ways, in the 
context of the vending zones, formalization means to “legalize” the vendors 
by giving them a legal permit.
45
 However, the transitional zones in Bogotá 
differ from traditional regulation through “individual licenses” and, instead, 
they are regulated by a collective agreement between the government and 
various vendor associations. In this chapter, I will explore the way social 
control operates in the transitional zones. Particularly, how street vendors 
experience formal control exercised by the bureaucrats at the Office of 
Formalization, organizational control by the vendor associations and informal 
control. I will explore how formal and informal practices of control interac.  
The Transitional Zones 
The easiest way to identify a transitional zone is by the tents provided by the 
Office of Formalization (IPES) to the street vendors. These tents consist of 
four metallic poles topped with a pyramid roof and green tarpaulin covering. 
In 2012, I visited the 16 transitional zones in the city and conducted extended 
periods of fieldwork at two of these zones, one in the north near a bus station 
called Portal del Norte and one in the south-east of the city in the 
                                                     
45 Note that there are different routes to formalization, as I explained in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis.  
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neighborhood of Santa Librada. The photograph below illustrate what the 
zones look like.  
 
Figure 9 Transitional Zone in the neighborhood of Santa Librada, Bogotá 
Source: Photographed by the Author, 2013 
According to the regulations of the city of Bogotá, street vendors can be 
grouped into two categories: those who have a legal permit to operate, and 
those who do not. The law regulating street vendors states that conducting 
commercial activities in public spaces is a violation of public order, unless 
one has a license or a legal permit. Before 1989, the main formalization 
police was to give individual licenses (See Chaper 4). From then until 2003, 
the main way to become ”formal” had been to move into one of the 
relocation malls built by the government (Donovan 2008).
46
 These relocation 
                                                     
46 Since 2003, the government has changed its main policies on street vending and has 
implemented a wider variety of options for receiving legal permits besides the traditional 
relocation programs outside on the streets. According to a report by the Institute for Social 
Economy (IPES) from the 30th October 2012, there were approximately 1,370 street 
vendors working within the government’s formalization programs in the streets (IPES 
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programs are regulated through individual licenses that operate like a contract 
between the Office of Formalization and each vendor. In contrast, the 
transitional zones operate through a collective agreement signed by the local 
mayor and the leader of a vendor association. In the agreement, the 
government establishes general rules, while in practice, the everyday 
enforcement of regulation is taken care of by the associations. In 2012, there 
were 458 vendors working in 16 transitional zones (IPES 2012).  
The following excerpt from a visit to the local mayor’s office of the borough 
of Suba, illustrates how the transitional zones operate. 
As I sat outside the office of the government official at the Office of 
Formalization, I asked the other people sitting there if they were also waiting 
for the same person. One of them answered that they came from the local 
street vendors committee and were going to a meeting concerning the 
“transitional zones.” Marisol, one of the leaders of the vendors, spoke out and 
explained that the zones were a kind of aid they received from the government 
(son una ayuda). She continued talking and explained that the good thing 
about the transitional zones was that they could work in peace without fear of 
the police. Marisol explained that after many years of being chased by the 
police, street vendors were finally able to formalize their small businesses. 
She was proud to be the leader of one of the vendor associations in the 
borough of Suba, and she was going to meet a government official who 
coordinated the transitional zones. Marisol said I could come to visit her in 
her transitional zone if I wanted, and she gave me her phone number. (Field 
notes based on observations from July 10, 2012) 
The spontaneous encounter with Marisol inspired me to look further into this 
formalization program. I started visiting Marisol’s vending zone, and after 
that, I visited other transitional zones in the city. It caught my attention that 
many of the transitional zones were located in strategic areas, near hospitals, 
bus stations, and commercial alleys. The idea of allowing the vendors to 
                                                                                                                             
2012). There were 404 kiosk-vendors, 58 vendors working within the program Puntos de 
Encuentro (meeting points), and 458 working in transitional zones. The city also has 
seasonal fairs with an average of 450 vendors working each month, but these fairs are 
temporary and only provide legal status for a maximum of 45 days. There was also a group 
of 1,897 vendors who took part in re-location programs and renting stalls inside shopping 
malls. However, for the purpose of this research on the regulation of street businesses I did 
not include this group since they were no longer working in the streets. Additionally, 
empirical research has previously evaluated relocation programs. See, for instance, 
Donovan (2008) and Hunt (2009). With regards to the large number of street vendors in the 
city, about 100,000, formalization initiatives in 2012 covered less than 42 per cent of the 
total vendor population. Thus, the majority were working without a legal permit. 
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formalize in the streets was an alternative way of formalization, compared 
with the city’s previous efforts to move the vendors into off-the-streets 
shopping malls. Marisol’s comment that vendors could now work in peace 
without fear of the police made me reflect on the well-being of street vendors 
and whether formalization could be a tool to improve their lives. Her role as 
the leader of a vendor association and the meeting she was going to attend 
with the Office of Formalization also made me reflect on the role of the 
associations in this formalization initiative. To a certain extent, giving the 
administration of the transitional zones to their organizations was in line with 
International Labour Organization objectives concerning the need to 
strengthen informal workers’ organizations (ILO 2008, 8). Through the lens 
of social control, I will explore the different experiences of various vendors 
inside the transitional zones in relation to their working conditions and well-
being. 
Experiences after Formalization  
It is often argued that law can influence our behavior directly (through 
sanctions or rewards) or indirectly (by supporting social norms that trigger 
informal control) (Hydén 2011; R. E. Scott 2000). When I conducted 
fieldwork in the transitional zones, I was interested in understanding the 
vendors’ experiences of formalization. I often asked what had happened after 
moving to the transitional zone. How had the process worked? And what had 
changed compared to their experiences before formalization?  
Free from Fear of the Police 
Most vendors in the transitional zones stated that one of the main changes 
after moving to the zones was that they could now work without fear of the 
police. As one of the vendors put it, “The police used to treat us like 
criminals, now I can work in peace” (See Appendix C). I started hearing 
about the importance of working without fear from the police. The following 
excerpt, from a visit to Marisol’s vending zone in the north of the city 
illustrates this point.  
Today, I talked to Consuelo the orange juice vendor about her experiences in 
the transitional zone. In her own words: “Now we’ve got a roof over our 
heads, and we don’t have to run away every time the police feel like pushing 
us around.” She said that after many years of running away from the police 
and working in the sun and rain, she was now able to work in peace. Consuelo 
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is 58 years old and had worked as a street vendor for fifteen years before 
moving to the transitional zone in 2008. (Field notes from an interview and 
observations from July 13, 2012).  
The previous excerpt illustrates how formalization has allowed many vendors 
to work without fear of police harassment or evictions. The threat pertaining 
to the police was a “serious” one, and many had bad experiences of the 
police. In the chapter 7 on the police, I discuss how police control can hinder 
the vendors’ well-being. Thus, when formalization was respected by the 
police, it helped the vendors to be able to work without fear.  
Waking up and Knowing You Have Somewhere to Work 
Apart from freedom from police harassment, many vendors in the transitional 
zones talked about the importance of having a place to work. When working 
in the streets, vendors also fear being exposed to abuse and violence from 
their colleagues. Competition for good vending spaces and envy are sources 
of conflict for many street vendors, and the transitional zones provide a fixed 
workplace. The following excerpt is from my fieldwork in the vending zone 
in Santa Librada. It illustrates how vendors perceive formalization as a way 
to escape the informal control that vendors normally experience from their 
colleagues. I have referred to this kind of informal control in chapter 4 on 
acreditar.  
Clara let me stayed often at her tent. She was a kind of gate opener. Today as 
we were having lunch, we talked about how her experience in the vending 
zone. I met Clara first in 2012 when I came to this vending zone for the first 
time. Now almost two years later, we talk again about the transitional zones. 
Clara is worried that the government may dismantle the zones one day. For 
her, the best thing about moving to the vending zone was that she could now 
work in peace without worrying about other vendors taking her spot. (Field 
note based on an informal interview from January 14, 2014).  
Clara’s experiences illustrate that after moving into the tents she was able to 
work in a more peaceful state of mind, because she knew she had a specific 
working place. Having a space in the tent, where neither the police nor the 
other vendors could interfere with her work, contributed to reduced stress and 
anxiety in her daily working life. Many vendors that had moved to the 
transitional zones claimed their lives have improved, because now they could 
work in peace. In these zones, vendors were not left to fend for their spots, 
and in theory they had the support of the government and the vendors’ 
association. In practice, most vendors did not have to seek help from the 
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government to enforce their formal rights (as legalized vendors) against the 
threat of new vendors. The tents, which bear the logo of the government, 
signal the vendors’ rights to new vendors in the tents. Moreover, each 
vending spot has clearly demarcated boundaries, which prevents disputes 
over the use of space with other vendors in the zones. Thus the tents also act 
as an artefact of control, but also help to prevent disputes over space.  
A Roof That Protects from the Weather 
The tents in the transitional zones also provide protection from harsh weather 
conditions. The following excerpt is from a visit to the vending zone located 
near the hospital of Tunjuelito. In that zone, vendors used to get wet in raily 
days, and many praised the tents for improving their working conditions.  
I arrived at the vending zone located in a park in front of the Hospital 
Tunjuelito. The vendors here work long hours since they serve visitors to the 
hospital. I met Alba, a 68 year old woman, in this vending zone. She said she 
had been skeptical to begin with. All these formalization processes had not 
seemed very convincing to her, and she had wondered what the catch was. At 
her age, she had seen too much to be naïve. Nevertheless, she had decided to 
move into the vending zone in Tunjuelito, and now she was pleased to have a 
roof over her head. Alba prefers to work in the tents where she is not exposed 
to the rain and the sun. Alba sells aromatic water, a type of sweet herbal and 
fruit tea that is very popular among people rushing to work during the cold 
mornings. She charges 500 pesos (25 cents USD) for a cup of tea, and she 
makes about 15,000 pesos (7USD) each day. Alba has sold tea and coffee in 
this area for about 15 years, but six years ago she was able to enter the 
formalization program and move to the tents.  
Alba explained that before moving into the tents, she had to carry the coffee 
thermos and aromatica (tea) with her and stand in front of the hospital all day. 
She had to boil the drinks at home, and she could only sell as much as she 
could carry. Now, I could see that she prepares the drinks inside her tent. She 
also has a chair where she sits and rest when she does not have costumers. 
Alba’s neighbor came and joined our conversation. We talked about our 
families and about the economy. Alba gave us free aromatic tea while we 
talked and watched the day pass. (Interview from August 13, 2012). 
Most vendors that had moved to the transitional zones appreciated having a 
roof over their heads. Many explained that when they worked on the streets 
they were exposed to cold weather, heavy rain and the sun. Now, they were 
also able to sit and rest during their working hours, and many women 
mentioned that they could now ask their colleagues to watch their tents while 
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they visited the toilet, something that had been more difficult prior to the 
tents.  
The Transitional Zones as an Artefact of Social 
Control  
So far, I have mentioned some of the main improvements following 
formalization. Being free from police control and also from the informal 
control of people around them has made it possible for many vendors to work 
in increased peace and without fear. While the tents protect the vendors in 
different ways, they also represent an artefact of state control. The following 
excerpt illustrates how according to some vendors, the tents were used to 
remove them from strategic areas. It illustrates the city’s effort to regain 
control over the regulation of public space.  
Today, I was supposed to visit the vending zone in the borough of Bosa. 
However, I could not find any of the tents. There were some itinerant vendors 
in the area, so I asked them about the government tents. They replied that the 
zone had moved to another street. I finally arrived at what I thought must be 
the vending zone. I could see the IPES tents. I asked for the leader of the 
vendors. There, I met Andres, the leader of one of the vending associations in 
the zone. He explained that the vending zone in Bosa had been dismantled 
after too many vendors had complained to the government about the zone’s 
poor location. “Now we call them, zona de traicion (zone of betrayal), 
because the government said they wanted to support the vendors when, in 
reality, they wanted to get rid of us”, Andres said.  
He explained that on the day the vending zone had opened, the police had 
conducted a major raid and evicted all the vendors in the area and had 
threatened all of them that they would suffer the consequences of not having 
moved to the zone if they came back. The more than 50 vendors that had 
refused to become formalized moved to the neighboring areas and waited for 
the police to leave, and then gradually returned. Of the 70 vendors that had 
moved to the vending zone, many had abandoned the tents after a while and 
returned to working in the streets. Others used the tents only to store their 
goods and continued selling in the streets. They were mad at Andres, the 
leader, because they felt betrayed by a government that had promised to help 
them, but had just left them in the tents like boats adrift. The government had 
told them that after moving into the tents they would be able to improve their 
businesses, but what had actually happened to many people was that their 
income had decreased, because the customers had not moved with them to the 
vending zone. (Field notes based on an interview from August 17, 2012).  
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The example of the vending zone in Bosa illustrates how formalization was 
sometimes experienced as a displacement, or a way to get rid of the vendors. 
While vendors in some of the zones had managed to continue their businesses 
and attract customers, some transitional zones had been dismantled soon after 
they were installed, since the vendors had left and returned to the streets. 
Their main reason was the decrease in sales and income. The following 
example of another vending zone located in the north of the city near the 
Santa Fé mall illustrates the use of formalization to remove vendors from 
strategic areas.  
The vending zone on the east side of the north highway is located in an empty 
lot. Few people walk in this area since it is two blocks away from the main 
bus stop. One of the four vendors working in the tents tells me that he rents 
the tent from another vendor that works near the bus station at Portal. He 
doesn’t know about the transitional zones. I talk to another vendor selling 
chorizos. She is the only vendor to remain here since the formalization 
process. She explains that they repeatedly told the government that this zone 
was too far removed from the customers waiting at the bus stop. Although the 
majority of the vendors had refused to move to the vending zone, the 
government had continued with the project, and 20 out of the 72 vendors on 
this sidewalk had agreed to move there. The vendors that had moved to the 
new zone returned to the streets soon after they realized that they were losing 
money. Eventually, the government had dismantled most of the tents. Of the 
remaining nine tents, four were still open and five were closed. (field notes 
based on an interview from August 10, 2012)  
Today, I was looking for the vending zone in the neighborhood of Prado. I 
looked around, but I could not find the tents. I asked one of the vendors of 
chaza near a pedestrian bridge. His name was Felix. He said the vending zone 
in Prado had failed and the vendors had returned the tents to the government. 
“They were a waste of time and money”, he said. He showed me that the tents 
were located far from the pedestrian bridge that connects the bus stop, and 
explained that they had lost most of their clients. Soon after they had received 
the tents, new vendors had started to arrive, and they were forced to go back 
to reclaim their spots. He said they had not wanted the tents to begin with, but 
the government had insisted on the formalization program. (field notes from 
an interview and observations from August 7, 2012).  
Felix felt that the transitional zones were a failure, because he had not 
benefited economically from moving there. He owned a Chaza, a wooden 
structure from which he sold candy, cigarettes, potato chips, soda drinks, 
water, cell phone calls, and other snacks. However, success in this line of 
business depends on being at the right location, and not being surrounded by 
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tough competition. You can find chazas everywhere there is dense pedestrian 
traffic in Bogotá, such as outside churches, in city and market squares, 
supermarkets, large work places and offices, schools, and bus stops.
47
 
Vending zones are considered the cause of urban disintegration in places 
were zones were used to move the vendors out of the city center (Yatmo 
2008; Lofland 1973). While some of the transitional zones in Bogotá were 
located in the same area that vendors conducted their businesses, others were 
placed far from their customers.  
Training Vendors to Become Business People 
One of the main characteristics of the transitional zones is their three year 
time limit. During that time period, vendors should have consolidated their 
businesses and entered into the formal economy. In order to learn to learn 
how to become “real business people” (in the words of one of the vendors), 
they could enroll in a one year entrepreneurship training program to learn 
about accounting, marketing and how to become formal. Thus, formalization 
not only came with control in terms of space in the tents, but also with the 
idea that education was needed to guide the vendors in the “transition” 
process. The following excerpt is from the stories of Carla and Consuelo, two 
of the vendors from the zone located near Portal del Norte. They tell about 
their experiences and frustrations with the entrepreneurship training. 
Consuelo is often busy between seven and ten in the morning. People stop to 
buy a quick breakfast that includes orange juice, empanadas and a coffee. 
Their customers don’t stay long; they just buy what they need and continue to 
the bus station. After the rush hour, I talked to Carla and Consuelo about their 
experience with the formalization program. Consuelo began talking first and 
said that the woman from the government [IPES] had visited them and told 
them about the entrepreneurship program.  
Consuelo said she was one of the few that had finished the classes, because 
most vendors had dropped out after a few lessons. People said that it was a 
waste of time, because they didn’t like studying. But Consuelo, who had only 
                                                     
47 Like the tents, they were an artefact created by a local decree that established that vendors 
could sell from wooden boxes of 60 cm x 40 cm that vendors could hang from their chests 
(Decreto 227 1964). Felix uses the same size but he has the chaza attached to four wheels 
that he can push around. 
198 
made it to fifth grade, was happy to go to university to study. They had 
studied for one year and had received lessons in how to manage a real 
business, and at the end they had to present a business project. Carla and 
Consuelo had a business idea of starting a soya yogurt factory. The teacher 
had said it was one of the best projects in the class and had helped them to put 
together a budget and think about marketing. They spent their savings on 
making the first batch of soya yogurt, but when they started selling it they 
realized it wasn’t going to be easy. People didn’t dare to buy yogurt on the 
streets, and this was a new product that was unfamiliar to most of their regular 
clients. Eventually, they drank the yogurt themselves, because they couldn’t 
sell it. They tried selling at small supermarkets, and were told they had to get 
a sanitary permit. They also had to sell the products on consignment, because 
supermarkets usually only pay after 30 days. So, Consuelo had gone back to 
selling orange juice and Carla to her coffee business. (field notes from an 
interview and observations from July 13, 2012).  
Carla also complained about the training; she said that the university teachers 
were all elegant people that had no idea what it was like to work as a street 
vendor.  
Carla explained that the teachers at the university where she had received her 
training had told her she had to keep an accounting book and write down how 
much coffee she sold every day, as well as how much money she spent on 
supplies. She did that for two days, but then lost track. She still doesn’t see the 
point of writing down whether she sells 50 or 70 cups of coffee. (field notes 
from an interview and observations from July 13, 2012).  
Lina who works at the Office of Formalization (IPES) is aware of the 
problems and complaints surrounding the training programs for street 
vendors.  
Today I met Lina. She was busy as usual, but we managed to go for lunch. I 
asked Lina about the training for the vendors in the transitional zones. She 
said there were a lot of problems with the training program. There was one 
class that had started with 30 vendors, but only three had finished the entire 
program. Some of the vendors had dropped out without saying anything. 
Others had said they were losing money, since they couldn’t work during 
those hours. Lina said she was disappointed, because the vendors only look at 
short term profits for their businesses. (field notes based on observations and 
informal interview from August 14, 2012). 
While there were many complaints about the training provided as part of the 
formalization program in the transitional zones, many vendors believed the 
reason they could not find a proper job was their lack of education. Many 
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hoped their children would get a university degree so that they could move 
further in life. In his analysis of Bogotá, Hunt describes the formalization 
process as a way to teach the vendors to overcome their “culture of 
informality.” 
…the proliferation of state agencies, policies, and plans which define the 
problem of public space as one of its invasion by ambulant vendors, and the 
solution to this invasion as the relocation of vendors to spatially marginalized 
and state-regulated markets where they are taught to overcome their ‘culture 
of informality’ by participating in political and economic transactions in state-
prescribed ways. (Hunt 2009, 331) 
Hunt criticizes the use of state bureaucracy and formalization programs, 
because they depart from the assumption that street vendors are the result of a 
culture of informality rather than structural reasons such as poverty, internal 
migration, lack of education, and poorly paid jobs (Hunt 2009).  
You Have to Be Organized To Be Formalized 
Organizations are often seen as a way to make your voice heard and get 
representation for informal workers (Chen 2013; ILO 2008). However, some 
scholars have shown that street vendors often face difficulties to create long 
lasting organizations that represent their interests and help them to achieve 
cooperation (Roever 2005b; Agadjanian 2002). While networks and family 
ties are important to access a place in the streets (Peña 2000; Crossa 2009), 
they can also exclude outsiders and impose excessive obligations on their 
members. Still, in the case of the transitional zones, since one of the 
requirements is to be member of an association, the law has created an 
incentive for vendors to organize.  
All the vendors I met in the transitional zones were members of a vendors 
association.
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 The following excerpt is only an example of many answers I 
received saying that they had to be organized, otherwise they would not be 
allowed in the tents.  
                                                     
48 From the survey I conducted in the transitional zones, all respondents reported being 
members of an association. Many looked at me strangely when I asked them whether they 
were part of an associations; some said, “We have to.”  
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During a conversation with the leader of one of the vendors associations in the 
borough of Kennedy, I asked him how they had started their organization. He 
said that they had not been organized previously, but that they had started 
their association because it was necessary in order to apply for a transitional 
zone. They had to go to the Chamber of Commerce to register the association 
as a non-profit organization, and it had cost about 300,000 pesos (100 USD). 
He told me that he had lent the money to pay for the registration of the 
association, but it was actually a donation, because in the end, no one had paid 
him back. (field notes based on observations and informal interview from July 
17, 2012). 
The fact that all the vendors I met were members of an association does not 
mean that they were actively engaged in their organizations.
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 Many vendors 
registered with the association but did not work collectively after being 
assigned a place in the tents. I will explore how the vendor associations 
operate, their relations with the vendors and with the government, in more 
detail.  
Associations, Leaders and Control  
One of the most interesting features of the transitional zones in Bogotá was 
that they were administered by the vendors associations. Although there were 
some governmental rules to be followed, such as not selling piracy goods or 
using child labor, the enforcement of these rules was left in the hands of the 
vendor associations. The government limited their role to finding a space, 
installing the tents and responding to complaints. While the local mayor had 
the responsibility to make periodic visits to make sure the transitional zones 
were operating according to the rules, in practice, unless there was a 
complaint, the zones were left alone. Instead, the associations were in charge 
of solving everyday problems. I conducted two months of fieldwork in the 
vending zone located in Santa Librada, one in 2012 and one in 2013. Based 
on my observations and informal conversations I will describe how the 
associations operate on an everyday basis.  
In Santa Librada, two associations control the vending zone. They decide 
who has the right to get a tent, they organize the provision of security at night 
                                                     
49 According to the survey I conducted among 169 individuals from the transitional zones, 
only 21,5 % were members of an organization of vendors prior to moving into the tents. 
The rest (78,5 %) became members of an association in order to move to the tents. See 
more extended results of this survey in Appendix B.  
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for the merchandise in the tents, they represent the vendors in meetings with 
the government and they solve conflicts that might arise in the vending zone. 
According to the leaders, both associations have been democratically 
established, have a board and a president. They were also formally registered 
at the Chamber of Commerce as non- profit organizations (the same status 
than some rickshaw associations). The following sections explore the role of 
the associations in the transitional zones. 
Setting up a Vending Zone 
The vending zone in Santa Librada was set up in August of 2009, and the 
Institute for Social Economy installed 110 tents on the sidewalk in front of a 
supermarket and in an empty plot on a corner further down the street. While 
there were different versions about how the vending zone had been initiated, 
the process had taken about three years of negotiations between the local 
mayor and the leaders of the vendors in the area. Some vendors said the 
government had started to count the vendors in the area and had told them to 
organize in order to get access to formalization programs, and thereby avoid 
police evictions. Other said it had been initiated by vendors who had claimed 
their rights and had negotiated access to the transitional zones. Other vendors 
mentioned that the police had told them that if they did not formalize, they 
were going to get kicked out. After meetings and discussions, the vendors in 
the area had formed two associations and the transitional zone was 
established in 2009.  
Today I met Ernesto, one of the leaders. We talked about the process of 
starting the vending zone. According to him, it all started because the police 
had told them they had to get a permit. Some of the vendors had gone to the 
office of the local mayor of Usme, and the government had said they had to 
get organized if they wanted to participate in formalization programs. The 
first step had been to form the organization and all the legal papers, and to get 
registered at the Chamber of Commerce. They drafted the statute and elect a 
board with a president and a treasurer. Then, the vendors in the association 
had to go to the “vendors’ house” [now called IPES] and get registered. It 
took about three years to complete the process of getting approval for the 
vending zone. Finally, on the 28
th
 of August of 2009, the government had 
installed the tents. (field notes based on observations and informal interview 
from July 18, 2012). 
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Ernesto’s version illustrates that the threat of eviction had represented a 
warning of a more severe sanction if the vendors refused to move to the 
zones. Thus, police control had also played a role to incentivize vendors to 
formalize.  
On the other hand, in order to be part of a vending zone, you had to be part of 
a vendors association, and be registered at the office for street vendors 
(IPES). The space for the vending zone had to be approved by the Office of 
Public Space of Bogotá (DADEP), and the local mayor was in charge of 
signing a resolution to create the vending zone. Sometimes the process of 
creating a vending zone was driven by the local government, and other times 
the process was pushed forward by the vendors associations.  
The Role of the Government 
The government had begun by counting the vendors in one area. In Santa 
Librada they had registered 160 vendors. Then, they had asked them to 
organize in associations. Vendors on this list were given priority for a spot in 
the tents. Determining who got which tent in the zones was internally decided 
by the associations. However, the first problem that the associations in Santa 
Librada encountered was how to distribute the spots inside the vending zone. 
While the government had promised tents for all their members, by the time 
the zone had been approved, the zone included only 110 tents. The police had 
counted at least 160 vendors, but new vendors were appearing all the time, 
and it was difficult to determine who had the right to the tents. Vendors 
explained that problems began to surmount and some accused one of the 
leaders of favoring his friends when distributing the tents. At this point, some 
vendors had decided to revolt against the leader and complain to the 
government. The following excerpt illustrates how this conflict had been 
solved by the government.  
Today, I was talking to Jorge, the leader of the other association. He came and 
talked to me while I was eating my lunch. He said I had to talk to him to get 
the real photograph of the transitional zones. Jorge said he had seen me 
talking to the people from the other association and that I needed to know the 
other side of the story. We talked in his tent. He told me that in the beginning 
there had only been one association. They had not trusted the leaders of the 
other association, and they did not like their attitude. Jorge said that the other 
association was all about getting money from the vendors, so he had 
complained to the government. First, they had to pay a monthly fee of 10,000 
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pesos (4.4 USD), then they had decided to create vests with the name of their 
association. The last thing was an association identity card which meant an 
additional expense.  
Jorge talked to the government about the association; he thought the leaders 
were taking advantage of their position. The government official replied that 
the vendors could start a different association. So, he had talked to other 
vendors that were dissatisfied and they had created a new association. This 
had created co-existing problems with the leaders of the first association. 
There had been gossip about the leaders of both associations. However, the 
government had said that they had to work together and divide the tents by 
half. This was not well received by the leaders of the first association, who 
believed they had worked much harder to get the zone. (field notes based on 
observations and informal interview from January 9, 2014). 
The previous excerpt illustrates the complexities involved in establishing 
democratic organizations to represent the vendors’ interests and help them 
improve their working conditions. Complaints about lack of trust in the 
leaders were common in many of the transitional zones. There were few 
zones where most vendors trusted their leaders and where people worked 
together towards common goals. Indeed, one of the complaints from the new 
association was that the leaders in the other association wanted to meet too 
often and waste their time. They believed that the best association was one 
that would let them alone. Again, this illustrates the difficulties of achieving 
collective action and creating social capital among street vendors (Roever 
2005b).  
It also indicates that the state can interfere to control social organizations. In 
this case, dividing the tents between the two associations had allowed 
vendors to exercise more control over their leaders. However, this control 
was not direct in the sense that the government had not delved into details to 
investigate whether the accusations against the other leaders were correct. 
Still, by dividing the tents among the associations, the government had 
signaled no preference or alliance to any of the associations, and had 
provided opportunities for checks and balances. 
From my visits to other transitional zones, I also perceived conflicts between 
the leaders and the vendors. The following excerpt is from Marisol’s 
transitional zone and may illustrate how vendors sometimes fear their leaders.  
Today, I visited Marisol’s transitional zone, which is located down by a 
pedestrian bridge near the Portal del Norte bus station. As I walked down the 
stairs, I could see the tents Marisol had been talking about. I approached one 
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of the vendors in the green tents and asked her about Marisol. She said that 
Marisol had not arrived yet, but that I could wait in her tent. I introduced 
myself and asked the vendor whether I could interview her about the 
transitional zones. She seemed uncomfortable and asked her tent neighbor if 
that was ok. Her neighbor also seemed uncomfortable and they said that the 
leader, Marisol, didn’t like them talking to people from the government. They 
told me I should wait for Marisol. The vendor’s name is Consuelo and she 
sells freshly pressed orange juice. Later, I met Marisol who worked for a 
while but left around around five in the afternoon. Some vendors in the zone 
worked during the day and others during the evening. I stayed until late and 
talked to some of the evening vendors. One of them started talking badly 
about Marisol immediately, and said she was in big trouble with the 
government because she had given one of the tents to her son in law, and the 
rules are only one tent per family. (field notes based on observations from 
July 11, 2012).  
This excerpt also shows the problems that street vendors have in trusting that 
their leaders do not abuse their position for personal advantage. Nevertheless, 
I also met leaders that also complained about having an unpaid job that only 
gave them problems. Therefore, establishing a strong social organization that 
could represent the vendors’ interests was a challenge.  
Payments of Fees 
Vendors in the Santa Librada transitional zone have to pay two fees: 
association fees and security fees. The association fee is paid to the leader of 
the association and is used to pay for paper work, paying registration at the 
Chamber of Commerce and to compensate for the work of the leader. The 
security fee is paid directly by each vendor to the security guard. According 
to the leaders, getting the vendors to pay the association fee was a nightmare, 
while the same was not true for the security guard that collected the fee once 
a month. The following excerpt illustrates how these fees are collected. 
The leader of the first association often complained that people were late in 
their payments to the association. While people complained that 10,000 pesos 
(4.4 USD) a month was too much, the leaders had had to pay for the 
registration of the association, and therefore they received some compensation 
for all the time they had spent in meetings with the government. “What is 
10,000 pesos a month? Nothing. But the vendors complain that it’s too much”, 
Ernesto said. He explained that only half of the vendors paid the fee, so they 
had reduced the fee to 3,000 pesos (1.3 USD) for those working in the tents. 
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Still, vendors outside the tents had had to pay 10,000 pesos if they wanted to 
become members of the association. Ernesto explained that while vendors 
were often late in their payments, it was a different story when it came to the 
transitional zone security guards. The vendors said they always paid the 
guards that take care of the tents. There are three guards and they collect 
30,000 pesos (9USD) a month per tent. If a vendor does not pay, his tent will 
not be guarded, and the vendors said that the guards were very strict about 
collecting the money. Later, Ernesto explained he had been the president of 
the association since it had been established, and that he wanted to get 
appointed for life so that vendors would not have to elect him each year. I 
asked him what he meant by “for life.” He said, “Twenty years or so.” (field 
notes based on observations and informal interview from January 13, 2014). 
Today, the two associations have agreed on a fee of 3,000 pesos a month (1 
USD), a relatively low amount that most of the vendors I met reported that 
they paid. However, both leaders agreed that if a person refused to pay the 
fee, they could only apply minor sanctions. They depended on the 
government to evict vendors from the zone, and not paying the association 
fee was not cause for eviction. While they had sometimes reported vendors 
for not opening their tents and the government had evicted them from the 
program, there were no cases of eviction of a vendor for not having paid the 
fee. The only thing leaders could do was to talk bad about those who did not 
pay, give verbal warnings and insults. Unlike the association fee, the three 
security guards who take care of the zone at night said they often got their 
money on time. Vendors fear losing their goods and pay the security fee on 
time. When I asked the vendors why they paid the security guard, they 
answered that it was cheaper than the storage they had paid for before. From 
the conversations with the vendors, I felt that some of them feared the guards 
might enter the tents and take their possessions.  
I Prefer to Work on My Own and Not in Associations 
There was a lot of gossip about the leaders in a couple of the transitional 
zones. Talk had it that the leaders of the associations were taking advantage 
of them and were collecting fees for their own benefit and enrichment.  
A leader can, in theory, be anyone who has gained the trust of the other 
vendors and has been elected as their representative. In order to be allowed to 
register, the associations need to have a president or leader, a secretary and a 
treasurer. They must also pay a registration fee and have an internal 
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regulation form. In theory, the president and the treasurer were legally 
responsible for the administration of the association’s funds. iI practice, there 
was a lack of trust in many leaders, and some vendors said they would prefer 
to work with individual licenses without the involvement of the associations. 
The following excerpt illustrates some of the problems vendors had with their 
leaders. 
Julio still remembers how the leaders of an association of street vendors called 
Cobuenosaires some years ago had taken all the money from the collective 
savings of the vendors and left the neighborhood. While people had been 
really upset, the leaders had disappeared and no one had seen them since then. 
What happened in Cobuenosaires had been a major incident and was still 
remembered by vendors in the neighborhood of Santa Librada. This was the 
main reason why many vendors are wary of their own leaders. “No, I would 
prefer to work on my own without being part of an association”, Julio said. “I 
don’t want to have to pay anything to anyone, and I don’t expect anything 
from anyone.” (field notes based on observations and informal interview from 
January 15, 2012). 
The previous excerpt illustrates that negative social capital (Portes and 
Landolt 2000) can affect the street vendor associations. Associations can be 
co-opted, can exclude outsiders, and can impose excessive obligations on 
their members. They are not exempt from corruption and abuse from 
individual leaders.  
However, there was also positive social capital. While people more often 
remembered the bad things than the good things, I could see that many 
vendors had friends and worked together in the transitional zones. They 
helped each other watch the tents when a vendor had to leave. They lent each 
other money to pay for lunch or coffee. The woman selling coffee let the 
vendors pay later when they had cash. They bought merchandise together in 
order to get a better price. They organized a raffle when a vendor’s family 
member died in order to collect money for the funeral. In the transitional 
zone in the borough of Engativa, the vendors hired musicians on Sundays to 
attract more clients. They often shared their personal lives and talked about 
their problems with their colleagues. There was also social capital, and being 
able to work under the rules of the transitional zones allowed them to 
overcome problems of envy over the use of space. The fact that they had 
fixed places also fostered the possibility to cooperate, because they had 
become neighbors, much like the ones in Shasta county that Ellickson 
mentions (1991).  
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Informality Inside the Formalization Zones  
During my visits to Santa Librada, I could see a large number of vendors 
outside the transitional zone. Many of them competed with similar products 
to those being sold in the tents. Vendors explained that when the zone had 
opened in 2009, there were more than 200 vendors working there. Because 
the space was not adequate to install more tents, the government had given 
informal authorization to the remaining vendors to establish their businesses 
in the streets surrounding the zone, despite this being in violation of the 
governmental decree regulating the zones that forbade informal vending 
around the zones. However, it should be pointed out that this rule was never 
followed, and there were always non-formalized vendors in the vicinity of the 
transitional zones. The existence of “informal” vendors inside the 
formalization zones is one more example of the common Colombian belief 
that, “it is legislated, but not enforced” (Kalmanovitz 2002).  
 
Figure 4 Informal vendors in the transitional zone of Santa Librada 
Source: Photographed by the author, 2013 
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I observed a number of vendors outside the transitional zones, and I talked to 
some of them about their working conditions. One of the vendors said he was 
waiting in line to enter the transitional zone until a tent became available. He 
showed me an ID card displaying the name of the association and said that 
the police let him work in peace when he shows that card. Thus, the police 
recognize the informal agreement between the government and the 
associations, and they had more tolerance for vendors that had this ID. The 
establishment of an “informal right” for the vendors of the association that 
did not get a tent illustrates how informal controls are also part of 
formalization initiatives.  
Nothing More Permanent than the Temporary 
Decree 419 of 2006 signed by the Mayor of Bogotá, which regulates the 
transitional zones, established a limit of one year, with the possibility of a 
maximum one year extension. However, as with many things in Colombia, 
the government’s temporary solutions tend to become permanent, as in the 
case of the “state of siege” that was supposed to be exceptional and 
temporary, but had ended up governing the country for 32 of the 42 years 
between 1949 and 1991 (Garcia-Villegas 2001). I have given other examples 
in chapter four, where I present some aspects of the Colombian legal culture.  
The first thing the government had done when the time extension for the 
transitional zones was about to expire was to change Decree 419 and 
establish a new time limit of three years. To change this decree, the mayor 
signed Decree 450 of 2009. This illustrates an overproduction of norms, 
typical of the Colombian legal culture. As I explained in Chapter 4, the 
Colombian legal culture can be further characterized by a flexible application 
of law in conjunction with a normative overproduction (Restrepo 2013). In 
turn, when it is not possible to enforce a law, as in the case of the expiring 
time limit for the formalization zones, the solution is to change the law. 
However, the decree was not adapted to accurately fit into the social norms, 
as explained by Håkan Hydén in his theory of norms (2011), but instead the 
decree was reformed and remained unenforced.  
After the three years had passed, the government had decided to use a more 
pragmatic and informal approach. Vendors could change the name of the 
organization and sign a new agreement, and pretend that they had not 
previously been working there. Another option was to move the transitional 
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zone into another street in the same neighborhood. They could also re-label 
the zone from “Transitional Vending Zone to “Zone of Regulated Use.” The 
following excerpt is from an informal interview with Marisol, where she 
explained that the transitional zones were originally seen as a temporary 
solution for the vendors. The idea was that the vendors would be able to 
move to markets or to formal stores after two years, but in practice this had 
not been a real option for the vendors.  
Marisol said she had been to the local mayor’s office to try to negotiate 
another time extension for the transitional zone. The problem was that two 
years was not enough time to formalize a business. Marisol seemed to be 
worried about the future of the transitional zones, and the other vendors 
around her had talked about what to do if the government dismantled the 
tents. Marisol said the official at the Mayor’s Office would help them to 
transform the transitional zone into another vending zone that would have no 
time restriction. (Field note based on observations and informal interviews 
from July 10, 2012).  
The previous excerpt is just an example of how vendors adapted to the 
uncertainty of state regulation. In this the flexible application of the law 
allowed some vendors to stay in the transitional zones for a longer period of 
time than the formal agreement stipulated. It is possible to say that the 
transitional zones should have helped the government to “clean up the 
streets”, since the final aim was to facilitate the transition to formal 
businesses (inside a store). However, through quiet encroachment (Bayat 
1997) and subtle resistance (Scott 1985), vendors remained in the transitional 
zones, tried to postpone their expiration as much as they could, or simply 
refused to leave the zones.  
The Future of the Transitional Zones  
The leaders of the associations did not know what the future would bring and 
were left in uncertainty. The government had created the transitional zones 
while waiting for the new regulation of the use of public space to be 
prepared, but six years later, many of the transitional zones were still in legal 
limbo, and the future of the vendors who occupy the zones was uncertain. In 
2012, there were 458 street vendors working in the 16 transitional zones of 
Bogotá. But many of their permits had expired, and their legal status was 
unclear. While the Office of Public Space had declared that there were 
enough places to create formalization zones for more than 8,000 vendors, the 
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staff at the Office of Formalization said that they were already overworked 
and could not cope with the amount of work that would be required to move 
8,000 vendors into the transitional zones. The process of creating new 
transitional zones began slowing down.  
The Office of Formalization also stopped registering vendors in their 
database once they had passed more than 35,000 vendors. The number of 
vendors in the city was well beyond their work capacity, so they had stopped 
registering them, as if stopping registration would stop the number of vendors 
from growing. As a result, the expansion and creation of new transitional 
zones came to a halt, because the Office of Formalization (IPES) was afraid 
that they would not be able to move the vendors once the two-year time limit 
had expired. According to Carlos at the Office of Public Space, the 
transitional zones had started to look more like shanty towns due to the 
decline of their infrastructure. 
Finally, in 2013, after eight years of discussing the regulation of the more 
permanent vending zones, the Mayor of Bogotá signed a new decree (Decree 
456, 2013). When I met Carlos, who had worked on the new decree for more 
than two years, he was confident about the success of the new regulation. He 
believed it was a revolutionary tool to regulate street vendors. He explained 
that the transitional zones would become ZAR (Zonas de Aprovechamiento 
Regulado - Regulated Utilization Zones). The new zones were intended only 
for vulnerable groups, people that are displaced or living in poverty, and not 
for well-established vendors. Established vendors should become formal 
businesses. Under the new regulation, a group of police officers would be in 
charge of public space. For this purpose, the city was going to hire 30 police 
officers who would work exclusively on public space issues.  
The government wanted to return to centralized control over the zones and 
end the agreements with the associations. Instead, they wanted to go back to 
the individual license approach. While Lina and Carlos from the Office of 
Public Space (DADEP), had spent many years in meetings and discussions to 
draft the decree regulating the new vending zones, they were aware that 
decrees are fairly easy to change. A new mayor can derogate a decree merely 
by signing a new norm, and therefore the regulation of street vendors could 
change at any time. In fact, elections for a new mayor were held in 2015 and 
won by one of the former mayors of Bogotá, Enrique Peñalosa. Many street 
vendor leaders commented that they were afraid that Mayor Peñalosa would 
probably return to the old policies of evictions and clearances of street 
vendors that he had implemented during his previous term as mayor.  
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Formalization and Well-Being 
For some vendors, the transitional zones had allowed them to improve their 
lives, for others it remained unchanged, while for yet other vendors 
conditions had deteriorated. For those that had experienced worse conditions, 
the option was to go back to the streets, and in fact, many abandoned the 
zones. I only had the opportunity to meet a few of the vendors that had 
abandoned the zones and the vending zones only covered 458 vendors, thus 
the results of this formalization study provide only an illustration of some of 
the issues, present in this process. However, based in the experiences of those 
who had remained in the tents, it is possible to analyze some of the aspects 
that can provide clues concerning the relation between formalization and 
well-being.  
One of the positive aspects of formalization was the elimination of evictions 
and confiscations. This is still an important issue in the vendors’ daily lives, 
and fear of the police creates a situation of anxiety and insecurity that can 
hinder the vendors’ well-being. The second improvement following 
formalization was protection from bad weather conditions and a general 
improvement of conditions in the working place. A third improvement was 
the possibility to have a fixed workplace and a sense of security that no one 
could kick them out. This sense of self-worth and living without fear relates 
to Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) list of basic capabilities in order for people to 
pursue the lives they value.  
Four, the government did not collect taxes or fees in the transitional zones, 
and this allowed the vendors to keep most of their income. However, other 
charges such as security and associations fees were a matter of dissent. 
Willingness to pay fees was low among the vendors. Government officials in 
Bogotá complained about the problems of enforcing any kind of payments 
from the vendors, and how the cost of enforcement was often higher than the 
fees. Finally, being close to their customers was essential for many vendors 
to maintain sales. Shah and Mandava (2005) argue that urban planners and 
other bureaucrats should not decide the places for re-location of street 
vendors from their desks. Re-location places that are too far from the 
costumers are often not attractive to the vendors. 
Although the state had decentralized some aspects of the regulation of the 
transitional zones, the government still set up the main rules of the game. 
These rules include the use of specific spots and tent were free of charge. 
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Additionally, the government was in charge of overseeing the formalization 
process and required that the associations were democratic and transparent. 
This allowed some vendors to stop abusive leaders from collecting unlawful 
fees, since vendors knew they could complain to the government about 
irregular and abusive practices. It is an example of hybrid systems of social 
control, when one controller (a person) tries to enforce the norm of another 
controllers (the government), as explained by Ellickson (1991, 254). While 
there were cases where the leaders had tried to take advantage of the vendors, 
in many cases the leaders were subject to control from the vendors as well as 
from the government.  
Formalization and the Legal Empowerment of the Poor 
The results of the study of the transitional zones shows the complexities 
involved in the process of formalization, the different actors involved and 
how control from the state is often interacting with other forms of social 
control. Nevertheless, this study shows that some well-being imporvements 
can come after formalization. While the economic gains of formalization 
were not as high as De Soto’s theory promises, other positive outcomes 
followed after formalization, such as improvements in the vendors’ working 
conditions. Most people that had criticized De Soto were right about the fact 
that formalization would hardly generate access to capital and credit for the 
poor (Shackelford 2009; Rossini and Thomas 1990; Calderón 2004). 
Unfortunately, there is no snowball effect that follows after formalization to 
improve the economic gains of street vendors. They are still selling basic 
goods at low prices, and they depend on long working hours in order to make 
a living. Sometimes, their income even decreases following formalization, 
because they cannot provide goods at the busiest corners in the city. Street 
vendors are not entrepreneurs in the strict sense of the meaning, and most of 
them do not innovate or introduce new products; rather, they deal in common 
products, which is why you find many vendors selling similar items on the 
same street.  
The government’s excessive focus on economic outcomes makes them think 
of formalization as a failure. Like Lina, most government officials consider 
the vendors a problem for the city, a nuisance for the rest of the citizens, and 
a source of congestion. In this regard, this research supports the findings of 
other studies that criticize formalization’s hidden aim of getting rid of 
vendors and cleaning up the streets (Ferragut and Gómez 2013; Hansen 2010; 
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Kayuni and Tambulasi 2009; Meneses-Reyes 2013). When government 
officials have a hidden agenda to get rid of vendors, it becomes hard for 
formalization programs to achieve other social goals, such as the 
improvement of working conditions and well-being.  
Another shortcoming of the transitional zones was that they only covered 458 
vendors, most of whom had long experience working in this occupation. The 
program was a drop in the ocean considering the city had more than 100,000 
street vendors. Formalization covered mainly experienced vendors who have 
better access to information about government programs and their rights. 
New vendors have greater difficulties to formalize, and often move around. 
The question about formalization should be how to formalize and it should 
considered the implications of formalization for newcomers, those who may 
enter the street at any moment in order to earn a living. 
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10. Well-Being, Freedom and 
Hardship 
I met Elsa, who was 69 years old, near Portal de las Americas. Unlike other 
ice cream vendors who moved around, Elsa often sat on a bench, so we 
managed to talk on different occasions. It is not often you get to meet 
someone as cheerful as Elsa, and even on rainy days she remained under the 
pedestrian bridge hoping to sell all her ice cream once the rain had passed. 
She appreciated her work and was thankful that she could earn her own 
money. Elsa did not have a pension, but at least she had the health insurance 
provided by the government and a small subsidy for elderly people living in 
extreme poverty. The following excerpt from Elsa’s story illustrates the role 
of street businesses as a way to earn a livelihood.  
Elsa explained proudly that she was a hard working woman and that she 
doesn’t like to ask others for help. Before working as an ice cream vendor, she 
worked with recycling, just like her father. But now she was too old for that 
job. “That’s life, we get old and we’re not as strong as we used to be, but I can 
get some extra money by selling ice cream”, said Elsa. (field notes based on 
informal conversations from June, 2013)  
Almost everyone working in street businesses struggles to make ends meet. 
Many talked about their situation being tougher than for people with formal 
jobs. However, they often had contradictory opinions about working in the 
streets, a feeling that can be described as being caught between having some 
independence, yet remaining in hardship. Like Elsa, many people I met on 
the streets of Bogotá talked proudly about earning an honest living and being 
able to provide for themselves. In this chapter, I have collected some of the 
field notes that describe how vendors and rickshaw drivers evaluate their 
working conditions and well-being.  
While the economic literature on well-being often makes reference to 
material aspects, by taking an ethnographic approach this thesis combines 
both material issues and subjective perspectives of well-being. The material 
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aspects (earnings, work schedules, hazards) are exposed in this thesis based 
on my observations and also based in the issues introduced by informants. 
However, a qualitative study provides relevant insights in the subjective 
aspects of well-being, particularly on the role of “people themselves to judge 
the quality of their life and, of their job” (Rojas 2013, 170). The following 
excerpts illustrate how street vendors and rickshaw drivers described their 
well-being. Furthermore, the data I present shows the kind of obstacles 
people encounter when trying to improve their lives. 
Freedom 
When analysing my field notes, the concept of freedom emerged as a relevant 
topic. Many street vendors and rickshaw drivers in Bogotá appreciate the 
possibility to earn an income while being independent and not having to work 
for another person. The feeling of independence and freedom is seen as a 
possibility to control your own life. People in street businesses often talked 
about autonomy at work, the possibility to combine family responsibilities 
with work, the ability to earn your own money, and the importance of not 
having to work for another person. The following stories illustrate how 
vendors and rickshaw drivers talked about the importance of independence at 
work.  
Earning Your Own Money and Trying to Improve “Salir Adelante”  
Aware of the tight schedules and poorly paid hours you get from washing 
cars, Luis considers being a rickshaw driver to be the best job he could get. 
He uses the expression “salir adelante” to explain that he wants to get ahead 
in life. He has many dreams and he hopes that by working as a rickshaw 
driver he can save money and eventually become a bus driver. The following 
excerpt illustrates this point. 
“The best thing about this job is that you earn according to your own effort”, 
said Luis. He explained that he was able to make good money, and he could 
work as many hours as he wanted. However, it was hard work because he had 
to pedal all day. “But here I get to see the fruits of my labor”, he exclaimed. “I 
don’t want to be on a rickshaw all my life, but this is good enough for now.” 
He told me that when he dropped out of high school, the only job he could get 
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was at the car wash at the petrol station. “Over there, they really know how to 
exploit people”, said Luis. According to him, you work all day, evenings and 
weekends, and you only get 3,000 pesos (1.3 USD) for each car you wash. 
The petrol station owner takes most of the money. As a rickshaw driver Luis 
could make as much as 70,000 pesos (31 USD) a day. So he preferred this 
kind of job. (field notes based on participant observations and informal 
conversations from June 7, 2013) 
Like Luis, most drivers said they made more than minimum wage, so of 
course they prefer this job in relation to other jobs they could get. “There 
isn’t any other job where I can make this kind of money” said Yeison. Some 
street businesses were successful and people could make more than minimal 
wage. Many felt proud of being able to succeed on their own and regarded 
dependent job as exploitative.  
Many of the vendors and rickshaw drivers I met were striving to improve 
their lives. Considering the choices available to them, based on their socio-
economic and personal circumstances, street vending or rickshaw driving was 
the best option for many. Many were in search of a better life and aspired to 
get a better job, to buy a rickshaw or to own a store. However, they did not 
only value economic income. They also valued independence and freedom in 
their work. 
I Can Work and Take Care of my Kids 
Many women and men appreciate the opportunity to have flexible working 
hours in order to combine work with household demands. Particularly 
women with small children like the flexibility of street businesses, which 
allow them to work and take care of their kids at the same time. This was the 
case for Maria Angelica, one of the two female rickshaw drivers working at 
Portal de las Americas. It is rare to see women driving rickshaws in the city, 
and in general, this is considered to be a man’s job. However, Maria Angelica 
liked the flexibility of her work and the fact that she could work in the 
mornings and stay home in the evenings with her kids. The following excerpt 
illustrates how she managed her days. 
I asked Maria Angelica about her work. She started to work as a rickshaw 
driver a year ago. At first, she had sent her CV to different places around the 
neighborhood, but the only job she could get was in a chicken grill restaurant. 
She said she couldn’t take it because the working hours weren’t good for her. 
218 
They needed someone in the evenings, and she couldn’t leave her sons alone. 
She complained that the salaries in restaurants were bad, and they didn’t pay 
for extra hours or holidays. “I knew Jose from one of the rickshaws 
associations, and he offered me the opportunity to drive one of his rickshaws”, 
she said. She also commented that she likes her job, because she works for 
herself and she can take care of her sons. Maria Angelica said she makes 
about 35,000 pesos a day (15 USD). It isn’t much, but she manages to survive. 
If she needs more money, for instance, to buy clothes for her children, she has 
to work in the evenings, and her ten-year-old son has to take care of his 
brother.  
Maria Angelica starts working at 4:30 in the morning and works until 6 a.m. 
Then she goes home and helps her sons get ready for school. Her oldest son 
starts school at seven, and the youngest one goes to a community day-care. 
She goes back to work around 7:30 a.m., and she stays until 11:30 a.m., and 
then she has to go back and pick up her oldest son from school. She takes him 
to a foundation called Salesiana [a religious NGO] where he gets lunch and 
help with his homework. She goes back to work until 3 p.m. in the afternoon. 
Then she picks up her four year old son and his brother at the day-care center. 
After that, they stay home, make dinner, watch some TV, and go to bed. (field 
notes based on an informal conversation from June 20, 2013) 
While Maria Angelica’s schedule was busy, she was proud that she could 
escape the constraints of being a single mother and manage to provide for her 
children. Many women working as street vendors also appreciated the 
flexible hours of their work, and some of them brought their kids with them 
to work.  
While there is a positive aspect to the possibility of combining paid work 
with caring for their children, informal work does not resolve work-family 
imbalance issues (de Casanova 2011). Thus, the decision to work as vendors 
or rickshaw drivers that many women make can be related to a culture where 
women have to bear the responsibility of providing care. It also relates to a 
welfare state problem which concerns how society divides the cost of care. 
The struggle for many women to find a livelihood in street businesses must 
be seen within the broader context of society’s gender roles and welfare 
policies.  
Many women working as street vendors, and the few that work as rickshaw 
drivers, expressed that they would not want another job. They valued their 
independence and their ability to provide food and care for their children. But 
what jobs are available to these women? Most of the time, women working as 
street vendors compared their situation to subordinate work such as cleaners, 
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maids, restaurant workers or shop clerks. Thus, their choice of employment 
as street vendors was not only constrained by their family responsibilities but 
also by the poorly paid jobs available to them and their low levels of 
education. 
Research shows that having affordable day care is essential for women with 
children in order to enter the labor market (Han and Waldfogel 2001; Loft 
and Hogan 2014). However, the opportunities for state provided day care are 
very limited in many countries such as Colombia. Nevertheless, many 
women find that work in the informal economy presents an opportunity to 
earn money while taking care of their children.  
I Don’t Like Working for Other People: In Search of Independence 
Many of the people I met insisted that working in the streets was better than 
working for someone else. To not depend on another person for your salary 
gave many a feeling of being in control of their economic situation. The 
following excerpt illustrates how many people felt that dependent jobs were 
more insecure than the work they had.  
Yeison explained that being a rickshaw driver was better than being under the 
control of a boss, because when working for someone else you often have to 
beg that person to pay your salary. You also can get fired anytime. There is 
always this uncertainty (incertidumbre). “Here I know I work hard, and I get 
my money”, said Yeison. For Yeison, incertidumbre had been the rule as an 
employee for as far as he could remember. He used to work in construction 
where he earned a weekly wage, but his boss was often late paying his wages, 
or did not pay him at all. Yeison could not complain because he feared he 
could lose his job. (Field notes based on an interviews from June 22
nd
 2013). 
Street vendors and rickshaw drivers often value the ability to work 
independently rather than for an employer that could mistreat or exploit them. 
They often compared their independence in the street to the subordination 
they have experienced in other jobs. Like Yeison, many reported not being 
paid for overtime or receiving social security, or sometimes not getting paid 
at all by employers that did not care to comply with the law. People working 
in street businesses were aware that the legal system did not work in their 
favor. Failure to comply with labor laws was rather the rule in most of the 
jobs available to them. The following excerpt illustrates how dependent jobs 
often lack of social security.  
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Soledad, who sold ice cream near the Santa Fé mall, laughed when I asked if 
she would leave her business if she could get a job with health insurance, 
social security and paid holidays. She replied that she had never had a job like 
that. She told me that when she worked as a cook in a restaurant she had once 
burned herself, and the employer had discounted the hours she had spent at 
the hospital from her monthly check. “That man was so cheap”, said Soledad. 
(Field note based on observations and a short interview from January 7
th
, 
2014).  
You couldn’t count on social protection even in jobs off the streets. Instead, 
people have to take care of themselves, regardless of the job they have. There 
was also discrimination based on different prejudices. Fredy, one of the 
vendors I met, explained that even as a cleaner or construction worker you 
needed someone that could recommend you, and for Fredy that was 
impossible. Additionally, when people found out that he was internally 
displaced, they immediately distrusted him and thought he could be involved 
with armed groups. Fredy did not have time to wait around for a job, he 
needed to start working right away in order to survive. 
When I met Fredy, he was walking around with his wife and daughter, and 
they were selling chontaduro (peach palm). He had a friend from Tumaco 
who sold chontaduro in the largest wholesale food market in the city, 
Corabastos. This friend had helped Fredy to get chontaduro on loan, and that 
is how he had started to work in the streets. Fredy said he likes his work here, 
because he doesn’t like to work for other people. He believes that people 
always want to take advantage of you, and you never know if they will pay 
you or not. He told me that when he first arrived in the city, he had tried to get 
help from the government, but couldn’t get any. He had tried to get a job, but 
he got tired of receiving nasty looks. “People thought I was going to rob them 
or something”, said Fredy. “I don’t want to work for anyone”, he said. “Look 
at me, I’m good at selling my stuff here, I just don’t like to depend on others 
for my needs.” I asked him how much he usually made and he estimated that 
on a good day, he could make 70,000 pesos (30 US dollars), and half of that 
would be profit. (field note based on observations and a short interview from 
January 22
th
, 2014).  
In Fredy’s case, he was unsure whether people in Bogotá mistrusted him 
because he was internally displaced. But he felt people looked down on him. 
Adriana who sold tinto near Portal del Norte preferred to work for herself 
than to work cleaning houses. The following excerpt from a conversation 
with her illustrates this point.  
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Today I talked to Adriana. She was watching her husband’s cart while he was 
selling on the buses. In the mornings Adriana sold tinto [coffee] to people 
waiting at the bus stop. She had to be at the bus stop at five in the morning 
and usually stayed until nine. She said she could make about 20,000 pesos (9 
USD). Adriana said it was better than cleaning houses. “When I cleaned 
houses I worked all day and only got 30,000 pesos (13 USD)”, she said. She 
preferred to earn less, but have more time for her family. (field note based on 
observations and a short interview from January 25
th
 2014) 
Violations of basic labor laws are common in Colombia and often the people 
I met in the streets feel helpless about their possibilities to claim their rights. 
Fear of losing your job if you ask your employer to uphold labor laws, lack of 
labor unions to protect workers’ rights and a slow and inaccessible justice 
system are circumstances that could play a role in people’s decisions to prefer 
to be self-employed. These findings are in line with the description of the 
legal culture of Colombia known as “un-rule of law” or more precisely as 
“the inefficacy of the law.” In Kalmanovitz’s terms (2002), it is a legal 
system in which many times rights are legislated but not enforced.  
No matter how much the government insists on the need for people to find 
“formal” jobs, people are aware that this is no guarantee that they will be able 
to improve their general well-being, their working conditions or receive 
social security. On the contrary, being dependent on a job could in some 
cases mean being more vulnerable, because you might not be paid on time or 
could lose your job at any moment. While “formal jobs” does not mean 
”better jobs” in the context of Colombia, many wish that they could improve 
their working conditions, and hope their children might get an education and 
have a better life. However, since food doesn’t fall from the sky, people that 
are busy trying to survive could not afford to wait for that “better job” to 
arrive. 
Hardship in the Streets  
People working in street businesses are not only exposed to police 
harassment but also violence from their peers and from other powerful actors 
in the street. The rule of the survival of the fittest often applies to street 
vendors and rickshaw drivers. During my fieldwork, I often observed the 
constant competition to get the best spot and make more money than each 
other. Thus, the freedom that people value was in many cases a superficial 
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freedom. Nussbaum criticizes Sen for not specifying which freedoms he 
refers to. Instead, she takes a normative approach to social justice and makes 
a list of basic capabilities that are minimal requirements for a human being to 
lead a life of dignity. In this list, one of the central capabilities that are 
conducive to freedom and social justice is “Not having one’s emotional 
development blighted by fear and anxiety” (Nussbaum 2003, 41). From my 
fieldwork, I could see that one of the problems with a lack of state 
recognition of street vendors is that they are exposed to high levels of anxiety 
and fear.  
Co-existence in the streets is often the most difficult part of this job, since 
rivalry and envy are often present. There is a feeling that you should not trust 
anyone, that people only care about themselves and that you have to watch 
your back all the time. Additionally, if the place where you work is under the 
control of a family or a powerful group you may have to pay them to get their 
protection. You may also have to work under the threat of violence if you do 
not follow their rules. This kind of peer conflicts and group violence was 
often mentioned as a challenging aspect of the work in the streets.  
Most studies that address the role of informal control mechanisms for people 
in the informal economy focus on the positive aspects of social capital 
(Roberts 1994). For instance, some studies show how social organizations 
offer a regulatory framework parallel to state regulation, allowing street 
businesses to resist formal control (Peña 2000; Chen et al. 2007; Steel 2012; 
Milgram 2011). However, there is a need of knowledge on how informal 
control is experienced by the members of the associations, the problems 
experienced by outsiders, and how informal control is also resisted and 
contested (Portes and Landolt 2000). There is a predominant view about the 
positive aspects of social capital that fail to recognize that the associations of 
poor people are vulnerable to political capture, opportunistic leaders, and 
mafias (Wells and Jason 2010). 
Being on your Own: Envy Among Street Businesses 
“In the streets, people don’t really help each other and you’re on your own.” 
These were the words Adriana used to describe her work. She believed you 
couldn’t trust anyone in the streets, because people only cared about 
themselves and whether they could sell more than you.  
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Adriana said her dream is to open a store one day. “I want to find a place 
where I can sell things without being insulted by others, without exposing my 
life, without being afraid of someone coming and hurting me one day”, she 
said. According to her, working in the streets was tough, because there was a 
lot of envy. (field note based on observations and a short interview from 
January 25
th
 2014)  
While there was also solidarity, at the end of the day, many felt they were on 
their own. More examples of how their peers and their associations affected 
their lives can be found in the previous chapters.  
Health and Pension Insurance 
Many people working in street businesses were busy with their daily lives, 
and they often looked at me with astonishment when I asked them about their 
thoughts on health or pension insurances. While most reported being 
registered for national health insurance, many avoided hospitals or doctor’s 
visits due to the time and effort needed to get an appointment. In the streets 
there was no time to get sick or to have a bad day, because the needs waiting 
at home could not wait. I met Luz Maria in 2012, near the vending zone of 
Santa Librada. The first time I met her, we did not talk about her work; 
instead, we sat for more than an hour talking about the problems the family 
was currently experiencing due to her daughter having passed away. “I just 
have a hard time letting go, she was so young”, said Luz Maria, and burst 
into tears. The following excerpt is from our conversation.  
Luz Marina’s daughter had recently passed away. She was only 17 years old, 
and she had been four months pregnant when she got sick. She was a happy, 
strong girl, who always helped Luz Marina at home to take care of her 
brothers and sisters. She had wanted to start working in a store or in a 
supermarket, but she had got pregnant and then she couldn’t get any jobs. Her 
mother hadn’t been able to go with her to the hospital on the morning that she 
had a stomachache, because she had to go to work. “Perhaps if I could have 
gone with her she would still be alive”, said Luz Marina. She had asked for 
help at the hospital, but no one had really paid any attention to her. They sent 
her home with some painkillers and said everything was normal. Luz Marina 
had to return with her two days later, because she hadn’t been able to move 
due to the pain. Finally, a doctor had checked her after she had started to fight 
with the nurses. But it was too late. They took her inside and more than eight 
hours later they took her to surgery. They said she was thoroughly infected. 
But the doctors said there was nothing they could do. Her daughter died, just 
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like that, and the baby died too. “I know I have to continue working because I 
have my other children and they need me, but she was my girl”, said Luz 
Marina.  
Luz Maria stood up to sell a fruit salad while she dried away her tears. Luz 
Maria received subsidized health insurance from the government, but 
according to her, it did not help much. She wanted to complain to someone 
about the bad treatment her daughter had received at the hospital, but she did 
not have the time to send a letter that probably no one would bother to read 
anyway. While still recovering from her loss, she had to work extra hours to 
pay off the debt for the funeral. (field notes based on an interview from 
August 10
th
 2012). 
Often, vendors were busy trying to sell products or trying to collect enough 
money to pay their bills. While some appreciated the flexibility of their jobs 
they could not afford to stay home when sick, because they were forced to 
keep working to put bread on the table. While most of the street vendors I 
met had the government subsidized insurance, they often complained about 
the low quality of the services provided. 
Pedaling Until I Break My Knees  
Working in the streets requires good health and being in good physical shape. 
While the working hours are flexible, those who want to make good money 
need to work hard. In the streets, people are also exposed to bad weather 
conditions and have to walk around carrying heavy loads. The working 
conditions in the streets are also not the best when it comes to sanitation: 
there are no public toilets or running water, and many said that they do not 
drink water during the day to avoid having to relieve themselves. The 
following excerpt is from a conversation with Ignacio, one of the rickshaw 
drivers at Portal de las Americas. 
Ignacio said he is trying to look for another job due to a knee problem which 
made pedaling the rickshaw painful. According to him, in this line of work, 
you can make some money but after a while your knees start hurting. Lots of 
drivers go to the drug store and get a shot to relax the muscles. (field notes 
based on informal conversations from June 12, 2013). 
Lots of drivers here suffer from knee problems because they pedal all day. 
They knew they could probably not work their entire lives as rickshaw 
drivers because the pedaling was too hard. Street vendors also complained 
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about the conditions of their work. They commented on being exposed to the 
sun and rain, and of long hours standing up.  
The Profits Are Too Low 
There is also a great deal of economic uncertainty involved in working on 
your own, and people are often stressed about not knowing whether they will 
collect enough money to pay for rent or to be able to pay back a debt. While 
the streets are often open for anyone to come and try to start a business, not 
everyone is able to survive. Because of unemployment and large rural urban 
migration, more and more people arrive on the streets to try to establish a 
small business. Yet, there is not much innovation, and instead you find 
people trying to sell the same products everywhere. The situation is the same 
for people working as rickshaw drivers, and due to the increased number of 
drivers, there are often fights over passengers and routes. Some complained 
about the country’s economic stagnation. Others complained about debts, 
high rent, the cost of food, and the various needs they have. Diego, one of the 
vendors near Portal de las Americas, complained about slow business days. 
He complained that the profits he received were too small, and most of the 
money went to the company that provided the ice cream.  
Diego sells ice cream from the Crem Helado company. He walks around 
pushing his tilin cart. I met him on a rainy afternoon when we were waiting 
for the rain to stop under the pedestrian bridge. I asked him about how his 
business works. He said that they get the ice cream and the pushcart at the 
agency in Porvenir. The woman at the agency is in charge of twenty vendors 
like him, but Diego complained that she kept bringing more vendors to the 
neighborhood, so it was getting hard for him to sell his products. Indeed, there 
were at least four more ice cream vendors outside Portal. With all that 
competition, Diego felt that it was getting too hard to make any money. For 
each ice cream he sold, he received a percentage of the price. Most of the time 
people bought the cheapest ice cream, and then he only mades 150 pesos 
profit (6 cents USD). The most expensive ice cream gave him a profit of 200 
pesos (8 cents USD). “Think about how much ice cream I have to sell to make 
minimum wage”, Diego complained. (field notes based on informal 
conversations from June 27
th
 2013). 
Economic hardship is one of the things that vendors complained about. They 
depend on their sales in order to survive, and they don’t have a cushion to fall 
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back on a bad day. When you work in the streets you are on your own, and if 
you don’t sell you won’t bring home any money.  
Hardship in the Streets 
Street vendors have to be tough and endure the threat of police harassment, 
harsh working conditions, and economic competition. They need to have 
access to a good spot which means fighting against competitors and 
individuals or groups that control the street. Additionally, most of their 
businesses require extensive working hours. There is a feeling of being in a 
tough situation without a safety net to crash on if needed.  
Among the groups of street vendors that experience tougher working 
conditions are those that are newly arrived. They often lack contacts or 
networks and therefore experience tougher forms of control. Most state 
programs for street vendors are directed at people already working in the 
streets. They do not account for the fact that new vendors enter the streets 
every day. People may lose their jobs, migrate to the city, drop out of school, 
lack access to higher education, become single parents or widows at any 
time. Without a state or family safety net to fall back on, street businesses are 
the only option for many. In this sense, researchers studying the role of 
informal economy in the context of low income countries argue that 
governments need to consider the role of these economic activities for the 
economic survival of the poor (Bromley 2000). Furthermore, formalization 
programs should not only be targeted only at those who have spent many 
years working in the streets; newly arrived immigrants are a vulnerable group 
and need the protection and not the exclusion of the state.  
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 11. Final Discussion and 
Conclusion 
In Bogotá, as in many other cities in the world, state-driven formalization of 
street vendors has been one of the main policies employed by the government 
to regulate their work. However, as I have shown, formalization programs 
only cover a small number of vendors. The majority still work outside the 
law. Thus, the main question guiding my research is: How does formalization 
of street vendors in Bogotá enable and/or hinder their well-being? To answer 
this question, I will first reflect on how street vendors themselves describe 
their own well-being.  
Well-Being as Freedom 
International organizations, such as the United Nations, promote 
formalization as a tool to empower and improve the lives of informal workers 
(CLEP 2008a; Banik 2009, Banik 2011). However, it is not always clear 
whose definition of life improvements and well-being is guiding 
formalization policies, and some authors argue that the formalization of 
informal workers can become a tool of control and not of empowerment 
(Faundez 2009). Thus, one of the ambitions of my research is to inquire into 
how street vendors themselves describe their own well-being, and thereby fill 
this knowledge gap. Accordingly, my first sub-question asks, how do street 
vendors themselves describe their own well-being? In Chapter Ten of this 
thesis, I provide detailed descriptions of the ideas and notions street vendors 
express about their work that have implications for their well-being. In this 
section, however, I discuss their personal descriptions of what well-being 
implies at a more abstract level. 
I argue here that working in street businesses provides, in some cases, 
freedom from starvation, from exploitative work and flexible working hours. 
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In this context, well-being could be defined as having work where the 
earnings are enough to provide for one’s needs, where it is possible to 
combine work and taking care of the children, and where one does not feel 
exploited or abused. When analysing street vendors ways of defining well-
being, it is possible see that well-being is more complex than the satisfaction 
of economic needs. Their definitions are in line with Sen’s argument about 
the need to appreciate agency and freedom when defining well-being (1999). 
Their stories highlight the constant struggle of street vendors to improve their 
lives, in their own terms. While they put an important value on autonomy and 
freedom, in many cases this freedom was an illusion, and to be able to meet 
their needs they often had to work long hours and endure harsh working 
conditions. They also experienced police harassment and worked in constant 
fear. 
Street vendors and rickshaw drivers are constrained in their choices due to 
broader conditions of a labor market, social and economic structures, political 
powers, and the social policies of the welfare state. They are also constrained 
by their low levels of education and lack of technical skills. Additionally, 
women are constrained due to a lack of access to children’s daycare, and the 
unequal distribution of family work.  
Well-Being Seen as Freedom from Starvation 
The street vendors I met regard their work as an honest livelihood, despite the 
legal prohibitions that exist. They often used phrases such as, “We 
Colombians don’t have to starve, because we can always start a business on a 
street corner” to illustrate the role street vending plays in economic survival 
in Colombia. Their choices of earning a living are very limited, and they take 
the risks that working in the streets entail in order to be able to provide for 
their families.  
Considering that there are not many formal job opportunities for people with 
low levels of education or the elderly, street vending creates an opportunity to 
generate an income without engaging in illegal activities such as drug dealing 
or gang crime. In many cases, street vending fulfils the function of a safety 
net (Bromley 2000, 5). Consequently, I argue that freedom from starvation is 
one of the main aspects of street vendors’ well-being. 
229 
Since street vending can prevent starvation, many street vendors argue that 
the streets belong to everyone and that they have a right to work there.
50
 
However, there is a conflict of norms between the right to work and the 
collective right to public space. According to Hydén, in large-scale industrial 
societies, conflicts of norms are solved through the hierarchical principle, 
where norms at a higher level prevail (Hydén 2011, 141). However, in this 
case, both rights are constitutional rights: The right to work (and to lead a 
dignified life) and the collective right to enjoy public space.  
The decisions of the Constitutional Court presented in Chapter Four illustrate 
how this court has interpreted this conflict of rights to give priority to 
collective rights over individual rights. Thus, in various decisions, the court 
states that evictions are allowed because the right to public space is 
collective.
51
 However, the court has made an exception for street vendors that 
have occupied public space for a long time, arguing that in those cases, the 
government must provide alternative jobs or re-locations prior to evictions.
52
 
From a norms perspective, the court has supported the acreditar norm (see 
Chapter Five) by creating the right to re-location via the court precedent for 
those vendors that have occupied certain spaces for a long period of time. 
  
                                                     
50 The right to work in the streets can be interpreted in line with Lefebvre’s right to the city 
(Harvey 2013). Using a Marxist critical theory approach, Harvey employs Lefebvre’s 
concept of the ‘right to the city’ to illustrate the struggle of vulnerable and oppressed 
people to participate in the definition of urban life (ibid. xii). As I see it, in my research, the 
right to the city can be the right of pedestrians to enjoy the sidewalks, the right of urban 
developers to build malls and/or the right of street vendors to earn a livelihood in public 
spaces. As Harvey says the right to the city is an empty signifier and the struggle that we 
experience in today´s world is to determine who has the power to determine this right (ibid. 
xvi).  
51 ”On several occasions, the Constitutional Court, when considering cases of street vendors, 
has explained the conflict that arises between the general interest involving the recovery of 
public space, and the fundamental right to work, by citizens who in some manner use it for 
commercial purposes aimed at making a livelihood. Indeed, the Court has expressed that 
the recovery of public space is one of the State’s obligations, and for that reason can not be 
hampered by special interests, given that the general interest prevails over the individual 
interest” (T-778-98). Translation from Spanish made by the Author.  
52 First the Court argues that the right to re-location only covers those who have an old license 
or a permit by the government (T-225/92). Then, in 1996, the Court changed the precedent 
and argued that re-locations should also cover vendors that have occupied a public spot for 
a long time (T-438-96). 
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The previous argument prevailed within jurisprudence until 2003. In 
Decision T-772 of 2003, the court changed precedent and argued that re-
locations should also cover vendors living in poverty, based on their 
constitutional right to work and to earn a livelihood. While the leaders of the 
street vendors often referred to this decision (T-772-03) to argue for their 
right to work and to receive support from the government, some writers 
explain that the law and court decisions often work ineffectively in Colombia 
(Uprimny 2006). Thus, even when some street vendors are able to bring a 
case before court, often it is not enough to have a favorable legal decision. As 
Uprimny claims, the common inefficacy of Colombian law means that it is 
often necessary to start a second action to enforce the court’s decision 
(Uprimny 2006). The local government sometimes ignores the court, which 
means that the real power to decide on the vendors’ right of survival lies in 
the hands of the local decision-makers (such as the mayors of the different 
boroughs and the city mayor of Bogotá). Therefore, depending on the 
political and personal views of the mayors, street vendors face different and 
changing levels of control. 
But are all street businesses a survival activity for the poor? The second 
argument I will explore is that people working in street businesses are not 
only trying to survive, but are also striving to improve their lives. 
The Value of Independency and Flexibility for Well-Being 
Street vendors also strive to improve their lives. Although they have limited 
options, they are generally not content with them and often make 
arrangements to improve them. Considering their socio-economic and 
personal circumstances and given the choices available to them, street 
vending or rickshaw driving was the best choice for many. Many of them are 
constantly in search of a better life and aspire to get a better job, to buy a 
rickshaw or to own a store. People also compare their work in the streets with 
“subordinate work” and weigh the benefits and costs of their choice. 
However, they do not only value economic income. Instead, two aspects 
appear to play a role in their search for better lives: one is the value of 
independence and the other, particularly for women, is the possibility to 
combine work with taking care of their children. 
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The Role of Independence for Well-Being 
The notion of independence and the more general concept of freedom became 
relevant ones after I had heard people’s own descriptions of their well-being. 
The stories of rickshaw drivers and vendors illustrate that in many cases they 
place a high value in their independence at work. The value of independence 
was expressed in terms such as “I don’t like working for other people”, 
“They think they can treat you any way they want in other jobs”, “I can make 
my own money”, “I do my job and no one tells me what to do”, “I can earn 
money from my first day here, and I don’t have to wait for my boss to pay 
me”, and more. The value that street vendors place in their independence 
highlights the aspect of their individual agency in their efforts to make a 
living. They describe well-being as being more than economic survival and 
economic improvements. 
People working in the streets, like many of us, not only value the money they 
earn, but also the ability to pursue a job that is fulfilling. This finding 
supports Sen’s argument concerning the importance of freedom and agency 
for people’s well-being (Sen 1999). Even though street vendors and rickshaw 
drivers are extremely constrained due to their low educational levels and 
socio-economic conditions, they strive to pursue lives that they value. A 
common argument in favor of formalization presumes that access to credit for 
investments allows street vendors to improve their businesses (De Soto 
1989). Yet, I show that well-being concerns more aspects than economic 
improvements. It also concerns having a job that is fulfilling and where one 
can experience basic autonomy, freedom and the independence to make one’s 
own decisions. 
Working and Taking Care of the Children 
Having flexible working hours and the possibility to combine work and 
childcare is a relevant aspect of well-being. Many of the women I met 
expressed that they would not take any other job, because as street vendors 
they could provide food and care for their children. A gender approach is 
necessary to show that well-being not only concerns the possibility to earn an 
income, but also their family needs. 
Based in the data I present, it is possible to argue that many street vendors 
value their ability to combine work with family life. However, I argue that 
the decision many women make to work as vendors is related to a societal 
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structure of inequality between male and female roles regarding childcare and 
house chores. Thus, the fact that many women search and find a livelihood in 
street businesses must be seen within the broader context of society’s gender 
roles and welfare policies. In this sense, my research supports the argument 
that informal work does not resolve work-family imbalance issues in society 
and must be examined within the context of larger social structures (de 
Casanova 2011). 
This way of describing well-being has implications for policies that aim to 
provide alternative jobs for street vendors and rickshaw drivers, or that want 
to formalize their businesses. There is a belief that people living on the edge 
of survival should take any job that pays better than the work they already 
have. However, people working in the streets do not only consider economic 
gains, but, like many of us, they also value the independence and flexibility 
of self-employment.  
In conclusion, I argue that well-being means the possibility to earn an income 
when one is in need, to enjoy basic independence at work, and to have the 
flexibility to combine work and childcare. Nevertheless, in many cases this 
independence and flexibility is an illusion, and to be able to meet their needs, 
street vendors and rickshaw drivers often have to work long hours, are 
unprotected from many risks, lack basic social security and experience police 
harassment. These are some of the aspects that hinder their well-being.  
Uncertainty and Fear Hinder Well-Being  
The people I met frequently mentioned experiencing anxiety due to the 
uncertain terms of their work. They also live in fear, because they are 
exposed to police evictions and other kinds of insecurity. I argue that they 
work in conditions of uncertainty and fear, because they experience multiple, 
complex and plural forms of control.  
Street vendors experience anxiety and stress in part because their access to 
good selling spots is uncertain, they do not know if someone may have taken 
their spot, organized groups require them to pay money and the police could 
take away their livelihoods at any time. Thus, the study of their well-being 
connects with the role of the law and other forms of social control at the 
street level. In this sense, living without fear relates to Martha Nussbaum’s 
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list of capabilities and her argument that living without fear and freedom of 
movement are essential for human beings (2001).  
In conclusion, street vendors’ well-being arguably includes four main 
aspects: the ability to make a living, having some independence, the 
flexibility to combine work and family, and working without uncertainty and 
fear.  
Social Control Pluralism 
With my point of departure in how street vendors describe their own well-
being, the second question that I want to answer is, how do street vendors 
experience law and other forms of social control in their everyday work life? 
Although street vendors work outside the law, they do not operate in a state 
of chaos or anarchy. Quite the opposite, different practices of social control 
are present in their work. Before examining the relations between social 
control and well-being, I will first discuss the plural forms of social control 
that are present in street vendors’ and rickshaw drivers’ work. 
Street vendors often experience both state control (legal control), as well as 
more informal control. I group the findings into themes, including informal 
controls, based on the acreditar norm, the organizational control of the 
associations of rickshaw drivers, the control of big ice cream companies, 
everyday police control, and a hybrid system of formalization in the vending 
zones. While each of these themes of social control emerged from the data I 
collected, they relate to Ellickson typology of systems of social control 
(1991, 131) introduced in Chapter two. 
However, following Hydén’s argument, in some cases two conflicting norms 
can regulate the same conduct (2011, 141). In Chapters Five to Nine, I 
provide multiple examples of conflicts of norms, as well as cooperation 
among controllers to enforce common norms. One example of this kind of 
cooperation is when the police recognize the acreditar norm and allow old 
vendors to remain while evicting new vendors. This illustrates that conflicts 
of norms can result in hybrid systems of social control, where one controller 
enforces the norm typical of another controller (Ellickson 1991, 254). 
Another example of hybrid systems of social control are when rickshaw 
associations combine the hierarchical control of the coordinator with informal 
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control by the drivers to exclude pirate drivers. In addition, the case of the 
transitional vending zones also illustrates a hybrid system of control, 
although this time directly created by the government. In Chapter Nine I 
show that the government signed agreements with the vendor associations for 
the transitional zones that thereby decentralized everyday regulation of the 
zones to these associations. The government provided some basic rules, such 
as not selling piracy goods, but the enforcement of these rules was handed 
over to the associations. Thus, I argue that the combination of bureaucratic 
control and the associations’ control in these cases is an example of how the 
law can employ informal control (Ellickson 1991, 284).  
Another example of how systems of social control interact is the belief 
common among vendors that in cases of conflict one should avoid calling the 
police. Street vendors know that police officers could evict everyone. Hence, 
many vendors avoid the use of physical violence as a means to enforce the 
acreditar norm. The presence of police control affects the way informal 
control operates, meaning that people refrain from physical violence to avoid 
getting into trouble with the police. While some vendors who enforce the 
acreditar norm might otherwise be willing to use violence to expel new 
vendors, they know that this could attract the attention of the police. 
Therefore, they usually fall back on merely issuing threats of violence. Still, 
this creates a sense of fear among the vendors who refuse to leave.  
The study of informal control also provides an argument against legal 
peripherialism, understood as the dismissal of the legal system as totally 
uninfluential (Ellickson 1987, 91). While the study of plural forms of social 
control illustrates the complexity involved in the regulation of everyday life, 
the law is not toothless in the sense that the police do indeed intervene when 
called upon by the government or by the owners of off-street businesses. 
However, police control as experienced by the vendors often varies in degree, 
time and space, with regards to, for instance, the frequency and severity of 
the evictions and confiscations. Donald Black explanations of how social 
control varies in relation to different aspects could be explore in further 
research on street vendors (1984a).  
In conclusion, I show the complexity and the plural forms of social control 
involved in the regulation of everyday street vending. This finding is in line 
with Griffiths’ argument that “the expression ‘legal pluralism’ can and should 
be conceptualized as ‘normative pluralism’ or ‘pluralism in social control’” 
(2006, 65). Through the study of everyday acts of social control, I provide 
empirical insights into the everyday operations of the law and other forms of 
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social control in society, and provide support to Griffith’s argument that the 
object of study in sociology of law should be ‘pluralism in social control’ 
rather than law (Griffiths 2006, 65).  
Social Control Matters for Street Vendors’ Well-
Being 
Showing the plural forms of social control, as experienced by streets vendors, 
adds to knowledge of the complexity of how law operates in everyday life. 
My aim was to connect the study of social control to the street vendors’ own 
descriptions of their well-being. Consequently, the third sub-question guiding 
my research is: Based on the street vendors’ own descriptions of their well-
being, how does law and other forms of social control enable and/or hinder 
their well-being? To answer this question, I will now discuss the forms of 
social control that I presented in Chapters Five to Nine. 
Acreditar: Cooperation or Exclusion 
Street vendors cooperate to define access to space in the streets. They call 
this process acreditar. It means that vendors that work in the same spot each 
day may ask newcomers to move along and to respect the places they have 
accredited in the streets. Acreditar illustrates a form of decentralized and 
spontaneous control (informal control). Street vendors regularly punish 
newcomers who occupy their spots with verbal aggression, gossip, and the 
threat of violence. 
While some vendors move around from place to place, many vendors prefer 
to find a spot that is good for business and remain there. From the perspective 
of individual well-being, the acreditar norm reduces the uncertainty of 
having to re-establish the informal right to a spot on a daily basis. It allows 
street vendors to work knowing that they have a somewhat secure spot. It 
also allows them to develop a customer base. In a sense, the acreditar norm 
is an example of order outside the law, based on informal and decentralized 
social control. A person with an interest in working as a street vendor needs 
to gain the trust of the other street vendors to achieve a good co-existence at 
work, and therefore, new vendors often move to “empty spots” and respect 
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the acreditar norm, hoping to benefit from this norm themselves once they 
are more established. 
A different way of explaining the acreditar norm would be in terms of 
exclusion of newcomers. The acreditar norm also means that experienced 
vendors obtain certain privileges over time. Newcomers often experience 
exclusion, mistreatment and a violation of what they claim is their right to 
earn a livelihood. During my fieldwork, I often heard street vendors using 
phrases such as, “No one owns the streets”, or “We are all needy” to 
complain about those who claimed “acreditar.” Indeed, some vendors openly 
violated the acreditar norm and refused to leave after a warning. This brings 
me to the issue of resistance to social control, and how social norms that arise 
over time enable some groups to improve their well-being, while hindering 
the well-being of outsiders such as new vendors. 
In this regard, Portes and Landolt (2000) claim that social capital often 
develops at the expense of outsiders. Regarding the protection of outsiders, 
Ellickson states that “there is no reason for thinking that a group’s norm-
making process will give weight to the interests of those outside the group” 
(Ellickson 1991, 284). In those cases, where the interests of those outside the 
group are ignored or even violated, Ellickson argues that law should play a 
more active role. However, falling back on the law is not seen as an 
alternative for the street vendors, because the law simply does not recognize 
their work. Instead, the police often evict street vendors that complain about 
abuse from accredited vendors. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of law, street vendors use other forms of 
resistance to informal control. They often use practices of quiet encroachment 
to access space in the streets, in violation of the acreditar norm. Bayat 
defines quiet encroachment as “a silent, patient, protracted, and pervasive 
advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in order to 
survive hardship and better their lives” (1997, 57). The study of resistance 
among newcomers illustrates a form of quiet encroachment that allows them 
to access busy spots. However, even though it is possible to resist the 
acreditar norm, newcomers are often sanctioned through verbal abuse, 
threats of violence and poor coexistence for violating this norm. 
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Rickshaw Associations: Organizational Control or Mafia Control? 
The example of the rickshaw associations illustrates a more organized form 
of social control than the one among the street vendors. These associations 
have clear rules and a specialized enforcer, the coordinator, who is in charge 
of overseeing the drivers’ work, controlling the routes, and making sure that 
pirate drivers (newcomers) are sanctioned when they violate the associations’ 
monopoly of the routes. In their original form, the associations were 
established by a group of drivers in order to cooperate and improve their 
well-being. By establishing a route, a group of drivers can increase their 
number of customers, avoid unnecessary time and energy consuming 
pedaling, establish a common price and reduce competition. It allows them to 
work in less uncertain conditions since they now have a fixed work place, 
they can make a stable income and control that pirates do not use their routes. 
This is another case of order outside the law. 
However, the associations also impose obligations on the drivers, who in turn 
sometimes complain about the high costs of belonging to the associations. 
Moreover, the association system of control is based on the threat of violence 
or actual use of violence to exclude newcomers (pirates) from the established 
routes. For this reason, the government sometimes claims that the rickshaw 
associations are similar to a mafia structure, and justify police action against 
the rickshaw drivers on that basis. However, how do we determine whether a 
social organization is a mafia? This is relevant, because mafia systems are not 
desirable, since they perpetuate exploitation and undermine the state.  
According to a study of street vendors in Mexico City, in most cases the 
vendor associations there help vendors reduce risk and uncertainties in a 
normless market and provide an important service to the vendors (Peña 
2000). In his study of the organizations that regulate street vendors in the 
metro of Mexico City, Peña found similarities to mafias in the sense that 
some individuals collect rents from the vendors and use the threat of violence 
to enforce their norm (2000). He found that the vendors’ situation in the 
metro is similar to that of drug dealers in New York, and that the difference is 
of degree and not of kind. Peña argues that, unlike drug dealing, we should 
not see them as mafia based only on the fact that vendor and rickshaw 
organizations collect smaller fees and use the threat of lesser forms of 
violence to deter outsiders (Ibid.) 
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Rickshaw drivers sometimes consider the fees collected by associations 
abusive and exploitative. For some drivers that want to become rickshaw 
owners, the price of the cupo is too high, considering that it costs almost as 
much as the rickshaw itself. Sometimes, the rental fees are considered 
excessive, while other times the drivers consider the rental fee to be fair, 
since they can earn enough to pay the rent and still keep more than 
Colombian minimum wage. 
Nevertheless, from a government perspective, having individuals collecting 
money from others to access public space is problematic. Ignoring it means to 
indirectly accept it, which creates an incentive for others to do the same. 
This, in the long term, leads to an undermining of the role of the state. Yet, 
from the perspective of legal control, a government trying to eradicate mafia 
systems of control should differentiate between legitimate associations of 
vendors and authoritarian and exploitative groups, and focus efforts on the 
latter group. Peña (2000) explains that in Mexico, for example, the 
government uses the argument that vendors associations are simply mafias to 
undermine their organization. Yet, he claims that “Street vendor 
organizations are important social and political actors and not mafias (as they 
are perceived by the Mexico City authorities) who perhaps need to be seen as 
part of the solution and not as part of the problem” (Peña 2000, 60). I agree 
with this statement insofar as that the organizations created by the rickshaw 
drivers allow for more concerted state action, as there now is a structure in 
place which makes it possible and easier to approach and work with, rather 
than dozens of individuals who are not organized as a group. 
The existence of organizations based on the threat of violence to outsiders is 
arguably a form of authoritarian, undemocratic and oppressive social control 
outside the law. Thus, I argue that the social order that comes from social 
organizations does not always enable well-being, but instead can create 
monopolies, exclusion and oppression outside the law.  
Private Companies: Organizational Control or Organized Exploitation 
The study of ice cream vendors illustrates the role of private companies as an 
important actor in the regulation of some street vendors. While on paper the 
companies have nothing to do with the vendors, in practice they coordinate 
and decide upon the main rules governing their work. In this case, a third 
party, the franchise agent, exerts control. 
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The social control exercised by private companies to distribute their products 
through street vendors is more sophisticated and formalized than the control 
exercised by the rickshaw associations. Through middlemen or franchise 
agents, the big companies can control thousands of vendors all over the 
country and avoid any formal labor relationship that would require them to 
pay social security for the vendors.  
According to the ice cream vendors I met, they work for the main company 
and must follow the rules the companies have established. The companies 
define where the vendors work, write their schedules, set the prices they are 
allowed to charge and prohibit them from selling products from other 
companies. Most of the time, control is exercised through the middleman (the 
agent). The standard sanction exercised by the main company for a vendor 
that violates any of the norms is a warning, and the most severe punishment 
is to be excluded as a vendor. Control also comes from other ice cream 
vendors who sell products from other rival companies. Since the interest of 
the main companies and the agencies is to sell as much as possible, they 
employ as many ice cream vendors as possible. Often, on the same corner I 
would find a vendor from each of the four largest ice cream companies in 
Colombia. Due to this situation, the ice cream vendors feel that competition 
and low profits are among the main problems that affect their well-being. 
The Variety of Police Controls  
In many cities around the world, street vendors and rickshaw drivers 
experience police harassment at work, they frequently have to pay bribes and 
have to find ways to resist control in order to make a living (Austin 1993; 
Crossa 2009). The street vendors and rickshaw drivers I met repeatedly 
talked about working in uncertain conditions and waking up in the morning 
without knowing if the police would let them work. They also talked about 
going to work without having a spot where they could feel safe. Although 
changing the legal status of street vendors and ending confiscations is not a 
magic bullet to enable well-being, my research shows that the current laws 
hinder people’s ability to work without fear. The few vendors that are 
formalized mention working without fear as one the main improvements 
following formalization. For formalized vendors, this legal status provides a 
sense of self-worth. Unlike Sen, who refuses to provide a list of capabilities, 
Nussbaum argues for a list of basic capabilities that are necessary in order to 
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live a dignified life. Of the points on this list, living without fear is 
considered one of the most basic human capabilities (Nussbaum 2001). 
Similarly, Shah and Mandava (2005, 36) propose a “livelihood freedom” test 
of law. In order to determine whether the laws should be kept or reformed, 
governments should apply a test to determine the law’s impact on people’s 
freedom to earn an honest living. I maintain that despite opposing views on 
street businesses from left and right ideologies (Bromley 2000), recognizing 
and legalizing the work of individual street vendors (not companies) is 
important to avoid worsening their already vulnerable situation. This could 
be a first step towards a work environment in which people can improve their 
well-being.  
Formalization and the Legal Empowerment of the Poor  
An important argument in favor of the formalization of street vendors is that 
when their businesses operate under legal protection, they can achieve 
economic improvements. One of the most influential scholars in the 
formalization debate is the Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto, who 
claims that facilitating the formalization of small entrepreneurs would 
support the growth of their businesses (1989). He explains that by allowing 
small businesses to formalize, they can use their businesses as collateral to 
get access to credit and investment (De Soto 1989). His work has been 
influential in promoting the rule of law and the formalization of businesses 
run by the poor, including the policy recommendations of the United Nations 
Commission of Legal Empowerment of the Poor (Banik 2011). 
However, there are many studies that question whether or not formalization 
does in fact enable economic improvements. Some authors argue that 
formalization increases the costs of running a street business due to rental 
fees and taxes (Donovan 2008; Slocum, Backman, and Robinson 2011). 
Moreover, formalization is often seen as a way to remove street vendors from 
public spaces (Hunt 2009; Adaawen and Jorgensen 2012). 
Most of the formalized vendors I talked to during my research felt that they 
were better off following the formalization of their businesses. They had 
gained confidence, self-respect and autonomy. The legal status of their 
business had allowed them to work in less uncertainty and fear. Moreover, 
the tents, provided by the government, had established boundaries that 
control the space they are allowed to use, but also provide shelter and 
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security from other vendors that might otherwise take their spot. Contrary to 
De Soto’s claims about economic improvements following formalization, 
most of the street vendors in the transitional zones had not been able to 
expand their businesses, as he suggested. However, they mentioned other 
social improvements. Formalization in the transitional zones continues to be 
limited to a maximum of three years, and therefore it is only a temporary 
solution. When the zones were originally located at a distance from the 
vendors’ customers, formalization attempts had failed, and the vendors had 
abandoned the zones. Therefore, further studies should explore the details of 
how formalization is best accomplished, and consider the street vendors’ 
needs. 
Finally, even though formalization can improve the well-being of some 
groups, it creates a division between insiders and outsiders and can hinder 
newcomers from attaining the same well-being. In this regard, formalization 
programs do not account for the fact that street vending operates as a safety 
net for people who need to earn a survival income. By controlling non-
formalized vendors, the state limits one of the main roles of street vending, 
which is the provision of a survival income at any time. Often, the most 
vulnerable groups (newly arrived immigrants, internally displaced people, 
women, the newly unemployed) lack the time and knowledge to formalize or 
simply are not targeted in formalization programs. To a large extent, 
formalization benefits only a few while it ignores the majority of the vendors. 
The Problem of Exclusion of Newcomers: Los 
nuevos 
A relevant finding of my study is that social control often develops to 
exclude newcomers. Even formalization programs by the government in 
Bogotá are directed toward the more established vendors and do not account 
for the fact that new individuals arrive on the streets every day trying to make 
a living. In my study, I found that both formal control by the state, as well as 
less formal control by social organizations are based on the exclusion of 
newcomers. During my fieldwork, I met internally displaced persons, a recent 
widow, a young woman expecting a child, and people that could not find 
work. More established vendors and even the police often referred to them as 
los nuevos, i.e., the “newcomers” or “pirates.” They experienced control in a 
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different way. Newcomers have more difficulties to organize, to voice their 
needs and to claim their rights. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has 
defended the rights of more established vendors more emphatically, while the 
newcomers’ right to work and to earn a survival income has simultaneously 
been neglected by this court.  
The well-being of a group may be enhanced at the cost of the exclusion of 
others who will not be able to enter the group. Newcomers often experience 
violence or are required to pay a large fee to access good spots in the streets. 
It is often those who lack contacts and networks who face greater restrictions 
to improving their well-being as a result of these different forms of social 
control. Some newcomers can resist exclusion by, for instance, pulling out a 
knife. But those who lack the means to resist working in fear are forced to 
leave. Most research on street vendors focuses on more established or 
formalized vendors and their organizations (Donovan 2008; Roever 2005a; 
Crossa 2009). In this set of literature, social capital and the vendor 
associations are seen as essential to their well-being.  
In contrast, few studies have looked at the problems of exclusion that 
outsiders face. Portes and Landolt’s study is an important contribution that 
illustrates how social networks and associations can have negative 
consequences for outsiders and become a kind of negative social capital 
(Portes and Landolt 2000). In this regard, my research adds to the study 
conducted by Steel (2012) in Cusco, Perú, on the greater vulnerability of 
people who lack networks in the streets. Thus, newcomers are more exposed 
to exclusion based on social control practices.  
Final Remarks 
Many people worldwide work as street vendors to earn a living. They work 
outside the law, live in fear of police evictions and confiscations, lack a 
secure work place, do not have social security protection, and are frequently 
trapped in low-income economic activities that require long working hours. 
In the case of Bogotá, an estimated 100,000 people work outside the law as 
street vendors. In this context, my study asks the question, how does 
formalization of street vendors in Bogotá enable and/or hinder their well-
being? 
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To answer this question, I took my point of departure in how street vendors 
themselves describe their own well-being. The data I collected illustrates that 
well-being is more than economic survival, and often, street vendors strive to 
gain the independence and flexibility to work and take care of their children. 
Still, due to various circumstances, including operating outside the law, they 
work in fear and constant uncertainty. How street vendors describe their own 
well-being provides a thorough photograph of their reality, which in turn is 
only a piece of the puzzle in the debate on the formalization of street vendors. 
Moreover, based in the study of well-being and social control, the problems 
faced by newcomers, those who may need to sell in the streets in the future to 
make a living, became apparent. Because street vending is a safety net in 
many places around the world, depending on how formalization is applied, it 
can remove one of the main safety nets available to many vulnerable groups 
in society.  
The conclusions of my study illustrate that although formalization is often 
defined as a concept, the question is not whether or not to formalize street 
vendors, but how and under what circumstances. I have shown how complex 
and multiple forms of social control are already present and influence their 
work. Without a deep understanding of how social control already operates, 
the state runs the risk of developing formalization initiatives that undermine 
the well-being of the most vulnerable groups, such as newcomers and those 
who lack experience and networks in the streets. There is also a risk involved 
in formalizing associations or businesses that exploit and use the threat of 
violence to control their street vendors. Therefore, an important point of 
departure must be to identify the forms of, and the multiple actors involved 
in, social control, prior to exploring whether formalization can enable their 
well-being. 
The study of street vendors’ everyday experiences of social control provides 
deep knowledge of how law affects their lives. International organizations, 
such as the United Nations (in the millennium development goals), the 
International Labor Organization (in the Decent Work Agenda), and the 
World Bank (in the “Doing Business” project) need to account for the various 
ways in which informal workers, such as street vendors, operate outside the 
law. Before promoting formalization reforms through international, as well as 
local policies, contextual knowledge is needed about the complex ways in 
which different forms of social control are already in place and influence the 
work of street vendors and other groups of informal workers in today’s 
world. 
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Appendix A List of Main Characters 
# Date Pseudonym Gender Occupation Location 
1 24/01/2014 Santiago M Middle-man Agency 
Borough of 
Suba 
2 17/08/2012 Andres M Leader Street Vendors Bosa Libertad 
3 22/01/2014 Alexandra F Government Official– IPES City Center 
4 20/01/14 Carlos M 
Government Official 
DADEP 
City Center 
5 22/01/2014 Fredy M Street Vendor City Center 
6 
10-
14/08/2012 
Lina F Government Official– IPES City Center 
7 17/07/2012 Leader M Leader Street Vendors Kennedy 
8 41677 Eduardo M 
Government Official 
Ministry of Transportation 
Phone Interview 
9 
27-
28/06/2013 
Diego M Street Vendor Portal Americas 
10 2013, June  Elsa F Street Vendor Portal Americas 
11 23/01/2014 Garcia M Police Officer Portal Americas 
12 24/06/2013 Gregorio M Rickshaw  Portal Americas 
13 41434 Guillermo M Rickshaw Portal Americas 
14 41614 Ignacio M Rickshaw Portal Americas 
15 27/06/2013 Jaime M Rickshaw Portal Americas 
16 21/06/2013 Jose M Rickshaw Portal Americas 
17 
10-
11/06/2013 
Julian M Rickshaw Portal Americas 
18 7-8/06/2013 Luis M Rickshaw Portal Americas 
19 41445 
Maria 
Angelica 
F Rickshaw Portal Americas 
20 41821 Maria F Street Vendor Portal Americas 
21 
11-15-
17/06/2013 
Marta F Street Vendor Portal Americas 
22 
24-
25/06/2013 
Miguel M Rickshaw Portal Americas 
23 22/06/2012 Yeison M Rickshaw Portal Americas 
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24 21/06/2013 
Anonymous 
Driver  
M Rickshaw Potreritos 
25 18/12/2013 Gabo M Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall 
26 41944 Gaby F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall 
27 15/01/2014 Nancy F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall 
28 16/12/2013 Perla F Street Vendor  Santa Fe Mall 
29 41944 Pilar F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall 
30 17/12/2013 Raul M Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall 
31 41821 Soledad F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall 
32 19/12/2013 Yanira F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall 
33 41190 
Women 
selling 
chorizo 
F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall 
34 13/07/2012 Carla F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall  
35 13/07/2012 Consuelo F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall  
36 41098 Felix M Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall  
37 
10-
11/07/2012 
Marisol F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall  
38 25/01/2014 Adriana F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall  
39 20/08/2012 Edwin M Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall  
40 17/12/2013 Rosa F Street Vendor Santa Fe Mall  
41 14/01/2014 Clara F Street Vendor Santa Librada 
42 41883 Jorge M Leader Street Vendors Santa Librada 
43 15/01/2014 Julio M Street Vendor Santa Librada 
44 41190 Luz Maria F Street Vendor Santa Librada 
45 16/12/2013 Pedro M Street Vendor Santa Librada 
46 
20/08/2012, 
15/08/2012 
Cali M Street Vendor Santa Librada 
47 
7/18/2012, 
13/01/2014 
Ernesto M Leader Street Vendors Santa Librada 
48 14/01/2014 Mariela F Street Vendor Santa Librada 
49 41974 Nico M Street Vendor Santa Librada 
50 13/08/2012 Alba F Street Vendor Tunjuelito 
51 8/8/12 Chucho M Street Vendor 
Zona de 
Transicion in 
Kennedy 
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Appendix B Questionnaire for the Transitional 
Zones 
 
  
Socio-Economic Characteristics  
Sex:  
Age: 
Level of School Education: a) No formal education, b) incomplete primary, c) completed primary, d) 
completed ninth grade, e) completed high school, f) technical degree, g) university education. 
How do you estimate to be your montly income? Lower than minimum wage, around minimum wage, higher 
than minimum wage. 
Working Conditions   
How many hours a day do you work?  
How long have you worked as a street vendor? 
Do you have health insurance? No, Yes; 
If yes: Is this subsidized state insurance, contribution-based insurance, Beneficiary from another person’s 
family insurance, other?  
Do you currently contribute to the pension system? Yes, No, I have contributed before 
Vendors’ Perceptions of Formalization  
How long have you worked in the transitional zone?  
Have the police confiscated your goods after you moved to the transitional zones? Yes No 
Did you experience police confiscations before moving to the transitional zones?Yes No 
In general, do you think your personal situation has improved, remained the same, or worsened after moving 
to the transitional zones? 
Has your income increased, remained the same, or worsened after moving to the transitional zones? 
Were you registered at the Institute for the Social Economy (IPES) before entering the transitional zones? 
Yes, No 
Civic and Political Participation   
Are you a member of a street vendors association? Yes No 
Were you a member before you moved to the transitional zone? Ye No 
Did you vote in the last election for city mayor? Yes No 
In your opinion, the street vendors outside the transitional zones: a) are illegal, b) have the right to work in 
the streets, but far away from the zones, c) everyone has the right to work in the streets.  
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Appendix C Results of Questionnaire for the 
Transitional Zones 
SOCIO ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS N= 169 
Sex # of interviewees (%) 
Male 76 (45%) 
Female 93 (55%) 
Age Distribution of Interviewees 
Min 33 years 
Max 69 years 
Median 43 years 
Average 47 years 
Education levels of interviewees 
Education level # of interviewees (%) 
No formal education 6 (4%) 
Less than 4 years of education (incomplete primary) 22 (13%) 
Completed primary school 61 (36%) 
Completed ninth grade 19 (11%) 
Completed highschool (11 years) 44 (26%) 
Technical 10 (6%) 
University 7 (4%) 
Income of street vendors 
Possible answers # of interviewees (%) 
Less than a minimal wage 44 (26%) 
About a minimal wage 86 (51%) 
Higher than minimum wage minimal wages 39 (23%) 
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WORKING CONDITIONS 
Number of hours worked a day # of interviewees (%) 
4 3 (2%) 
5 1 (1%) 
6 4 (2%) 
7 9 (5%) 
8 11 (7%) 
9 27 (16%) 
10 25 (15%) 
11 27 (16%) 
12 35 (21%) 
13 9 (5%) 
14 6 (4%) 
15 9 (5%) 
16 3 (2%) 
Total 169 (100%) 
How long have you worked as a street vendor (in years) 
Average Min Max Median 
15 4 35 13 
Do you have health insurance? 
Answer # of interviewees (%) 
Yes 162 (96%) 
No 7 (4%) 
If yes, is this subsidized state insurance or contribution-based insurance? 
Answer # of interviewees (%) 
State subsidized 122 (72%) 
Private insurance (contribution-based) 18 (11%) 
Beneficiary from another person’s family insurance 22 (13%) 
Without insurance 7 (4%) 
Other 0  
Do you currently contribute to the pension system? 
Answer # of interviewees (%) 
Yes 16 (9%) 
No 114 (67%) 
I contributed before 39 (23%) 
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VENDORS’ PERCEPTIONS OF FORMALIZATION 
How long have you worked in the transitional zone? (in years) 
Average Min Max Median 
5 2 7 4 
Have the police confiscated your goods after you moved to the transitional zone? 
Yes 0  
No 169 (100%) 
Did you experience police confiscations before moving to the transitional zone? 
Possible answers # of interviewees (%) 
No 75 (44%) 
Yes 94 (56%) 
In general, do you think your personal situation has improved, remained the same, or worsened after 
moving to the transitional zone? 
Possible answers # of interviewees (%) 
Has improved 138 (82%) 
Remained the same 24 (14%) 
Got worse 7 (4%) 
Has your income increased, remained the same, or worsened after moving to the transitional zone? 
Possible answers # of interviewees (%) 
Has increased 78 (46%) 
Remained the same 55 (33%) 
Got worse 36 (21%) 
Were you registered at the Institute for the Social Economy (IPES) before entering the transitional 
zones? Yes, No 
Possible answers # of interviewees (%) 
Yes 70 (41%) 
Not 99 (59%) 
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CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Are you a member of a street vendors association? 
Possible Answers # of interviewees (%) 
Yes 169 (100%) 
No 0  
Were you a member before you moved to the transitional zone? 
Possible Answers # of interviewees (%) 
Yes 36 (21%) 
No 133 (79%) 
Did you vote in the last election for city mayor? 
Possible Answers # of interviewees (%) 
Yes 136 (80%) 
No 33 (20%) 
In your opinion, the street vendors outside the transitional zones:  
Possible Answers # of interviewees (%) 
a) are illegal 2 (1%) 
b) have the right to work in the streets, but far away from the zones 38 (22%) 
c) everyone has the right to work in the streets. 129 (76%) 
 
